The German philosopher. Hegel, said that the only lesson of history is "that people and governments never have learnt anything from history". This is not altogether true but it can be applied to the attitude of capitalists, of capitalist politicians and of economists to the recurrent crises and depressions of capitalism. In spite of a score or more of depressions in the past 200 years the capitalists (and most workers) believe, when each boom comes, that it will last for ever. As Marx put it, when the market is expanding, each capitalist behaves as if the demand for his products is limitless. For a time this appears to be true: there is a growing demand for raw materials and finished products, and for workers. Profit prospects are good, unemployment falls and wages rise. But, as Marx also said, that situation is "the harbinger of a coming crisis". Suddenly some industries find that they have overproduced for their particular market and start to halt further investment and curb output.
Capitalism does not go on producing if there is no profit in it. At that point (as happened in the autumn of 1973) there will be. side by side, some companies cutting back because of falling orders and other companies still reporting inability to meet their orders because of scarcity of materials and workers. Then they all become more or less involved in the depression as unemployment grows and demand falls generally.
When the inevitable depression takes place, politicians and economic "experts" say that something has gone wrong, and that what they have to do is discover what this something is, why it happened and how to avoid it next time. Dozens of "remedies" have been publicised: put wages up or put them down; raise prices or reduce them; go in for free trade or import restrictions; increase government expenditure or decrease it; stay in the EEC or leave it; induce the banks to lend more freely or the reverse; increase government borrowing or avoid it; increase taxation or reduce it; raise the foreign exchange rate of the pound or lower it; tighten up trade union law or relax it: have more nationalisation or less nationalisation. One thing ignored by all these peddlers of remedies is that they have all been tried before and failed.
Take the Thatcher government, with its “monetarist” policies. They say that all will be well if government expenditure, borrowing and taxation are reduced, inflation got rid of, wages and prices left to market forces, if there is less nationalisation and tighter laws governing trade unions and strikes. But all these supposed cures for depression existed in the last quarter of the 19th century. Government expenditure and taxation, in relation to the National Income, were only about a fifth of what they are now. There was no inflation. Wages and prices were then left to market forces and not only were the unions numerically much weaker but they operated under more stringent trade union law. There was much less nationalisation. For most of the time Tory governments were in office. So what happened? It was the period of the Great Depression, which lasted for over twenty years. In the middle of it, in 1884. the Tory leader.
Lord Randolph Churchill, had this to say:
We are suffering from a depression of trade extending as far back as 1874. ten years of trade depression, and the most hopeful either among our capitalists or among our artisans can discern no signs of a revival.
He listed all the industries that were, in his words, dead or dying — coal, iron, shipbuilding, silk, wool and cotton. He ended: “Turn your eyes where you like, you will find signs of mortal disease".
This country had not at that time experienced capitalism run by Labour governments, whose record was in fact no better than that of the Tories or Liberals. In the fifty years 1929-79 there were four periods of Labour government, in all of which priority was given to reducing unemployment and keeping it low. (Actually they said they could abolish it entirely.) In all these four periods unemployment was higher when they left office than when they went in. The latest period was 1974-79, which saw unemployment rise from 629,000 to just under 1,300,000. The favourite remedy of Foot and Benn to this is to increase government expenditure. In 1973 unemployment was 630,000 and government expenditure £24,000m. The latter has increased every year since 1973. including the years of Thatcher government, and in 1981 was £107,000 million, but unemployment, though still much below the levels of the 1930s. is now over 3 million.
One question on which the Labour Party, the Tory Party and the economists are agreed is that one cause of depression and heavy unemployment is that prices are too high. In a similar situation of depression and heavy unemployment in 1931 a government committee (
Committee on Finance and Industry), took exactly the opposite line. The fourteen top bankers, economists and Tory, Labour and Liberal politicians studied the problems for eighteen months and issued their Report in June 1931. Among the recommendations was a chapter on "The immediate necessity to raise prices above their present level”. Both views are baseless: capitalism has periodic depressions whether prices are high or low, rising or falling.
The belief of the searchers for remedies is based on a misconception. They believe that trade depression and heavy unemployment prove that something has gone wrong. They are mistaken. Nothing whatever has "gone wrong" with capitalism; it is just the way the system operates in accordance with its structure, with alternate expansion and contraction, much like the tides. If, one evening at the seaside, you see the sea almost up to road level, and then in the morning see that it has dropped twenty feet, you don't shout: "Something has gone wrong. What shall we do about it?"
Where the analogy with the tides fails is in respect of regularity and the length of trade depressions. It is not possible to count on all depressions lasting for some specified time. Some are quite short, others very long, like the Great Depression. (Some economists have recalled the "long-wave” speculative theory of Kondratieff. An article on this in the Financial Times on 6 September had the cheerful title:"Why The Recession May Last Till 1996".) All that can be said is that at some stage in the present depression, as in all the earlier ones, expansion will be resumed when capitalists, viewing all the relevant factors (prices, interest rates, wages) decide that it will be profitable to invest again in the development of new industries and the re-expansion of old ones.
The headlines have recently been made by the banking crisis. There is nothing new in this; every trade depression is accompanied by bank failures or banks losing much of their assets. Walter Leaf in
Banking (1926 edition, page 59) says that in the crisis of 1837 "it is believed that every bank in the United States, without exception, suspended payment". And the same happened again in 1875. Writing of the American depression in the 1930s, H. G. Nicholas says that “two-thirds of the banks of the country had closed their doors". (
The American Union, page 252.)
H. M. Hyndman, in his
Commercial Crises of the Nineteenth Century (page 95) wrote of the collapse of the great banking house Overend & Gurney, described as standing next to the Bank of England, and “their name and influence extended to all parts of the civilised globe”. When they stopped payment on 10 May 1866 "the panic occasioned throughout Great Britain was to the full as furious and unreasoning for the time . . . as the panic of 1857”. Hyndman says that the Foreign Secretary "was impelled to send a circular to all our Ambassadors abroad, in order to assure foreigners that the bottom had not fallen out of our island". Banks make most of their profit by borrowing money from depositors at a low rate of interest and lending or investing at a higher return. According to the
Financial Times (27 September) the London Clearing Banks are now paying on average about 3 per cent to depositors and lending at over 12 per cent. Out of this margin they have to meet the costs of 234,000 staff and of maintaining some 11,000 branches. Banks can get into difficulties either by their depositors wanting to withdraw all their deposits, or by lending money to companies or governments which go bankrupt or default on the loan.
If depositors lose confidence in the bank and try to get their money out the bank is in trouble because they have only very small amounts of cash in their tills or on deposit at the Bank of England, and it may not be possible for them to turn other assets into cash at short notice without big losses. The Evening Standard (8 September) reported that the sudden decision of the Mexican government to nationalise all banks, suspend payment for five days and make the dollar an illegal currency was because there was a run on the banks; they "literally ran out of dollars". The Western bankers are all in trouble through having lent vast sums of money to companies and governments which, because of the depression, are unable to keep their repayment agreements or, in some cases, even to pay the interest. Mexico’s interest payments have been running at £580 million a month.
One aspect has been the fall of oil prices and oil consumption which have reduced the foreign investments of the oil producing countries (OPEC). At the same time Third World countries find their exports falling so that they are unable both to pay for necessary imports and meet commitments on their huge debts. One of the worst-hit countries is Mexico. On the strength of hoped-for big and increasing revenue from oil exports, loans were raised from world banks totalling £67,000 million, of which £15,700 million was due to be repaid this year. Because of the depression and falling oil revenues Mexico was unable to pay. In effect it was on the verge of defaulting. but that is the last thing the bankers want. So the Mexican authorities were able to induce the bankers, through the International Monetary Fund, to lend still more, an amount of £2,640 million, and with the agreement of the bankers to defer repayment of the debt in the hope that sometime or other Mexico will be better able to pay. However, IMF loans are granted only on the condition that the borrowing government agrees to restrict its expenditure and take whatever other measures the IMF will approve'. One action forced on the Mexican government is to impose a wage freeze until the end of the year.
Poland and many other countries are in the same plight as Mexico. While arrangements such as the IMF loan to Mexico save the banks from having to show big losses in their balance sheets, as they would if Mexico defaulted, they cannot avoid the loss they suffer through deferment of repayment of the loans. The Polish Government, which is in negotiation with Western banks over its huge debts is reported (Financial Times, 25 September) to have warned them that "there is no point in talking of repaying our debt over the next seven or eight years".
While the depression, like all the earlier ones, has seen thousands of companies go bankrupt in America. Britain and other countries, if appears that the governments will, this time, try to prevent widespread failures of big banks. And a small step has been taken in Britain to protect depositors against losses through bank failures. The banks, with Bank of England approval, have arranged to set up funds to ensure that depositors up to £10,000 will receive 75 per cent of their deposits in the event of the smaller banks closing down. The Midland Bank is reported (Sunday Times, 19 September) to be asking the government to guarantee any further loans to ailing companies to prevent them closing down, since this was done with government encouragement.
It should of course be remembered that whatever governments may, or may not do, the banks cannot escape running up huge bad debts in a depression, at the expense of bank shareholders. If banks fail, depositors lose. Any government financial aid must come out of taxation — a choice of evils as far as the banks are concerned. The Daily Mail (7 September) quotes an American banker as saying: “We’ll never sec most of these loans again. The best we can plan is to lose them gradually and gracefully”.
What of the future? In this depression, as in all the others, voices are heard prophesying the coming end of capitalism — a "final collapse". This overlooks the fact that all the parties of capitalism, including the Labour Party, far from seeking the end of capitalism, are busy devising policies to keep the system going. Until the world working class decide to end capitalism this present chaos will continue — the present depression will end followed by another crisis and depression, and another and another.
Edgar Hardcastle
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