The Struggle in South Africa (1976)

From the October 1976 issue of the Socialist Standard

In a little over a month at least 250 African men, women and children have been butchered by South Africa's armed police. In the first day alone, 25 — mainly children — were slaughtered in Soweto. At the end of a week it was 176 killed, 1,139 injured and 1,298 arrested.

The rioting and demonstrations have continued in many other African townships and even the Coloured and White universities. The immediate cause of the big Soweto demonstration of school-children and parents was the Government’s insistence on Afrikaans being used as the language of instruction. In the reserves, however, schools are free to choose English instead. There is little doubt that Africans regard Afrikaans as “the symbol of our oppression.’’ It is the language of the police, of the pass laws, of the job reservation rules, of all that they detest. It is the boss’s language, not theirs.

The Nationalists would prefer to have no blacks at all. But they recognize that industry, mining etc. would collapse without black labour. So they built townships outside the big cities, outsize council estates with minimal amenities. In Soweto “fewer than 20% of their tiny, boxlike houses have electricity, no more than 5% have hot running water.” (Time, 28th June 1976.)

Government policy decrees that all Africans belong to the tribal reserves and should settle there. In a 1947 pamphlet on Apartheid, the Nationalists declared: “the Bantu in the urban areas should be regarded as migratory citizens not entitled to political or social rights equal to those of the Whites” (quoted in Apartheid, ed. Alex La Guma, 1972) In 1969 a Nationalist MP justified the townships on the grounds that the urban Africans ”are only supplying a commodity, the commodity of labour . . . it is labour we are importing and not labourers as individuals . . . numbers make no difference”.

In Guilty Land, P. van Rensburg sums up the policy: “at the moment the Blacks are still necessary for the urban labour force . . . but they must not be allowed to gain the impression that they a permanent part of the town and city population. When they are moved to residentially segregated areas, they can have no freehold rights ... for otherwise the Government fears they would regard themselves as something more than temporary sojourners.”

The urban Africans have no security of tenure. If they lose their jobs or get in any kind of trouble they can be "endorsed out” or jailed. A Pretoria survey showed that only 15 per cent of the township’s residents were “born and bred” there. The African worker is merely a migrant. The government denies him either the vote or the right to strike or belong to a registered trade union. He is thus nearly helpless in the hands of the capitalists. One such migrant was John Mvalo: “John was conceived during one of his father’s visits home from the mines . . .  Of his working life from the age of 16 to 47 (31 years) 36% of his time was spent at home and 64% in employment away. He had had 34 different jobs and the average length of a job had been 47 weeks.” (Geographical Review, Jan. 1968.)

Workers' Wages

The pay of Johannesburg Africans is only one-fifth of that earned by Whites in the same area, according to Time. A survey in 1957, after the bus boycott, indicated that for the bare essentials a family of five needed £27.10s. per month but the average income of such a family was only £18 per month. Ten years later a Johannesburg survey revealed that more than two-thirds of African families had incomes below R53 per month — the absolute minimum.

The next year the minimum figure rose to R59.70: “the effective minimum level of income is generally estimated at one and a half times the poverty datum line figure, which would mean that a family at Soweto should have at least R95.63 a month.” (Hilda Bernstein, in Apartheid.)

In 1969 a survey gave these figures for all urban African households:

Monthly incomes between   R1 and R19   25%

   ” ” ” R20 and R49   40%

   ” ” ” R50 and R79   20%

                                over      R80                   15%

In other words, 85 per cent of urban African families were living below “the effective minimum level of income” and about half were trying to survive on incomes below even the poverty datum line! A survey of African schoolchildren, by the South African Institute of Race Relations, found that 60-70 per cent. were “recognizably malnourished”, 50 per cent. “needed nursing and medical attention” and almost 10 per cent. “required hospitalization for diseases directly or indirectly attributable to malnutrition”.

But if the urban African is badly off, note how much worse off he could be. If he worked on a farm he could earn an average of £50 per annum or, possibly, nothing at all: “the African works for a fixed number of days in a year, between 90 and 180 days, in return for the right to live on the farm, to graze cattle, and to cultivate the land.” (M.B. Yengwa, in Apartheid.) In 1972 there were about 2 million African workers on White farms.

Out of Town

The urban African worker’s insecurity is increased by the fear of being sent back to the Bantustans or tribal reserves. These comprise a mere 13 per cent. of South Africa’s land and only the Transkei has any coastline or is sizeable. Its only port, however, is zoned for Whites. “The land is impoverished and overcrowded with people and livestock; practically no economic development has taken place, and the primitive subsistence agriculture cannot at present support even the small proportion of resident Bantu; there are almost no mineral resources and no industry; and the population has acquired neither skills nor capital.” (Geographical Review, Jan. 1968.)

The Government refuses to allow White capital investment inside these areas. Instead the Government have insisted on the development of Border Industries just outside. The Border Industries, in spite of the cheap labour force, are unable to compete effectively against the heavy concentration of industry and capital in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area, which in 1969 housed 17 per cent. of the population and produced about 55 per cent. of S.A.’s industrial products. “The Reserves remain an economy without manpower. The men live in two worlds . . . More than 2 million people spend their lives circulating between industrial centres in White areas and in the subsistence life of the Reserves.” (Geographical Review.)

The same writer is anxious to point out how harmful this is: “only about half of the annual potential manpower resource of the Reserves is economically applied in White areas”. Moreover, according to a 1960 writer in the South African Journal of Economics, “a total annual potential of 1.140 000 man-years is available in the Bantu areas, of which 600,000 are not economically applied”. Now that’s what really hurts the bourgeois boffins: all that “cheap, docile” labour-power and it’s not being exploited. Just think of the loss of surplus-value involved!

In 1954 the Tomlinson Commission recommended that industry in the reserves should be financed by White capital investment. But the Government cut its own investment fund by two-thirds, refused to allow White capital investment and insisted on agriculture being based mainly on the tribal system.

Tomlinson proposed that 50 per cent. of the population of the reserves should be removed to enable the rest merely to get a living of 168 dollars per annum. Others suggested “a minimum subsistence figure three, for our even five times the Commission’s figure” (Geographical Review).

M. B. Yengwa describes life in the reserves in Apartheid: “Here grinding poverty and the resulting malnutrition, disease and squalor have become a way of life. This is the land of women, children and old and sick people. The healthy and active are the only exports “the Reserves have in the form of cheap ‘Bantu’ labour which they sell to the mining, agricultural and secondary industries in the White areas. In the Reserves — all Reserves — famine and starvation are the usual seasonal visitations.”

African Education

The government’s view of African education is clear. "The school must equip him (the Bantu pupil) to meet the demands which the economic life of South Africa will impose on him . . . There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour.” (Dr. Verwoerd, 1953.) Also: "Who will do the manual work if you give the Natives an academic education? . . . We should so conduct our schools that the Native who attends these schools knows that to a great extent he must be the labourer in the country” (Mr. le Roux, Nationalist MP).

To ensure that Africans don’t get too much education, the Government instituted a system of “academic ceilings.” The result is a phenomenal dropout rate. In 1968, of the 78 per cent. of African children in school, only 4 per cent. were getting secondary education. Other factors which prevent Africans from getting adequate schooling are lack of money, inadequate classrooms, gross overcrowding and double sessions in most schools (even triple sessions in some). Africans are forced to pay one-fifth or more of teachers’ salaries themselves, to raise half the cost of school building (from higher primary up) and to pay for school maintenance.

In 1969, the Johannesburg Star reported that the cost of education in Soweto schools had risen 50 per cent. The teacher-pupil ratio went from 1:42 in 1949 to 1:72 in 1969: “ill-fed families throughout South Africa cut down on the skim milk powder and mealie meal and contribute cents saved to pay thousands of extra teachers privately, thus improving the teacher-pupil ratio to the still appalling 1:58.5” (The Failure of Bantu Education, 1970).

In farming areas the policy is to have only primaries and these can only be established if the farmer wishes. The schools can be useful to the farmer. In 1969 the Minister of Bantu Education told the Senate: “we have made it compulsory that where the farmer wants these facilities, part of the school instruction . . . must be training in the normal activities on the farm . . . any farmer who has a farm school on his farm and who wishes to make use of the school children under the supervision of the teacher to assist with certain farm activities, this can be arranged . . .” The success of the Government’s policy has resulted in there being “no registered non-White veterinarians, architects, civil, electrical or mechanical engineers” (UNESCO). Dr. Birley visited the 4 secondary schools of the African township of Johannesburg: "I have recently surveyed their laboratories and equipment carefully. The schools have . . . between them 13 Bunsen burners, six balances and three microscopes.” Literacy among Africans dropped from 80 per cent. in ’59 to only 40-50 per cent. in ’63 (Government figures). In addition, the Government bans “unregistered” teaching, including night schools, and reduced its grant for night schools from R46.000 (’58-9) to zero (’65). The wonder is that any Africans learn to read at all!

Effects on the Economy

Some of these facts go to explain just why the world capitalist class condemns Apartheid. Here are some typical criticisms:

“The very idea of separateness is a renunciation of market forces . . . it denies the non-Whites the right to advance industrially in existing fields where their skills can be fully used productively to the benefit of the community as a whole; it inhibits the development of consumer purchasing power and therefore it discourages new investment” (Fridjohn, quoted in The Geographical Review.)

In this context “productively” means of course “profitably”, the “benefit of the community as a whole” really means “the benefit of the employing class and the greater exploitation of the wage-slave class”.

The low wages which are preserved by job reservation, the pass system, denial of the right to strike or to organize in trade unions, lack of any political power, and concentration in the starvation areas of the reserves, these low wages which are so helpful to the farming and mining sections of the capitalist class in S.A. spell “wastage” to the manufacturers. (In S.A., industry has only got ofF the ground recently: in 1972 it still accounted for only 28 per cent. of the Gross National Product.) By the year 2000, it is estimated there will be more than 20 million Africans in S.A. Are they never to be allowed colour TV, washing machines, hi-fi, DIY gadgets, cars, holidays abroad and so on? After all, it’s a poor sort of a home market which specialises in mealie meal and skim-milk. Not much profit in them.

The “liberal” Patrick van Rensburg deplores apartheid because it means extra costs for “the taxpayer” (those poor capitalists!): all those dual bus services, separate park benches, loos, exits and entrances, the enormous bureaucracy needed to administer the Population Register, and the pass laws, not to mention boss’s army of police, spies and paid informers. Also he points out that “if the burden and worry of undernourishment were removed at once, Africans would immediately produce more”. Which shows us whose interests he really has at heart! Greater productivity means greater profit-making for bosses, greater exploitation for workers. Another point he makes is that job reservation, preventing the Africans from competing for skilled jobs, cushions inefficient Whites.

Quo Vadis

As Socialists we do not concern ourselves with the plight of the capitalists, and their dispute with South Africa’s White farmers. The pass laws exist to protect the farmers from the effect of higher wages in the urban areas. In South Africa political power is held by the representatives of the farming and business community, and working-class Whites support them. The Government’s policy has been successful in dividing the workers of S.A. on grounds not only of race but also of language — English or Afrikaans speaking.

It is a fallacy to suppose that the ending of Apartheid would mean the ending of slums, hunger, unemployment, and insecurity. Nowhere can you find a country which has eliminated these miserable features of the profit-producing system. The Africans of South Africa will remain second-class citizens as long as they are part of the international wage-slave class. Their poverty is a result of their class position in society, only made worse by the fact that they as a group have been selected for the low-paid jobs in the economy and that they are denied the right to organize for better living and working conditions, either politically or through trade-union action.

The Socialist attitude has nothing in common with the Pan Africanist Congress which operates on racially divisive lines, or the African National Congress, one of whose goals is “equal pay for equal work”. Both are reformist organizations. Neither is based on class-consciousness, and an awareness that the African worker is a part of the international working class, just as the South African boss class is a part of the international brotherhood of bosses. The workers of S.A. have a long way to go in discovering that their real enemy is our class-divided social system, and that unity on the basis of the common interests of all workers everywhere, “without distinction of race or sex”, is the real key to their liberation from misery and exploitation.

Charmian Skelton

Apartheid the background (1985)

From the October 1985 issue of the Socialist Standard

The following article first appeared as a chapter in our pamphlet The Problem of Racism: A Socialist Analysis that we published in 1966. We republish it today not only because it outlines the historical background to the situation in South Africa but also because recent events there bear out our analysis that apartheid, far from being in the interests of the South African capitalist class, was an attempt to go against the logic of the capitalist system and so doomed to collapse sooner or later.

A number of changes — all in the same direction — have occurred since the article was written: the virtual disappearance of the industrial colour bar, the legalisation and recognition of African trade unions, the emergence of the Progressive Federal Party as the main white opposition party in place of the United Party, the admission of Coloureds and Indians to some, albeit a paltry, say in national political matters, the abolition of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. All these changes represent victories for the logic of capitalism — "the market is colour blind", or better "exploitation is colour blind" — over the system of apartheid. And now sections of the South African capitalist class are calling for negotiations with African nationalists to bring about political reform.

The present population of the Republic of South Africa are descendants of people who came from many parts of Africa. Europe and Asia. The latest census figures, those of 1960. show that out of a population of 16 million some 11 million (68 per cent) are Bantu or Africans. 3 million (19 per cent) Whites. 1 l/z million (10 per cent) Coloureds and nearly half a million (3 per cent) Asians, mainly Indians. The principal race problem arises over the relations between Whites and non-Whites, especially the Africans, though this is not the only race problem as the African anti-Indian riots in Durban in 1949 show.

White people first came to South Africa in 1652 when the Dutch East India Company established a post at the Cape. Settlers, mainly Dutch, came not long after. Within a few years slavery was also introduced. The original Hottentot people were not actually enslaved but were reduced to a servile status by various laws which forced them to work for the Whites. The slaves in South Africa came from many places: West and East Africa. Madagascar. India. Ceylon, Malaya. In the early days there was much intermarrying between Whites and Hottentots and slaves and eventually emerged the group now known as the Cape Coloureds. In the 150 years after the original settlement a pattern emerged: the whites were the masters and people of colour the servants. This colour division marked off groups that were almost castes, and the habit of thought became deeply rooted and still survives. In this period there was a self- sufficient pastoral economy with sheep and cattle farming, which required wide ranges of land and led to expansion inland. But as the White farmers or Boers moved inland they met Bantu tribes coming in from the north for much the same reasons. There were clashes, the first major one being that of 1779.

A further complication was introduced in 1806 when the British government finally acquired control of the area from the Dutch. The new governors tried to introduce an efficient governmental machine by streamlining taxation, the law courts, land registration. etc. They also interfered with the traditional master-servant relationship. In 1828 the Coloureds were given the same legal status as Whites and, in 1834, the slaves were freed. In 1820 the first immigrants from Britain arrived. As a result of these measures many Boers, together with their servants, moved inland in the Great Trek and away from British rule setting up the two Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. As the Boers advanced they came increasingly into conflict with the Bantu tribes, and generally, but not always, the Boers triumphed. In doing so they did not drive the Bantu back before them; these Africans were reduced to being landless squatters and labourers on European held land. Denied access to the land the Africans became entirely dependent on their Boer masters. In 1877 the British government intervened, annexing the Transvaal and setting up Native Reserves. After a revolt four years later the Boers achieved independence under British sovereignty. The Orange Free State was now also independent, the territory having been first annexed by the British in 1848 and abandoned six years later.

The Indians were introduced into South Africa in the 1860s as indentured labourers on the sugar plantations of Natal. When their contracts expired many stayed on while others came of their own accord.

In 1867 occurred the discovery of diamonds which was to transform the South African economy. It was not long before diamond mining fell into the hands of big capitalists like Cecil Rhodes. The independent diggers were reduced to wage-workers; skilled workers were introduced from Europe and America, while the unskilled work was done by Africans. When gold was discovered in the Transvaal 17 years later the same pattern emerged: whites got the skilled high-wage jobs and blacks the unskilled low-wage jobs. This was not purely a matter of discrimination as the whites were the more skilled but eventually the pattern became fixed. The caste division of the farm was introduced into industry.

The coming of capitalism to South Africa had a serious effect on the self-sufficient pastoral communities of the Boers. In the Transvaal under President Kruger they did all they could to prevent capitalism breaking up their way of life. In the end it came to war in 1899. This war, which lasted for three years, was a classic imperialist war with gold as the prize for British imperialism. Although the Boer Republics were incorporated on equal terms into the Union of South Africa in 1909, anti-British, anti-imperialist Afrikaner Nationalism survived.

The advent of capitalism not only had its effect on the Africans, turning many into urban wage-workers, but had a similar effect on the Boers. Many became landless themselves, reduced like the Africans to being squatters on European-held land. After the first world war many drifted to the towns creating a poor white’ problem. Unlike the workers who had been imported into the diamond and gold mines these Whites were unskilled and unused to industrial discipline; left to compete with Africans on equal terms they would have been reduced to the level of destitution of the Africans. The government adopted various measures to deal with this problem. One of these measures was the extension of the industrial Colour Bar. Some skilled and semi-skilled jobs were legally barred to Africans. Jobs were reserved for Whites in the State-run railways and public services.

Striking by Africans had been a criminal offence since 1911. The pass laws, the beginnings of residential segregation and other restrictions date from this period. In 1936 the African voters on the Cape Province electoral roll were removed to a separate roll. The various inter-war governments were, in effect, trying to protect white society’ from the effects of capitalism. In other words, the pre-industrial farm ideology of the Whites as masters and Blacks as servants was surviving and reacting on capitalism. At the time most of the capitalist class were prepared to go along with this policy as segregation and the colour bar were not pursued in a systematic fashion but were a series of patchwork measures not ruling out change in the future. Some did protest. They protested at State interference in the market. They pointed out how wasteful and unprofitable it was to deny Africans access to skilled jobs. They protested at having to pay wages on a colour basis rather than on the quality of the labour-power.

The capitalists and their economists took the same orthodox liberal line as does W.H. Hutt in his "The Economics of the Colour Bar’’, published in 1964. In a chapter entitled "The Market is Colour-Blind”. Hutt puts the capitalist case against colour and other forms of prejudice quite plainly.- "When we buy a product in the free market, we do not ask: What was the colour of the person who made it? Nor do we ask about the sex, race, nationality, religion or political opinions of the producer. All we are interested in is whether it is good value for money" (page 173).

The present Afrikaner Nationalist government was first elected in May 1948 with a race policy of preserving the domination of the white people come what may. The somewhat haphazard segregationist policies of previous governments was succeeded by a policy of ruthless apartheid, social and political. While previous governments had preferred mainly to rely on custom to separate the races’, the Nationalists believed in using the law and the full power of the State machine. In implementing their policies the Nationalist government, amid protests from the conservative opposition United Party, has shown scant regard for the traditional parliamentary procedure or for academic freedom or for established civil liberties. The so-called Communist Party was banned in 1950.

The names of the Acts passed since 1948 show the pattern of apartheid: Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act. In 1956 the Coloureds were removed from the Cape Province electoral roll as the Africans had been 20 years previously. Other acts provided for a separate, inferior education for Africans, encouraged tribalism and restored the powers of the chiefs in the reserves. The Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 provided for the establishment of so-called Bantustans. The first of these has been in the Transkei where elections took place in 1963.

The Nationalists have enforced their policy with a logic that is sometimes cruel and sometimes ridiculous, as in the reported case of the bleaching of two Chinese women before moving them to a White hospital ward — or perhaps not so ridiculous as when Japanese are classified as White so as not to embarrass visiting Japanese businessmen. Today the non-Whites live apart from the Whites; are provided with separate entrances, park benches, buses, railway compartments, schools, beaches, etc. The African is given an education which does not allow him to compete on equal terms with Whites in the labour market; he is forbidden to strike; his trade unions are not recognised; he has to carry a degrading pass and is always subject to the petty arrogance of the police. By and large the non-White, and especially the African, is inferior socially, economically and politically. This policy has not been enforced without resistance.

In 1952 a large-scale civil disobedience campaign ended in violent rioting — in 1956 began the notorious Treason Trials. In 1960 at an anti-pass laws demonstration at Sharpeville police opened fire on an unarmed crowd killing and wounding many. The provisions of the Suppression of Communism Acts have been freely applied against all advocates of racial equality. Other Acts, such as the Sabotage Act. have made great inroads into traditional civil liberties.

In South Africa a government deriving its inspiration and programme from the racial attitudes of a pre-industrial society is trying to force a policy of racial separation on an economy which is becoming increasingly dependent on non-European labour. Today it is no longer only a primary producer of diamonds and gold; it has also developed other secondary industries. In both mining and other industries the bulk of the workers are non-White, and these make up the majority of the population of most of the large cities. A permanent non-White urban factory proletariat has been created.

The tendency of capitalism everywhere is to reduce all previous social divisions to the one great division between owners and non-owners of the means of production and distribution. In South Africa it is working against the traditional white/non-white caste division. The Nationalist government is trying to prevent this effect of capitalism working itself out. The capitalist class itself appears to be perturbed at the restrictions that apartheid places on its profit-making activities; it wants to pay wages according to skills not skin colour; it wants to train Africans as skilled workers to meet the acute and ever-growing shortage of skilled labour in South Africa (indeed there is evidence that non-whites are already illegally doing jobs reserved for whites).

This appears to be happening also on the State-run railways and in the public services. The Times (23 November 1964), under the headlines 'Manpower shortage causes breach in apartheid: job reservation by colour unworkable', reported that as a result of shortages "and apparently with the tacit approval of the Cabinet — non-White labour is beginning to infiltrate into these public services. The railway colour bar has already been breached in Durban where non-Whites (mainly Indian) are being employed in semi-skilled work. They are to do rivet-heating and coach-washing, jobs formerly reserved for white staff'. Others "are already employed on shunting operations without either official approval or protest".

In 1959 a number of leading capitalists broke with the opposition United Party because of its ineffectual opposition to apartheid and formed their own Progressive Party with the slogan merit not colour'. Unfortunately for them the White, mainly Afrikaans, working class is solidly behind the Nationalists. Should the Progressives or the more radical Liberals triumph then the main effect would be to simplify the class situation in South Africa. Pre-industrial caste attitudes would be pushed aside and the working class (of all colours and races) would stand opposed to the capitalist class (of all colours and races). In this respect a class of wealthy Indians has long been in existence; wealthy Africans are also beginning to appear. Thus the ground would be cleared for the final struggle between these two classes.

The present policy is a bid to preserve the values and attitudes of the old agricultural order. Afrikaner Nationalism tried once before to hold back capitalism when gold was discovered in the Transvaal; they failed that time — and. soon or later — they will fail this time too. By trying to divide the Africans through tribalism, by building up vast internal security forces and by repressive legislation the Nationalists may ward off the inevitable for a time. But sooner or later apartheid will go; the question is when and how. Although the Progressives and Liberals still hope for a peaceful solution, many of the African Nationalists have come to accept that violence is the only way. In any event capitalism must triumph in South Africa, peacefully or violently.

Blogger's Note:

As mentioned previously on the blog, sadly, the text of this pamphlet is not on the SPGB website. I'm not sure what happened. 

The struggle in South Africa (1986)

From the November 1986 issue of the Socialist Standard

South Africa is the fourth most populous country in Africa, after Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia, but it is by far the richest in terms of wealth produced and capital accumulated. Although representing only four per cent of the land area of the African continent and only seven per cent of its population, it has been estimated that South Africa has 30 per cent of its income, 43 per cent of its mining production, 87 per cent of coal production, 75 per cent of steel production, 57 per cent of electricity production, 56 per cent of rail traffic, and 50 per cent of its motor vehicles and telephones. South Africa, then, is by far the most developed capitalist country in Africa. Its economy is based on the export of minerals (gold, platinum, chromium, diamonds) whose earnings have permitted the development of sizeable manufacturing and service sectors.

The special feature about South Africa is of course what for want of a better term will have to be referred to as the "racial" breakdown of its population. Of its 26 million people, some 18 million (70 per cent) are of African origin, a little under five million (18-19 per cent) of European descent, the remaining three million or so being made up of about three-quarters of a million Indians and of people of mixed European. Asian and African descent.

Everyone in South Africa is by law classified into one of four “groups": European, Bantu, Coloured and Asian. The first group is also officially described as "Whites" and the others (as on park benches) as "Non-Whites". These, it must be emphasised, are the official legal classifications. They are not biologically-defined, but politically-defined groups, even though an individual's biological features and ancestry are used in this political definition. These classifications are absurd even on their own terms. For instance, some "Non-Whites" are whiter than some "Whites", while some "Europeans" are just as much of mixed origin as are those classified as "Coloureds": however their ancestors were able to pass as Whites sufficiently long ago to escape the race classifiers’ investigations. Further, Bantu (like Aryan) is a linguistic not a biological classification and, besides, is completely rejected as contemptuous by those so classified

Needless to say, "Non-White" too is also rejected as being the equivalent of "non-existent". Some political activists and groups in South Africa use the term "Black" as a substitute for — indeed as a reply to — "Non-White", thus including the Africans, the Coloureds and the Indians in a single group facing the Whites. Others, however, use "Black" to mean just the Africans. This can obviously lead to confusion, especially as in British usage the terms "Coloured" and "Black” are synonyms.

This whole discussion of so-called racial classifications shows that, in the end, no term is completely neutral, all are more or less political as the term used indicates the group or groups of human beings that the user thinks should unite (or be separated). In this game, then, the only terms that are acceptable to socialists are such terms as human race, citizens of the world, world working class and workers of the world.

Your racial classification in South Africa is important as it determines where you can live (and where you can’t) and. until very recently, who you could marry and who you could have sexual relations with (and with whom you couldn't). It also determines whether you are a first, a second or a third class citizen. For in South Africa there are, legally and not just factually, three classes of citizenship.

The first class is composed of those who have full political rights, the same for instance as those nearly everybody has in Britain and in particular the right to elect the members of the national law-making body. Such full political rights are enjoyed only by the Whites — by only one in six — less than 20 per cent — of the population.

The second class, constituted as recently as 1984, is made up of the Coloureds and the Indians who were allowed that year to elect their own members of the national parliament who have a limited (very limited in fact) role in the law-making process. This limited role was recognised by the overwhelming majority of Coloureds and Indians who boycotted the elections — there was a turnout of only about 20 per cent — seeing participation as an acceptance of their second-class status.

The third class is composed of the African majority — representing 70 per cent of the population — who are without any political rights whatsoever at national level. Some do have a vote at local level, while others (some four million) can, on paper, vote for the parliaments of the so-called Bantustans like the Transkei. In fact these latter are not regarded as being South African citizens at all, let alone third-class ones.

Apartheid — which is merely the Africaans for segregation — originally had a much more ambitious project than maintaining White political supremacy by denying the other groups full citizenship rights. As laid down by the National Party which has held power in South Africa without interruption since 1948, it wanted to prevent the Africans from becoming permanently established in the "White" towns and to allow them to be there only temporarily as migrant labourers (and. of course, domestic servants). But what apartheid, as embodied in rigid laws which the National Party government enacted after coming to power in 1948 sought to keep apart, the development of capitalism brought together. Over the years a permanent African urban working class, employed at all levels in manufacturing and service industries and not just in mining, has come into being. In fact since 1975 the majority of urban dwellers have been Africans.

The National Party governments have had to recognise this and to make concession after concession to the economic facts: Africans have been permitted to form trade unions and have taken strike action, the notorious pass laws are soon to be abolished, while other reforms have granted urban Africans property and even municipal voting rights in the towns. Only two of the original pillars of apartheid now remain — the Group Areas Acts laying down residential segregation (and reserving 85 per cent of the land area for the Whites) and the discriminatory political structure — but this latter too is now beginning to totter.

South Africa's present political structure where your say in the political decision-making process depends on your racial classification and which completely excludes 70 per cent of the population is so anachronistic that it is universally — and rightly — condemned, especially since political power is now being brutally used to impose the government’s authority on the unwilling majority. Even the capitalists and Thatcher condemn it. There is no reason to challenge their sincerity here since the South African system is anachronistic even from a capitalist point of view. Historically capitalism has sought to reduce all relations and differences between people to one: economic, to whether you are rich or poor, employer or employee, capitalist or worker. It didn't demolish feudal relations based on birth and legally-defined estates to see such distinctions re-introduced as racially-based citizenship classes.

Basically, capitalism wants a political structure which protects and enforces the property rights of the owning class and which ensures political stability within which the extraction of surplus value from the working class can proceed undisturbed by extraneous. non-economic considerations. Although both theory and practice have shown that political democracy is the ideal capitalist political form, this is not something that the ruling class anywhere has ever spontaneously applied nor, when faced with the choice between political stability and political democracy, will a capitalist class automatically prefer the latter. Historical experience (Nazi Germany. Fascist Italy, Franco Spain. Greece under the Colonels for example) shows that they will sacrifice political democracy and embrace dictatorship, at least for a temporary period, if this is the price of securing a stable political regime.

So political democracy has generally had to be forced on capitalism by popular pressure, in particular from the working class. Workers were right to press for political democracy since this provides the best framework both for the propagation and spread of socialist ideas and for the peaceful establishment of socialism. Since political democracy does not exist in South Africa, workers, besides becoming socialists, need to struggle for its establishment there too.

Over 50 per cent of the population of South Africa now live in the towns and, as indicated, since 1975 over 50 per cent of this urban population — which is overwhelmingly working class — wage and salary earners — has been African, a percentage which is growing all the time. This African and Coloured urban wage and salary working class majority, representing an even greater percentage of factory workers, could bring enormous political pressure to bear on the government to move towards granting them the same political rights now enjoyed exclusively by White workers. In fact the South African capitalist class has already got the message and has also been putting pressure on the Botha government to move in this direction.

Of course it is not going to be easy. People are going to be thrown into jail. People are going to be beaten up. And people are going to be killed by the "security" forces. Indeed, all these things are happening at this very moment. Sooner or later, however, the South African government is going to have to retreat as it did over economic apartheid and to move more and more towards political democracy. But the struggle should not stop there. Political democracy is not an end in itself — it leaves working class exploitation intact and working class problems unresolved — but merely as a means to the end of socialism. This more important struggle will still need to go on.

Adam Buick

The South African snake pit (1963)

From the June 1963 issue of the Socialist Standard

Repression and bloodshed are no strangers to Africa.. Even so, what is happening now in South Africa will make a black page in the history of that unhappy continent.

South Africa lives now under a cloud of fear, in resigned acceptance of the fact that widespread violence is inevitable in the near future. Both the Government and the Africans are ready. Both have done their share of violence. The record of the government is well enough known; now an African terrorist movement has emerged, and has already carried out its first “execution.”

Behind the political dispute there is the mass of everyday crime, the gang warfare, the murders (2,610 of them in 1961—twenty times many as in Britain, which has a population three times that of South Africa) and the intimidation. This is South Africa. It is a scene savage enough to belong to a distant, primitive society.

Yet in many ways the Republic is a modern country, with strongly developing industries and considerable natural wealth. It has mines which have turned out over £16 million worth of gold in one month. It has uranium—a by-product of the gold mines. It has silver, manganese, asbestos and diamonds.

Over the ten years 1952 to 1962, South Africa more than doubled the value of her exports, from £376.2 million to £778 million—in impressive increase, even after we have allowed for currency inflation. Vital production, such as steel, has bounded upwards.

With her economic power, and with a ruling class which is possibly the most sophisticated in Africa, South Africa could become the workshop of its continent. But the policy of its government is firmly denying the Republic its chance of becoming an advanced, developed capitalist nation.

This policy is apartheid—euphemistically translated as “separate development’’—which the South African government has followed single-mindedly since the Nationalists came to power in 1948. Because apartheid is essentially a repressive policy, it needs widespread coercive laws to enforce it.

The Pass Laws, for example, forbid an African to stay outside his allotted area for more than a certain time. The Laws are designed to keep the Africans out of the towns, and confine them to the rural areas. There are frequent round ups of Africans in the towns, to ensure that the Pass Laws are not flouted. One thousand Africans a day are being arrested in this way.

South Africa has established Bantustans, or areas reserved exclusively for coloured people. Nobody goes voluntarily to a Bantustan—100,000 native families have already been forcibly moved into them and the government plan to move a total of five million families in the same way. This has meant that one-third of the Africans now have no legal right to live anywhere.

It means that eventually South Africa will be split into two nations, with the white one having 87 per cent. of the land.

The Pass Laws are not the only repressive legislation at work in South Africa. The Africans—the vast majority of the population—have no legal right to strike, nor even to negotiate through trade unions. And in case opposition to the government threatens to become too vocal, there are Acts like the recently passed Security Bill, which allows the indefinite detention of an opponent of the government and which can, of course, be used against a European as easily as against an African.

As the screw has been tightened upon the African, his desire to hit back has been intensified. The Luthuli tactic of passive resistance seems likely to be forgotten, as the violence from one side inevitably provokes further violence from the other. The immediate outlook for South Africa is not happy. 

Why does the South African government stand out against what seems the inevitable progress of its country into the ranks of the world’s capitalist powers? In South Africa there are eleven million Africans as against three million Europeans. If the country’s industry is to develop it needs a stable, contented working class to draw upon for its labour requirements. The bulk of this working class must come from the Africans.

But a stable working class is one which has the sort of political and legal rights which workers in this and other capitalist countries have. If the Africans had these rights, there would almost certainly be no compromise with the Europeans. The country would become, like Ghana, Nigeria, and so on, politically African.

To the industrialists of South Africa, this is not so fearsome a prospect. They are confident that they could do a deal with an African government and in any case they know that their future expansion depends upon the freeing of the native labour force.

It is a different matter for the landowners. Their future hangs upon them preventing the Africans asserting their numerical superiority. So they have done their best to prevent the Africans developing into a perceptible working class. They have tried to keep them out of the towns. And now, as they split the country in two, they are in fact trying to stop South Africa entering the twentieth century.

South Africa's industrialists—her capitalists—aspire to become the continent’s dominant economic power. The policy of apartheid stands in their way, while the smaller, newer states do their best to catch up and take the lead. Unless the industrialists can match their economic power with political power, their ambitions will become an empty dream.

They have a hard struggle ahead. At the moment, as the country slips ever deeper into the pit of violence, of crime and xenophobia, it seems that the landowners may win.

And there is a massive irony in this situation, which should be remembered by everyone who, for one reason or another, takes up the stand against apartheid. The very people who are administering the policy—the dour, ruthless men who are obstinately turning South Africa into a mad dictatorship—are the heirs of the men who were once the darlings of the “progressives.”

When, at the turn of the century, British capitalism was reaching out for the new-found mineral wealth of South Africa, the Boer farmers were the world’s favourite underdogs. Many people thought that they were gallant defenders of liberty against a powerful bully. What was called the “morality” of what was called “ England's last imperialist war ” was a hot political issue.

Well, the Boers made their point. Out of the early struggle of their nationalism has grown the dictatorship which oppresses South Africa today. There is nothing surprising in this. Most struggling nationalist movements pose as the champions of freedom; when they come to power, freedom is often one of the first things to be thrown out of the window.

True as this is of the Boers, it is equally so of the Africans who are now suffering under apartheid. There is no reason to assume that if they ever get power in South Africa they will be any better than some of the other African governments, who have allowed only as much political freedom as their particular brand of capitalism needs. There is no reason to assume, in fact, that the African nationalists would be any better than Verwoerd himself.

This is the irony and the bitterness of nationalism and indeed of property society. South Africa is but one corner of a world which, by its very fundamentals, can only live by denying human priorities.

Ivan.

Class and colour in South Africa (1955)

From the May 1955 issue of the Socialist Standard

Class struggle

The class struggle in a fully-developed capitalist society is a struggle between the ruling class, which owns the means of production, and the working class, which operates the means of production and is exploited by the ruling class. Such a struggle can be observed in full swing in countries like Britain and America. But in societies which are slightly less fully developed, the capitalist class has to fight not only against the working class, but against the previous ruling class—that is the class which derived its power from the ownership of land, and which formed the master class before the progress of large-scale industry threw up another class to challenge it. Nineteenth-century Britain witnessed the strife between the old landed upper class and the rising industrial upper class, culminating in the victory of the latter in the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832 and the Repeal of the Corn Laws 14 years later.

The situation in South Africa at the present time is in some ways not dissimilar to the situation in this country 130 years ago. There is a class which draws its wealth from the ownership of land; and there is a class which draws its wealth from the ownership of industry. There are, in fact, two kinds of society in South Africa: the old agricultural society, and the new industrial society. South African politics reflect the economic and social struggle between the old form of society and the new.

Dutch South Africa

The farming community of South Africa is very largely composed of Afrikaners—descendants of Dutch, Flemish. German Protestant and French Huguenot immigrants. These Afrikaner farmers own the land and employ Negro labourers. The landowners are and always have been determined that the Bantu shall form merely a floating population, with no stake in the land. The Bantu farm-workers have very little money; the white farmer pays the greater part of his labourers’ meagre wages in kind, in the form of huts to sleep and eat in, rough grazing for their few head of cattle, and seed for their garden plots. This form of society has existed, and from the point of view of the ruling and owning class has prospered, almost since the first settlers were put ashore, by the Dutch in the 17th century, to hold the Cape as a valuable halfway house for the ships trading to the East.

British South Africa

The Dutch took possession of the Cape as a landfall on the way to India; and the British stole (or, to use a more polite word, captured) it from them in 1806 for the same reason. As the century wore on, and the Dutch quarrelled with their new masters, the more independent spirits among the settlers trekked north, to Natal, then across the Orange River, and finally across the Vaal River. But British settlers followed them, attracted by the lure of diamonds and of gold. The apostle of this industrial expansion was Cecil Rhodes, at once Prime Minister of the Cape and Managing Director of the British South Africa Company; its centres of operation were Kimberley and the Witwatersrand, and its outlets Cape Town and the ports of Natal. A number of armed clashes between the British and the Boers culminated at the turn of the century in the Boer War, which, at length, the British won, by means of destroying the farmsteads of their enemies and transporting their families into concentration camps, where many of the Boer children died. It may be doubted whether at that time the strength of the new capitalist class was sufficient by itself to overcome the class which drew its strength from the land; but the ultimate issue was put beyond dispute by outside intervention. The farming-landowning class had been cut off from its former fatherlands in Europe; while the Capitalist class could count on the help of imperialist Britain, then the greatest industrial power in the world

This is the background of the South African scene. But the Boer War did not settle the matter. There was, and still is, much vitality left in the Afrikaner farming class. It still carries on its resistance to the industrial capitalist class; but in the long run one of them must go down before the other.

Black South Africa

The hostility between these two classes can be seen clearly in their respective attitudes to that majority of the South African population—the Negroes—who form the bulk of the working-class, alike on the farm owned by the Afrikaner and in the mine or factory owned by the Britisher. Each of them regards this class as subordinate. But while the Afrikaner’s self-interest drives him to adopt a harsh and oppressive policy, the Britisher, also motivated by self-interest, tends ip take a more “liberal” point of view.

To the Afrikaner the Negro has two possible capacities. He is, first and foremost, a rival for the ownership of the land. There were in 1946 over 8,000,000 Negroes in the Union, against 2,300,000 whites, nearly 1,000,000 Cape Coloured (of mixed white and black ancestry) and 200,000 Asiatics (nearly all of them Indians). Most of the Negroes are the descendants of the Zulu-Xhosa peoples, who came into the country from the North while the whites came in from overseas—the whites having exterminated or driven out the original black inhabitants of the area. These white and black invaders naturally found themselves in competition for the possession of the land. It has always been the policy of the Afrikaner landed interest to confine Negro ownership of land to certain fixed “Native” reserves: the Bantu can emerge from these reserves only as landless labourers on the white-owned farms, and must never be allowed to take root in the great areas of South Africa which are kept exclusively for white ownership. This restriction of Negro ownership always applied in the Afrikaner territories of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State; and the granting of Dominion status to South Africa in 1909 by Asquith’s Liberal Government' enabled the Afrikaners (who were the numerical majority of the white population) to impose the same rule throughout South Africa. Since 1913, Negroes have been able to own land only in certain carefully limited areas of the Union. At the present time, more than three-quarters of the total population of South Africa can own land in only one-tenth of its territory. This fragment of South Africa set aside for Negro ownership consists largely of less favoured land in remote districts, such as the Transkei Reserve in eastern Cape Province. At the beginning of this year there was only one important urban area throughout South Africa where Negroes could own land : and that was in a suburb of Johannesburg called Sophiatown.

Anomaly

The Nationalist Government has now put a stop to this anomalous situation. It has built a new settlement of corrugated-iron-roofed one-storey-huts at Meadowlands, eleven miles outside Johannesburg, and has forcibly begun to evict the Africans of Sophiatown from their freeholds and to carry them and their goods to Meadowlands. There the Negroes will be allowed to become tenants of the land; but they will not be allowed to to own it. The Africans have no say in the matter. The Government says they must go, fixes the exact days, and provides transport and police. This operation is being carried out under the Native Resettlement Act, passed by a Parliament elected almost exclusively by the whites. The Nationalists claim that the removal to Meadowlands is aimed solely at improving Native housing; but there are other African locations around Johannesburg where the housing conditions are worse than at Sophiatown; and, what is more, the shacks of Sophiatown are being destroyed and the area reserved for white occupation— this in a city which is short of 50,000 houses for its black population (Daily Telegraph, 10/2/55). The real aim is clearly to destroy the African’s ability to own land in one of the few urban areas where he still had that right.

Apartheid

The Afrikaner, then, sees the Negro as a competitor for the ownership of the land; and is led thereby to support apartheid, the policy of confining each of the ethnic groups in South Africa to its own areas—with the unspoken corollary that the areas reserved for the white minority shall be much larger than the areas reserved for the coloured majority. But to the Afrikaner the Bantu is not only a competitor for the land: he is also a farm-labourer. If apartheid were carried out in full, as is advocated by the extreme wing of the Nationalists, who would do the work? The extremists, those who embrace apartheid in all its pristine purity, say that the Boers must return to the ways of their ancestors, and themselves work their farms with their own hands and those of their families. But the majority of the Afrikaners are no more prepared to give up the surplus value—that is, the profits —which they make out of their African labourers, than they are to abandon their ownership of the land to the Africans. “On the farms you hear sad tales of how difficult it is to keep Africans, even with the help of legislation, from drifting away to make rather more money in urban employment. No one at these managerial levels suggests that his workers—-or he—would be better off if there were a trek back to the Reserves. On the contrary the cry is for more cheap labour.” (The Times. 14/1 /55: succeeding references are also to The Times). The Nationalists, then, are in a dilemma. They have swept triumphantly into power on the cry of apartheid: they captured 86 of the 156 seats in the South African Parliament in 1948, and in 1953 they increased their members to 94. But even their own supporters would not tolerate them if they ever seriously tried to put apartheid into effect.

Big business

The Nationalists must also, when they are considering apartheid measures, reflect upon the opposition they would arouse among the English-speaking element in the Union. Although this element is now split among the United Party, the Federal Party, and the Liberal Party, it remains very powerful; for it contains within its ranks the owners of the country’s industries. The Times correspondent, coming from a country where the Capitalist class and the ruling class are merely two names for one body of people, finds this distinctly odd. “The situation is a somewhat curious one in which a Government and those who have voted it to power play relatively little part in the conduct of big business. . . . It remains true to say that the bulk of the business in the Union, especially at its directorial and managerial levels, is carried on by men of British stock or by other non-Afrikaner immigrants. The Afrikaner now governs: the minority makes the money in the towns.” (14/1/55). Curious or not, it is the fact; and the Capitalist class gains in economic power with every year that passes. “By 1939 South Africa was well advanced along a course from which, so far as can be seen, there is no turning back and which was transforming her from a land of primary producers and gold and diamond miners into a complex society in which secondary industries were looming more and more large. The process was accelerated by the war-time hold-up leading to demand for consumer and capital goods. Major industries were established or extended.” (11/1/55). Industrial expansion means larger towns and more workers in the factories. If we take four of the largest cities in the Union, Johannesburg, Cape Town. Durban, and Port Elizabeth, we find that between 1936 and 1946 the white population rose by 29%; the Cape Coloured population by 34%; the Asiatic population by 38%, and the Negro population by 71%. Recently Mr. Hepple, a South African M.P., speaking in Parliament, said that in 1936 there were only 175.000 Negroes in industry; now there are 500,000—nearly three times as many (9/2/55).

Joshua.

(To be continued)

Class and colour in South Africa - Part 2 (1955)

From the June 1955 issue of the Socialist Standard

Link to Part 1.

Hands off our workers

The South African Capitalist looks on the Negro not as competitive but as complementary. Already many Negroes have been drawn into industry as wage-workers; and those who have not form a valuable reserve on which to draw for future expansion, and to use as a threat in order to keep down wages. To the factory-owner in Cape Town or Durban, to the shareholder in the Rand mines or the Port Elizabeth car-assembly-works, Negro labour is an essential ingredient in his profits. He is, therefore, resolutely opposed to the Nationalists' schemes for apartheid.

The Government, although theoretically committed to apartheid, is thus faced with the fact that its opponents regard it as anathema, and that its own supporters are unenthusiastic about translating the ideal into the practical. Few whites are prepared to attack separate seating in buses or separate queues at the Post Office counter, but serious measures of apartheid have a much more mixed reception. Even the removal of the Sophiatown Natives to a distance of no more than 11 miles outside Johannesburg, with rail transport available to bring the workers into Johannesburg, has roused much hostility in English-speaking circles. British Capitalists sympathised with South African Capitalists over this interference with “their" workers, and British workers were able to enjoy the spectacle of the English Conservative Press apparently defending the rights of the South African proletariat.

Stagnation of Industry 

In all their seven years of power, the Nationalist Government have only produced one serious plan for apartheid. In the western part of Cape Province, the numbers of Negroes have increased since 1921 from 30,000 to 178,000. But in this area of South Africa, there was already a large population of Cape Coloured people. If apartheid was possible anywhere in South Africa, a start might be made on it here—so the Government reasoned —because even if the Bantu were removed, there would still be Cape Coloureds to do the work. Even this scheme, it will be noted, is not full-blown apartheid: for even if all the Negroes were forcibly ejected from western Cape Province, the whites would still rely on the Cape Coloured population; the Government did not dare propose that the Cape Coloureds too should be sacrificed to “apartness." As could have been expected, the plan came under heavy fire from the industrial interests. “The long-term Government plan for the removal of Africans from the western Cape which was announced on Friday by Dr. Eiselen, the Secretary for Native Affairs, has received a hostile reception from the spokesmen of industry, which depends heavily on native labour.  . . . The Cape Times to-day attacks the proposal on the ground that it is impracticable, as commerce, industry, and agriculture, are too dependent on African labour. .. . Natives at present do nearly all the unskilled labour in the western province.  . . . The Cape Times also argues that, if the new policy is seriously implemented, it must be accompanied by a control of industry as drastic as in any totalitarian country to avoid increasing labour needs" (18-1-55). In Parliament a former Minister for Native Affairs strongly attacked the Eiselen plan “as impracticable and likely to depress the living standards of both Coloured and Europeans, through the stagnation of commerce and industry" (21-5-55).

Where can it be done?

What was even more significant was that the proposal, although it was for only partial apartheid in only one part of a single province, and although the long-term nature of its implementation was stressed by Dr. Eiselen, received nothing more than lukewarm support from the Nationalist Party newspaper itself, Die Burger. Die Burger, the Nationalist newspaper, applauds the plan, but does not gloss over the difficulties. “Let us not be under any illusions," it says. “The natives are here because of the economy of the western province as it has evolved, and as it is to-day it needs their labour.” . . . Die Burger sees this matter as an important and perhaps decisive test of apartheid. There are fewer Africans in the western Cape than elsewhere in the European areas, and the western Cape has a large coloured working population. If the plan to reduce the number of Negroes here fails, where in South Africa, Die Burger asks, can it be done, and what then of the policy of progressive territorial separation? " (18-1-55).

The Nationalists receive electoral support not only from the Afrikaner farmers but also from the “poor whites” in the towns. These failures of white society listen eagerly to a party which proclaims that, low as they are, they can still look down on men of a different coloured skin. And those of them who work for wages fear that the Negroes will soon be able to do their jobs for less pay. With these people “apartheid" is a valuable rallying-cry for the Nationalists. But the landed interest is the mainstay of the Nationalist Party, and in the long run determines its policy. In these circumstances it seems probable that thorough-going apartheid will remain a word on the Nationalist banners rather than an item of their practical policy, just as in this country the Conservative Party, while remaining theoretically opposed to all nationalisation, nevertheless makes no effort to restore the coal mines and the railways to their private owners. 

Education

The difference of opinion between the landed class and the industrial interest over apartheid or the lack of it is then, perhaps, more apparent than real. But there are other issues where the two classes are divided by a deep gulf. Whereas the Afrikaner farmer will not hear of African ownership of land outside the Native Reserves, the capitalist has no such objection to it. Indeed, a worker who feels he has a stake in the country by his ownership of his house and garden is often a better worker than the completely propertyless man. He is rooted to one spot, and is less likely to go off to another job, leaving his employer with the trouble of training a successor. He can only buy a house with the help of a mortgage, and a worker who has regular repayments to make is less likely to go on strike than one who hasn't. On this question, then, there is a clear division of opinion.

But the self-interest of the two classes is most clearly in opposition in the sphere of education. In the eyes of the Afrikaner the Negro is and must remain merely a hewer of wood and a drawer of water; he should have the very little education needed to fit him for his task, and no more. For more education would lead him to consider himself as good a man as the Afrikaner, and would tempt him to agitate for a share in the land of South Africa more consonant with his numbers. But the Britisher sees the Negro as a workman at a modern factory bench or conveyor-belt; and modern methods of production need skilled and educated workers. Which view is to prevail? In the long run, there seems little doubt that capitalism's inevitable demand for educated workers will become more vocal and will eventually carry the day; but at present, the Afrikaners seem to be trying to put their theories, in this field at least, into practice. As a start, the Nationalist Government is making a determined effort to get all education into its own hands. Under the Bantu Education Act, the subsidies which previous governments have paid to high schools and industrial schools, are to be cut immediately by a quarter of their former figure, and may ultimately be stopped altogether (8-1-55). The Act is designed to take native education out of the control of the provincial authorities and the English-speaking churches, and put it into that of the State. In the State-run schools, the Bantu will have a “special education"—that is to say, an education which the Afrikaners hope will ensure that they never rise above their present lowly status.

Mr. Strauss, leader of the United Party, indicated recently that his party might be prepared to accept a compromise on the Native question. “The Native as such,” he remarked in a speech at Bloemfontein, “is not even a homogeneous entity. What is right for the primitive tribesman in Pondoland may be wrong for the educated and cultured Native professor. What would be necessary for the Native urban worker in Johannesburg would not be desirable for the labour tenant on the Transvaal platteland ” (13-1-55). This naive “You do what you want with your workers if we can do what we want with ours" offer has so far, it seems, awakened no response among the Nationalists.

Religion

The question of education is bound up with the question of religion. As usual, each of these two contending upper classes has the support of its own churches. The Afrikaners’ church is the Dutch Reformed Church, of which, it will be remembered, the former Prime Minister Malan, Doctor of Theology, was a pastor. The divines of this Church bend their energies to demonstrate, with the aid of Biblical quotation, how the white man is by nature superior to the black, and how he is thus clearly designated, in the eternal order of things laid down by the Almighty, to rule over him. This kind of rubbish is refuted by the Anglican and Catholic Churches, which depend for their existence on the support of the capitalist class; they therefore select other Biblical quotations to "show that the Bantu, with the help of and under the suzerainty of the particular church concerned, can become a reliable and responsible member of society. In mid-twentieth-century South Africa this means, in effect, that he can become a trustworthy wage-slave. The English-speaking churches are supported in this by their brethren overseas: many British clergymen have been able to gain a cheap reputation for liberality by descanting on the evils of the Nationalist administration in South Africa, while closing their eyes to the exploitation of the workers on their own doorsteps.

Colour and Class

The colour problem in South Africa is not distinct and separate from the other problems which arise inevitably out of a society which is based on private property. Under Socialism there will be no landowner, no capitalist, no poor white, no “worker": there will be no fear of competition for land or for jobs, no fear of a rival class, no fear of loss' of dividend, and therefore none of the hatred to which these fears give rise. When South Africans understand and want Socialism, their hatred for persons of a different colour will disappear; for no man, black or white, can continue any longer in his hatred when he understands the real reasons for it. To treat the colour-bar as an issue outside of and beyond the class- struggle, and to believe that it can receive any real solution while the class-divisions in society remain unresolved, is to stultify oneself at the very outset. The answer to South Africa's problems is the same as the answer to the problems of Britain, America, Russia: it is the introduction of a Socialist system of society.

Joshua.

Running Commentary: Too old at 35 (1985)

The Running Commentary column from the June 1985 issue of the Socialist Standard

Too old at 35

Capitalist ideology is underpinned by many lies and delusions. Expressed simply, this is one of them: "If you work hard at passing your exams and at your job, security and prosperity will be yours". Along with this delusion goes the notion that a worker can somehow be elevated by passing exams, into an imaginary "middle-class" status. In fact there is no middle-class; anyone who faces the indignity of having to sell their labour power for a wage or a salary is in the working class, no matter what their educational qualifications. A particularly cruel reminder of this appeared in the Daily Telegraph on 25 March 1985:

Fifty advanced computer scientists and technicians carrying out research for Philips Electronics have lost their jobs because "they are too old at 50". The management of Philips Research Laboratories at Redhill. Surrey, are taking on young graduates to replace them. They [union officials] accused the company of following the example of the Japanese electrical firm Hitachi, which tried last December to get all workers over 35 at its Hirwaun colour TV plant in South Wales to take redundancy.

Hitachi said in a letter to all employees that staff over 35 were slow, prone to sickness, had poor eyesight and were more resistant to change.

The article went on to say that "graduates cost less than older staff' — one more example of the ruthless, cost-cutting nature of capitalism.

How inconvenient to the capitalist class that workers still want to go on living — with the expense of redundancy pay, unemployment benefit and pensions this entails — after their abilities have been consumed and they find themselves discarded.

Price of gold

The South African government has recently offered a sop to reform by committing itself to abolition of the obnoxious laws which prohibit sex and marriage between men and women of different racial origin. This reform is rendered virtually meaningless by other laws on racial segregation which remain, such as the Group Areas Act, which segregates residential and business areas along racial lines. This means that despite the abolition of the "immorality" laws, a man and a woman of different races involved in a sexual relationship will still be unable to set up home together.

Those people who see this legal change as the first step towards liberalisation of South African society must surely have had their hopes dashed by another event in South Africa last month which demonstrated yet again the odious policies of the South African ruling class.

The event was the dismissal of 17,000 black gold miners who were sacked by their employers. Anglo-American Corporation, for causing stoppages and disruption in protest at the sacking of trade union officials. Not only have these workers lost their jobs; they have also been transported back to various "tribal homelands". Under South African law the majority of black gold miners are forced to live as migrants, without their families, in work camps close to the mines.

These gold mines produce the commodity that is the basis of the enormous wealth of the South African ruling class. One of the mines where workers have been sacked — the Vaal Reefs mine in the western Transvaal — is the biggest gold mine in the world and produces 13 per cent of South African gold. In a situation where there are many poor workers, mostly black but increasingly white too. desperate to work, it is only too easy for the capitalist class to replace sacked miners with others who they hope will be less militant.

It is the grossest form of hypocrisy for the South African ruling class to talk of liberalisation in a society in which workers continue to be repressed in this way. No one should be taken in by the cosmetic changes taking place in South Africa at the moment which are intended to appease international opinion and so open up more markets for South African goods. The oppressive structures of both apartheid and capitalism remain intact.

Coup in Sudan

While President Nimeiri was busy trying to rally support for his regime among American leaders the Sudanese army, supported by other sections of the Sudanese ruling class, seized governmental power in a manner that is only too familiar in countries where the absence of democratic institutions means that the only way of changing government personnel is through a coup d'état. Of course this military government, like many others, is promising a quick return to civilian rule as soon as conditions permit the holding of elections.

The complaint of the army and its supporters was that Nimeiri, after sixteen years in power, was mismanaging the economy. The ruling class was also angry at the way in which Nimeiri had imposed the barbaric Islamic code of law in order to secure his own political ends by courting the support of the fundamentalist Moslem Brotherhood. This marriage of convenience was. however, short-lived. Fearing a challenge to his power from Islamic leaders, Nimeiri had purged the Moslem Brotherhood and imprisoned its leaders, blaming them for unpopular policies. As a result Nimeiri lost his only real power base in Sudanese society, leaving him vulnerable to a coup from rival sections of the Sudanese ruling class.

Sudan is a desperately poor country currently ravaged by widespread drought which has exacerbated agricultural policies intended to produce quick profits for the landowners at the expense of both land and people. Its scarce food resources are under increasing pressure due to the huge influx of refugees from Ethiopia, themselves trying to escape famine. In the south of the country there has been a civil war in progress led by a rival Christian army officer. The majority of the population are totally dependent on American grain shipments if they are to avoid starvation. This American "aid" is granted in return for Sudan maintaining a pro-western stance in an area that is of great strategic importance because of its proximity to important oil supplies.

What is certain in these murky waters of political intrigue and double-dealing is that the lives of the vast majority of Sudan’s 22 million people will be largely unaffected by these shufflings of official positions among the Sudanese ruling class. Drought now affects 4 million native farmers and relief workers are currently predicting that one million people will die in Sudan in the coming year (The Times, 9 April 1985). It matters not one jot to them, nor will it affect their chances of survival, that they are now being ruled by a military rather than a civilian government.

The Passing Show: South African Revolution (1960)

The Passing Show Column from the May 1960 issue of the Socialist Standard

South African Revolution

The recent events in South Africa have made starkly clear the real nature of the conflict there. The entire capitalist world, Governments and press, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, has denounced the measures taken by the present ruling class in South Africa to bolster its position. The Nationalist newspaper Die Burger, the organ of the ruling landowners and farmers, admitted that staid Conservative British papers like The Times and the Daily Telegraph had been “practically hysterical in their vehemence.” The Times, indeed, went so far as to say in its leading article of April 6th, that it was sixteen days “since the revolution began in South Africa.” 

After the Sharpeville massacre it was announced that the pass laws would not be enforced for the time being. This was an astonishing concession for the ruling landowners' class to make to the capitalists. It showed how much the landowners had been shaken, for the pass laws are the cornerstone of the society built by the landed interests. The aim of these laws is to keep Africans in the country, where they must work on the white men's farms in order to live, and to prevent them coming to the towns, where they could obtain higher pay in the capitalists' factories. If despite the pass laws they come to the towns, they are arrested—in numbers running to hundreds of thousands each year—and sent back in convict gangs to labour on the farms for a mere pittance. The news that the pass laws had been suspended was a tonic to the South African capitalist class: the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, which had slumped at the news from Sharpeville, recovered some of its losses. Then came the announcement that the pass, laws would be reimposed: again share prices fell. And the South African Federated Chamber of Industries was reported to be seeking a meeting with Dr. Verwoerd to urge some modification in his policies.

The question now in South Africa is this: how long will the growing capitalist class allow the landed interests to continue ruling the country?

Calvinism

Christians are sometimes harder on their fellow-Christians than many materialists would be. For example, when on April 8th the House of Commons was discussing the open police brutality against Africans in the streets of South African cities, Sir Godfrey Nicholson (the Conservative member for Farnham) said the situation was partly due to the Afrikaners' “background of a rigid Calvinistic creed." This is a case of putting the cart before the horse. Many other peoples in the world share the Afrikaners' Calvinism, but not being in the same economic position, have no sympathy with the South African landowners’ apartheid. The Afrikaners' “Dutch Reformed Church” originated in Holland, whose inhabitants are also closely related to the Afrikaners. But far from sharing the Afrikaners’ beliefs, the Dutch leaders go out of their way to criticise apartheid. The Calvinist Scots Presbyterian Church has long attacked the white farmers’ policies in both South Africa and the Rhodesian Federation. No, religious beliefs do not determine political views. Both of them are, in the long run, expressions of the economic and material position in which a particular class finds itself.

Sailing before the wind

The Readers' Digest, which claims a world circulation of over twenty million copies, is one of the most accurate indicators of the current policies of the American ruling class. During the war it was full of articles showing how bestial the Germans and—even more the Japanese were. As soon as the war was over, and it became clear that in the next war the United States' enemy might well be Russia, with West Germany and Japan lining up as America's allies, the content of the articles shifted abruptly. Now it was the bestiality of the Russians which was written about; references to Germany and Japan became friendly. The editors even went so far as to print articles about the heroic deeds of German and Japanese soldiers in the Second World War.

Rome

But besides Germany and Japan, the United States also fixed on the Catholic Church as a useful ally against Russia. References in the Readers Digest to Roman Catholicism therefore became friendly. The fact that the Catholic Church is hand in glove with Fascism in Franco Spain, and supports at least one South American state (Colombia) where Protestants are harried mercilessly, was ignored. In the March, 1960, issue there is an article on “Good Pope John,” in which the writer talks about the “warm humanity, irrepressible humour and amiable wisdom” of the Pope with all the starry-eyed enthusiasm of a twelve-year-old girl listening to Cliff Richard. Still, that’s not surprising. If America’s alleged “defence of democracy” can be stretched to include military and other assistance to the Fascist Franco, it can't be too much of a strain to take in Franco’s friend as well

The nearly royal family

The news (in the Daily Express, 31/3/60) that at the forthcoming royal wedding there may be present not only Mr. Armstrong-Jones’ father and mother, but also his mother's present husband, his father’s present wife, and his father's other previous wife—the five of them all coming roughly under the heading of “the bridegroom's parents"—reminds one of the extent to which the divorce courts are patronised by the ruling class. The American millionaire Tommy Manville, who has had ten wives (or is it eleven now?) is exceptional, but the difference is not a matter of principle: it's only a question of how often the principle has been applied. Cases of husbands with three or four successive wives, or wives with three or four successive husbands, are not uncommon, as anyone who glances through the gossip columns can testify. Monogamy, at least in the upper class, now appears to have been replaced by this successive polygamy, at it were. The whole subject is worth careful study by anyone who claims to understand the workings of modern society.

Alwyn Edgar

Whither South Africa? (1950)

From the April 1950 issue of the Socialist Standard

On the western outskirts of Johannesburg lies the “shanty-town" of Newclare—an ugly sprawl of wooden shacks, patched up with canvas and corrugated iron, dirty and horribly overcrowded. Buried deep in the misery and squalor of Newclare and other places like it, live the Native workers of Johannesburg and the gold-mines of the Rand.

On February 13th this year, two armoured carloads of police drove into Newclare. Their object was to make a surprise check-up on passes, the documents which the law compels all adult male Africans to carry to show they are in work (and which, incidentally, most of them are unable to read).

These “pass laws” have never been completely effective. They are even less effective now when the Natives have been flocking into the towns in such large numbers that the authorities have found it quite impossible to keep up with them. And so, to remind them that the law still exists even though it cannot be administered properly, the police have taken to making surprise raids (often in the middle of the night), in which they make a sudden swoop on an area, quickly round-up likely suspects, arrest those found without passes, and carry them off to gaol. Sometimes the arrests run into hundreds, and the raid looks more like a minor military exercise.

Perhaps because it was only a small raid, the one on February 13th did not pass off quite so smoothly as usual. When the police tried to make an arrest on this occasion they were immediately attacked by a large crowd of Natives who eventually forced them to retire under a hail of stones and other missiles. Having driven off the police, the crowd then proceeded to throw barricades across the streets and began stoning every vehicle they found carrying Europeans, at the same time setting fire to shops and looting the contents.

The rioting continued unchecked until the following day, when heavy reinforcements of armed police and firemen were drafted to the scene, and to other places where disturbances had also broken out in sympathy. Covering the firemen with rifle and machine-gun fire to enable them to fix the hoses and at the same time prevent the crowd from cutting them, the police began to occupy the area. The crowd resisted fiercely, attacking both the police and the bands of armed Europeans who were now also roaming the district, bent on taking matters into their own hands. (The presence of these gangs was one of the most significant aspects of the riot, and is a disturbing indication of the level to which racial feeling has now risen inside South Africa.) Finally, after several hours of pitched battles, the police cleared the streets, and the disturbances came to an uneasy end.

The incident itself has since been referred to the Riots Commission, which is already sitting to consider five other cases of rioting. All of them have occurred within the last six months.

What has brought South Africa to this perilous pass? What has brought about this situation, in which certain elements in the White group are already expressing their intention of suppressing all future trouble, whatever the cost and whatever the consequences? Where some of the politicians are already talking about the dangers of civil war? South Africa has always had a racial problem. What has happened in the past few years to bring it to such a terrible state?

To answer these questions, we must first make a brief review of the events that have taken place since 1948.

The Past Two Years

There are two main political parties in South Africa, the Nationalist Party under Malan, and the United Party under Smuts. In addition, there are two smaller organisations, the Afrikaner Party led by Havenga, and a Labour Party.

At the last General Election, held in May, 1948, the Nationalists and Afrikaners combined had a slight majority over the United Party and the Labour Party. This enabled them to form a Coalition Government with Malan as Prime Minister, and Havenga in the key position of Minister of Finance.

Backed largely by the Boer farming vote, the Nationalist Party has always taken an extreme line on the racial question, and, indeed, they fought the election on this issue. Malan himself, in a speech at Praal on the 20th April, 1948, said about the election that it was 

  “dominated by the question of whether the European race would be able to maintain its rule, its purity, and its civilisation or float along until it vanishes for ever in the black sea of South Africa’s non-European population.”

Once in power, there is no doubt that Malan would have been prepared to go the whole way with his extreme racial policies if it had not been for the reluctance of Havenga to go the whole way with him. As his Government depends upon the support of Havenga and the Afrikaner Party, he has had to give way—at least for the present. This, however, has not prevented him from pressing on with all kinds of other repressive legislation, with or without the support of Havenga. Prominent in this legislation has been: —

(a) The pushing forward of the general ideal of "complete separation” of all the racial groups of South Africa, “socially, residentiary, industrially, and politically.” This means that, the four groups of South Africa—the Whites, the Coloureds (people of mixed blood), the Indians, and the Africans, will be for ever kept strictly apart. In line with this, legislation has already been introduced forbidding inter-marriage between Europeans and Coloureds (laws already exist forbidding marriage between Whites and Indians, and Whites and Africans).

(b) The intention to keep the Natives on the Reserves, and away from the towns—in Malan's own words, “the Native reserves must become the true fatherland of the Native." In the towns they must henceforth be regarded as “visitors.” 

(c) Repeal of the previous Government’s law allowing the Indians three representatives in Parliament.

(d) Abolition of present Coloured vote, and in its place a similar system to that now operating for the Natives in which they are allowed three separate representatives (who must be Europeans).

(e) Repeal of the previous Government’s Bill recognising Native Trade Unions.

(f) All training of Native skilled workers to cease.

(g) All voting rights to be taken away from the Indians, and from all Natives living away from the Reserves.

As the culmination to all these repressive activities Malan is now about to introduce an identity-card system by means of which every person in the Union will eventually be registered according to “race.” Its effect will be to put every individual, once and for all, into a racial classification from which there will never be a chance of escape. To the darker-skinned African it will be just another document to add to the others he has to carry already, but for the Coloured group its effects will be profound. It will put an end, in fact, to all possibility of a white-skinned Coloured person “passing over” into the White group.

Finally, the Nationalists have extended the racial laws to cover the Cape Province, formerly the least subject to prejudice. In the post offices, non-Whites are now directed to separate counters; there are separate exits and entrances at the railway stations; “Jim Crow” travels the trains; and rides shamelessly on the buses, where Europeans now sit in the front and members of the other groups sit at the back.

All these things show clearly that the Malan Government is determined to put the clock back in South Africa. But what of the United Party and Smuts? Are they any different? Only to this extent— that whilst they do not wish to put the clock back, they neither wish to put in very far forward. Their alternative boils down to a few reforms here and there which they hope will take the sting out of the Natives' rebelliousness, relieve the pressure on the Indians and Coloureds where it hurts them most, and leave them all once more contented with their inferior position.

The same applies to the Labour Party. Only recently there was a split in their ranks when their Leader and Deputy Leader in Parliament voted against the Indians being allowed the vote. One member abstained and the others voted in favour of the Bill, which was in any case a milk-and-water effort that only allowed them representation by Europeans.

What it comes to is this, irrespective of Party, irrespective of class, almost the whole of the White group are united in refusing to allow the non-Whites anything like a position comparable with their own. They may differ here and there amongst themselves as to which particular rung of the ladder each of the other groups should occupy, but one thing they are agreed upon—that they, the Whites, belong near the top of the ladder and the others a long way further down.

They continue to deceive themselves that they can maintain this situation, that for ever and ever 2½ million Europeans can keep the other 9 millions in subjection. There never was a more forlorn and fantastic hope, nor one with graver possibilities of terrible consequences for themselves. Speaking in the South African Parliament three days after the riot. Smuts said: —

  “Something new is coming into the life of this country. We are accustomed to the orderly conduct of our Natives and on the whole our Natives are well behaved, but some change is coming about  

  “Unless this new development is stopped and stopped at once and unless firm measures are taken no one can be sure of the future of South Africa.” (Johannesburg Star, 15/2/50.)

Unfortunately for Smuts, for Malan, for all the vast majority of Europeans in the Union who think like them on the Native question, there is a change taking place in the Natives, not only in South Africa, but throughout the whole of the continent. Smuts has sensed the change and would like to explain it by the recent activity of Malan and the Nationalist Party. What he fails to recognise is that whatever the Nationalists have done to provoke matters, they have only helped to bring more quickly what is bound to have come in any case. What all the Whites of South Africa fail to face up to is that the Natives are on the move, and will not stop until they have gained the same position as the Whites.

On this question we can do no better than quote from our pamphlet. “The Racial Problem.” What it said three years ago is even more relevant now than it was then:—

  “As industry develops, they (the Natives) will learn more, and want more, and then the same position will face the South African White worker as faces the American White worker at the present time. Then will the South African workers, White, Native. Coloured, and Indian, be at their own cross-roads. What their decision will be we do not know nor do we intend to guess. What we say to the South African workers we have already said to the American workers. They must realise that their interests as workers lie together: until they do so they will remain divided and weakened, wide open to the attacks and encroachments of the capitalist class. Much worse may result; the logical end of the road which the South African White worker is treading can only be bloody violence and destruction. No group can permanently hold down another many more times more numerous than itself, and sooner or later the working class, particularly the White section, will have to face up to the situation and make their decision.”

Recent events in South Africa have served only to underline the warning contained in this statement. The White workers in the Union will ignore it at their peril.

Stan Hampson