While the Roman republic was carrying all before it the power of cavalry began to show itself, and in the latter part of the Empire it dominated the military situation as the supreme offensive weapon.
The hills and marshes of Italy were not an ideal training ground for cavalry. Like gunpowder, the new offensive weapon came from the East, originating among the Magyars and the Gauls, who developed their horsemanship on the plains of Hungary and the steppes of Russia. When these barbarians first overflowed the Roman frontiers they presented Rome with a military problem that was only solved ultimately by making these barbarians citizens of Rome and the basis of its army. But the solution was obtained slowly and occupied centuries in accomplishing.
It is an extraordinary instance of the cupidity, solidity and power of the Roman commercial class that, in spite of numerous disastrous defeats sustained by Roman arms, the wealth and influence of Rome extended and digested victors and vanquished indifferently into its predatory pursuit of riches. For the grandeur of old Rome was based upon the capacity of its privileged patrician and commercial class of merchants and financiers to contrive that all roads carrying wealth, sweated from slave and freedman, led back to Rome.
In the early years of the Roman republic, while its power was extending over Italy, the heavily armoured Roman soldier, fighting in the phalanx formation borrowed from the Greeks, was irresistible. When, however, Roman conquest spread beyond the borders of Italy the Romans came in contact with foes whose offensive equipment showed up certain weaknesses in the closely-packed phalanx.
The first shock received by the Roman military organisation was delivered by the Carthagenians.
While Rome had been conquering Italy, another State, Carthage, had risen to power in North Africa. The Carthagenian was a maritime power drawing wealth to itself through sea traffic. It was by far the wealthiest State in the Mediterranean area, and Rome and Carthage eventually came to blows because of the growing influence of Carthage and the fear this inspired in Rome that Carthage would obtain control of the narrow strait between Sicily and Italy and dominate the Mediterranean. It was a struggle between two nations whose privileged classes both drew their wealth from usury, commerce and exploitation. But whereas (in those days) the Romans fought Rome’s battles, the Carthagenians never fought theirs, relying upon the huge numbers of mercenary troops their enormous wealth enabled them to purchase.
In passing it is worth noting that there was one important difference between mercenary and native troops that the Carthagenian wars brought home so forcibly to the Roman Government that steps were taken in the course of the war to remedy it. The Roman levies were compulsory and had a tendency to melt away as the soldier-farmer learnt how his land was ruined or his farm legally and illegally taken from him by financiers while he was away on foreign service. The mercenary, however, remained as long as his pay was good, though in defeat he sometimes turned upon his paymasters. As will be shown later on the Romans got out of this difficulty by the revolutionary change of organising a volunteer army.
The first series of battles was fought on the sea the Romans being successful. They introduced a revolution into sea warfare. The old method of fighting was to ram and sink the opponent’s ship—hence the iron beak below the waterline. But the Romans were poor sailors, and to make up for this deficiency, and to take advantage of the fighting skill of their soldiers, they introduced the method of grapple and board. To effect this a narrow movable gangway with a sharp spike at the end was attached to the ship in such a way that one end could be raised into the air and dropped upon the deck of the enemy ship. The sharp spike pierced the deck and the Roman soldiers rushed down the gangway to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. Against the Carthagenians, who were expert sailors but poor soldiers, it proved very successful.
The Romans then carried the war into Sicily and Africa. Four years were spent gathering and equipping an expeditionary force to attack the city of Carthage itself, and eventually an army of twenty thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry was landed on the coast of Africa. The small size of the cavalry force shows what little reliance was placed upon cavalry by Roman tacticians.
This army was met by a mercenary Carthagenian army which had been carefully trained by Xanthippus, a Spartan in the service of Carthage. When the two armies met the numerous Carthagenian cavalry, which was stationed on the wings of the phalanx, swamped and drove from the field the small force of Roman horse, and then turned inwards on the Roman centre enveloping and almost completely annihilating it. Only two thousand escaped.
The weakness of the phalanx formation was that, if crowded in upon itself by a force striking from different sides and the rear while the front ranks were still engaged, the soldiers became too closely packed to raise their arms and use their long pikes. It was cavalry that showed up this weakness, and the battle in North Africa was the first important victory of cavalry over infantry. The Greek and Roman phalanx had always depended upon moving forward rapidly and keeping formation until they got af the enemy, but cavalry was too mobile to be reached in that way. However, the hills and marshlands of Italy were not good breeding grounds for cavalry on a large scale, and a compromise formation was later developed by the Romans to meet the new form of offensive.
After the struggle between Rome and Carthage had lasted for twenty-two years, the Romans gained a naval victory that for a time set a limit to the encroachment of Carthage. The latter suffered a further setback by the revolt of its mercenary army which was being treacherously hamstrung by its faithless paymaster. The terrible story of the ferocious crushing of this revolt is told by Flaubert in his novel, “Salambo.”
The next important phase in the struggle between Rome and Carthage for supremacy was the period of Hannibal’s march in B.C. 217 from Spain over the Pyrenees and Alps into Italy, and his conquering progress towards Rome. Again cavalry was the ruling factor in Roman defeats. Hannibal’s force, though inferior in size to the Roman armies, was immensely superior in cavalry, and Hannibal planned every battle to make the best use of this force.
Ultimately another crushing blow was delivered to the old infantry formation by cavalry when the heavy Gallic cavalry of Hannibal dealt its sledgehammer blow at the battle of Cannoe. The Roman infantry were again forced into a helpless heap and massacred by a much smaller body of horsemen. The experience of North Africa had been repeated and was to occur on a larger scale once again before the Romans recognised that the day of the heavily-armed infantry was passing and a more mobile offensive weapon had to be forged.
Hannibal’s final withdrawal from Italy was not due to defeat on the battlefield, but to blockade, guerilla and fortress warfare, and the jealousy and suspicions of the ruling groups in Carthage who eventually recalled him.
The next period of interest in this discussion is the time when the German tribes were threatening to overflow Roman frontiers. At first the Roman armies suffered overwhelming defeats. Then an army, raised and trained under a new system devised by the Roman general, Marius, was successful, and the invaders were driven off.
The new military organisation developed under Marius to meet the cavalry menace was a carefully trained volunteer paid force, with its infantry ranks spaced out in three sections grouped as a cohort (six centuries totalling 600 men). Ten of these cohorts formed a legion. The weapons of the legionary were a javelin for throwing and a short sword for close quarters, and his armour a helmet and cuirass. Thus the old armoured citizen-soldier of the phalanx with his pike was abolished and a professional army established in his place. The new legionaries were capable of building fortifications and roads and were the foundation of the system which carried Roman arms successfully all over the known world and built roads and fortifications that still remain famous. It has been asserted that the new army fought as much with the mattock and spade as with the sword. It met all the calls upon it successfully until it came up against the Magyar horse archers and finally the heavily-armed Gothic cavalry in the later days of the Empire.
The disaster that eventually rendered the Roman legionary obsolete was suffered at the battle of Adrianople where the Emperor Valens was defeated by the Goths in A.D. 378. It was the most crushing defeat since the battle of Cannoe and was brought about in a similar way. While the infantry ranks on both sides were engaged the Gothic cavalry, which had been foraging at a distance, received news that the fight was in progress, and, galloping on to the field, rode the legionaries down and forced them into a tightly-packed, helpless mass. Only a few thousand were able to escape.
This Gothic cavalry was a formidable force. With body and limbs clad in mail, and armed with a heavy lance, they were irresistible. There was also added to their equipment a heavy battle-axe which could be thrown or wielded and would penetrate Roman armour and split the Roman shield.
After Adrianople the Roman Emperor, Theodosius, commenced to enlist in his service every Teutonic chief whom he could bribe to enter his service. These war bands obeyed their immediate commanders alone. Thus order in the Roman world eventually depended upon the purchased loyalty of these Teutonic chiefs.
Henceforth for a thousand years heavy cavalry was the ruling power in war.
The limited nature of the subject under discussion prevents us from examining the internal constitution of the Roman Empire which had its share of responsibility for the poor show put up against the German hordes and also for the attempt to digest them into the Empire.
The armoured knights of mediaeval times and their part in the building up of Feudalism will be discussed in the next contribution—that is, providing bombs do not interfere with the production of it !
Gilmac.
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