South African domination (1986)

Book Review from the October 1986 issue of the Socialist Standard

Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War Against Its Neighbours by Joseph Hanlon. (Penguin 1986).

As South Africa once again dominates the news, Hanlon's study provides a valuable addition to the analysis of the situation that exists there. South Africa's aim of domination within this area involves a mixture of military, political and economic action against its neighbours to create a buffer for the system of apartheid. South Africa's destabilisation policy has involved it in a war which has not hit the headlines but which has since 1980 "cost more than 100.000 lives and £10,000 million, and has made at least one million people homeless". This is part of the nightmare of South Africa. The aim of the war is to force dependency on South Africa by undermining the effectiveness of the economic organisation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Victims of that destabilisation have included Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi and Angola. South Africa also sees itself as a crusader against what it believes to be the rising tide of "Marxism" and for this reason it is prepared to back Unita forces opposed to Angola's so-called Marxist government. Lesotho and Swaziland are totally surrounded by South Africa and use the rand as their currency Along with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are also part of the customs union with South Africa. This is a system administered by South Africa in which there is free flow of goods within the four states with high tariffs on imports. Effectively this ensures South African domination because most businesses are located in South Africa and the high tariff rates necessitate purchase of goods from South Africa. SADCC attempts to relieve this reliance on South Africa by an integrated development including coordination and transport but all the neighbouring states are still integrally linked to South Africa. One aspect of this dependence can be seen in energy. South Africa is energy deficient but it still dominates. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland purchase all petroleum products from South Africa which also supplies significant amounts to Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia even though that oil is as much as 50 per cent dearer than world market prices. Similarly about 50 per cent of SADCC imports and exports go through South Africa although this is partly guaranteed by the fact that South Africa has bombed Angolan and Mozambiquan railways so that they could not carry traffic to and from ports in those countries.

The benefits to the South African ruling class of its destabilisation policy are fourfold. They ensure "security" insofar as they involve punitive attacks against ANC bases and escalate the notion of an outside threat. The creation of chaos and instability in neighbouring states allows South Africa to claim that alternatives to the apartheid system are less successful economically. The fact of economic dependence does not permit of a more aggressive policy against South Africa. Chaos elsewhere also makes South Africa appear as a bastion of stability in an economically backward area. Hence they can cry out against sanctions because, as Hanlon argues. “P. W. Botha talks of South Africa bringing 'salvation' to the neighbouring states, and of the west preventing this by actions against apartheid". The irony is that South Africa claims that it is being destabilised by the actions of its neighbours, by supporting the ANC and calling for boycotts and sanctions. It also justifies South Africa's destabilisation programme as retaliation. This includes arming rebels in Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho and Zimbabwe and cutting food supplies, as in Mozambique, Zambia and Lesotho in order that the indigenous populations would direct their frustrations at the individual governments. There have also been varied economic destabilisation tactics that have included limiting access to South Africa's railways, restricting migrant labour, closing borders, curbing imports, regulating exports and cutting electricity. This ensures South Africa's regional dominance, making the neighbouring states "a buffer against sanctions — just as Pretoria hopes to make them a barrier against liberation movements" This is why South Africa is opposed to SADCC which would free the neighbouring states from such reliance.

South Africa sees itself as the regional power of Southern Africa in the same way that USA operates in Latin America and USSR in Eastern Europe. Its incursions into neighbouring territories have been many and as Hanlon points out "commandos have raided seven of the neighbouring capitals and tried to assassinate two prime ministers". Only Malawi and Tanzania have escaped military insurgence. South Africa funds Unita, Mozambique National Resistance, the Lesotho Liberation Army and dissidents in Matabeleland in Zimbabwe. This adds to the claim that majority rule does not work.

There has been verbal support for SADCC from USA. Britain and West Germany but these countries have been less favourable to the notion of breaking with South Africa. Actual support for SADCC has come from countries without substantial investment in South Africa and have included Scandinavia, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands and Belgium, while the USA, Britain and West Germany are more concerned about "their existing investments. markets and sources of minerals" in South Africa. Destabilisation may be a short term answer to South Africa's paranoia but it requires markets for its products and chaotic economies are not such markets. Developing capitalism in South Africa will bring divisions based on class rather than racial differences and a population capable of acting as a market. Hanlon's argument is that, although limited in their effect, sanctions, boycotts and disinvestment should be pursued against South Africa. Sometimes this is a facade pursued by countries, as is the case with Japan who bans investment but allows licences and technology transfer "so Japan is now South Africa's second largest trading partner and Japanese firms have 40 per cent of the South African market". For Britain and USA there has been a reluctance to impose sanctions, not that this is a point of principle (USA has wide ranging sanctions against Poland and Britain has done the same to Argentina). Hanlon argues that Britain must be prepared to suffer as a result of imposing sanctions and that this is a moral question. For Hanlon it is also a belief that this might constitute a long term investment for future majority rule might not look favourably on a Britain that was unwilling to take up such a moral stance There has been a high price to pay and SADCC in its report to OAU in mid 1985 said that between 1980 and 1984 destabilisation cost SADCC member states a total of £7,000 million as a result of war damage, higher transport costs, sanctions imposed by South Africa, production and export losses and caring for the many refugees. SADCC calls for sanctions even at the risk of its own suffering. The case that sanctions against South Africa will cause harm to the "frontline" states is the latest that South Africa has created to ensure its continued existence. It forces dependency as an act of calculated cynicism. Hanlon's answer is to replace one form of exploitation by another in the hope that capitalism without South Africa and apartheid will be an improvement. The dilemma for capitalism is the extent to which South Africa can survive with limited markets. For western capitalism the question of sanctions is one in which vested interests must be weighed against the possibility of future interests. In these economic arguments morality has a very minor role to play As for the majority black community they are merely the pawns calling for a voice in a world of rival capitalist interests.

Philip Bentley