Oil and War. (1940)

From the April 1940 issue of the Socialist Standard

Since man found a motive force, other than the energy of his own body, for operating machinery, fuel for power production has had to be an important consideration. With the development of the internal combustion engine and its application to road, sea and air transport, petroleum has assumed a position of outstanding importance among the products of the world.

The machinery and instruments for producing petroleum, like all other means of production in a capitalist world, are privately owned. Likewise, the tankers, pipe lines and other things necessary for the transport and distribution of the oil, together with the laboratories and machinery for its distillation and refinement—all this is privately owned and operated with a view to the production of profit. The profits that have been derived from the exploitation of the oil workers have been, and still are, stupendous.

The various oil companies of the world have struggled desperately with one another for control of the oilfields and for markets for the disposal of their produce. Capitalist governments, recognising the vital necessity of ensuring adequate supplies of oil, especially in war-time, have placed state resources at the disposal of their respective national companies. Governments invariably give official backing to their national companies in their struggles for concession lands and their endeavours to oust rivals and competitors. The strained relations that have existed between different capitalist governments during the last thirty years have frequently been the direct result of the conflict between their respective oil groups. More than once troops have gone into action to settle disputes over oil lands.

There is the possibility that one of the campaigns of the present war will be fought for the control of the world’s most prolific oilfield, the Russian Caucasian field. The British Government is prepared for large-scale military operations in the Near East. Military men and journalists have been emphasising the strategical importance of these Russian Caucasian oilfields for weeks past.

Brigadier-General C. F. Aspinal-Oglander, C.B., C.M.G., in the Evening News, March 5th : —

“In this connection the news of large German troop movements in the direction of the Caucasus assumes considerable significance; and this potential threat may account for the presence of strong allied forces in Syria and Palestine.”

Then “Scrutator” in The Sunday Times, March 10th: —

“The deadliest blow we can deal to Germany is to cut off her supplies of oil for which, if she is to undertake large-scale military operations, she must be dependent on Russia. Nor are the chances of success in such an operation by any means hopeless. Turkey would give us access to the Black Sea from which we might defend the Roumanian wells against German appropriation, or, if the war is extended, attack the Russian wells at the eastern end. Even if there were difficulties about the use of the Black Sea we have a way of access from Syria and Mosul.”

The Evening Standard, on March 15th, reports what are claimed to be plans for “an immediate counter-attack on Russia’s rich Caucasian oilfields” in the event of a Russian attack on Roumania. The report adds : —

“Then General Weygand’s Near-East army, soon expected to be 1,000,000 strong, was expected to attack across the Turkish-Russian frontier with the Turkish army of nearly 2,000,000 men.

Supported by battleships of the tri-Power fleet, one army would move on the port of Batum, only ten miles from the Turkish frontier.

Another starting from Kars, in Turkey, would move on Alexandropol, in the Soviet Republic of Armenia, the observers said. A third would strike across the frontier near the junction of the Turkish-Iranian-Russian frontiers toward the city of Eriwan.

The extreme Eastern army, after capturing Eriwan, would wheel north-east to Baku and the shores of the Caspian Sea.

The western army, after seizing Batum, would advance up the coast, under the protection of battleship guns, to the Caucasus mountains. A further coastal push towards the oilfields of Maikop, in the province of Adyghai, might be ordered.”

So many young workers from Empire countries who are now in the Army may find themselves transported to the East to endure the inconveniences of a military campaign there. If so, they will march and fight in the company of those same Turks who, a few years ago, they were taught to regard as infidels, slaughterers of Armenian Christians, perpetrators of the vilest atrocities.

The British Government’s statement, “We seek no material advantage for ourselves,” will be worth remembering whilst watching the events in this part of the world. The claim that the Caucasian oil wells must be seized for strategical purposes has a vaguely familiar sound. The expedition under Major-General Dunsterville, which occupied Baku during the last war, set out from Persia to prevent a supposed German march on India. When, on the signing of the armistice, and after an intervening German-Turk occupation, the General Thompson expedition entered the district, the British set about making themselves at home. They took over the banks, the post and telegraph offices, and assumed the function of policing the country. Louis Fischer, in his “Oil Imperialism,” quotes an article by Arthur Moore in the London Times of July 10th, 1922, dealing with the reasons for the subsequent withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus: —

“. . . . we announced we had come to keep the Bolshevists away. But as soon as the Bolshevist menace began to materialise, it was we who faded away. Why, then, did we go there at all ? Islam knows the answer. We went to try to get hold of the Baku oil-fields, but we were not prepared to fight for them.”

When the Russians re-occupied the district in 1920 (the British garrison withdrew from Batum on July 7th, 1920) the Bolshevik Government proceeded to nationalise the oil industry.

The British statesmen at the peace conference in Paris wished to have Batum set up as a free state under the League of Nations, but failed in their effort. Whilst the states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijhan were anti-Bolshevik there was hope for the foreign oil concerns. These states were officially recognised by the British Government and White Russian generals received support to commence operations from Georgia against the Bolshevik Government.

Opposition to the Russian nationalisation of the oil industry was the keynote at the Geneva and Hague conferences. Whilst the statesmen met and wrangled in one part of the towns, the oil magnates met in another part and fought over the Russian oilfields. Davenport and Cooke, in their “The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relationships,” suggest that “this was the Hague Conference which really mattered.” The Russian Government would not relinquish its control of its oilfields but it was prepared to grant some generous concessions. The conferences came to a standstill mainly because the different oil companies wanted monopoly concessions and none would give in to the others.

After the conferences a general blockade and boycott of Russian oil was agreed upon. But the rival oil companies were so anxious to get a foothold in the Caucasus that they were soon double-crossing one another and defeating their own boycott efforts. The boycott forced the Russian Government to set up its own distributing agencies and Russian Oil Products (R.O.P.) came into existence. A price war ensued. The Royal Dutch-Shell Group, under Sir Henri Deterding, took up the war in earnest.

After a period of price-cutting both the Russian Government and the Royal Dutch Company were financially embarrassed. The Russians hoped to barter oil-land concessions for recognition by other governments and loans from foreign finance houses. A London bank had arranged a loan for Russia. The day following the bank’s decision the offices of the Anglo-Russian Trading Co. in London were raided by the police on the plea of seeking espionage documents. The raid was wrapped in mystery. The Home Office denied having given instructions, but the British Government found it necessary to break off negotiations with the Russian Government and to forbid the loan.

Of late years the struggle for Russian oil has been carried on mainly between the Royal Dutch-Shell and the American Standard oil companies. Each has bought Russian oil in large quantities, striving for monopolies, and then carried the struggle to India, where they have competed for the market for the disposal of the spoils.

In the preparations for the present war the British Government’s manoeuvres in South-east Europe have been carried on also with an eye to safeguarding its own oil supplies : the recent Anglo-Turkish arrangement is an example. Mr. S. W. Alexander, City Editor of the Daily Express, pointed out in that paper on October 24th, 1939, that—

“Turkey’s decision to come in with Britain and France leaves the sea route open for the transport of oil.”

The recent attempts to placate the Arabs by limiting the purchase of land by Jews indicates an attempt to win them to a support of a British Near-East campaign.

The Allied Powers distributed the Mesopotamian oil lands amongst themselves during the last war and fell to quarrelling about the division after the armistice.

Now oil is once more playing a great part in the rivalries of the Powers. It should serve to remind us that wars are not fought for “moral” reasons but are caused by the conflict of material interests inherent in the capitalist system of society.

W. Waters