The rulers of many ‘Third World’ countries often distinguish between foreign aid programmes from the USA and those from Russia, seeing the former as the efforts of a capitalist superpower to dominate their nation, while the latter are regarded as kindly gifts of good faith from a “fraternal” power.
Of more importance than the beliefs of Third World capitalists, bankers, landlords and lackey politicians, is the fact that the same mistaken view is held by many workers not only in the so-called “developing” world, but also in the industrialised west. They think the USA is an expansionist power, always attempting to make Third World countries mere client states of its economic and strategic empire, while the friendly Soviet Union has no such imperial intentions. The latter power is often seen as the champion of the Third World underdog, due to the help it gives to “national liberation” movements such as in Angola, Vietnam and Cuba.
Unsurprisingly, this belief in the benevolent aims of Soviet foreign aid is fully endorsed by the Russian economist V. Rymalov:
Unlike the leading capitalist industrial powers, the USSR gives extensive aid to other countries without imposing terms incompatible to their national interests and dignity. There are no strings attached. (Asiaweek 30/1/81)
However, this view of Russia as the “goodie” and the USA as the “baddie” (or vice-versa) in international affairs is incorrect. While not wishing to imply that the ruling classes of the USA and other Western capitalist powers are without imperialist schemes and aims, the ruling class of Russia and other Eastern Bloc nations are prime examples of countries with expansionist goals. This is because Russia behaves like any other capitalist nation: constantly seeking opportunities to secure and extend its sources of supply of natural resources, its spheres of influence and its markets. A clear case of Russia's imperialist aims is its involvement in the much troubled country of Afghanistan.
Russian imperialism in Afghanistan did not begin with the December 1979 occupation of that country; for decades prior to that event, Afghanistan was well on its way to becoming a colony of Moscow. The 1979 invasion was clearly a brutal and successful attempt by Brezhnev and his politburo cronies to tighten their grip on Afghanistan at a time when squabbles among that country’s own politicians and ruling class could have led to civil war, which would probably have suited American interests.
However, despite this background, strategic considerations constituted one of the main factors behind the invasion. According to a South-East Asian journal:
The temptation to occupy a strategic position within 300 miles of the Gulf, and acquiring the choice of marching south and/or east at will could have been too strong to resist. Occupation of the Shindand base and the erection of missile launchers at that base are strong pointers. Equally important are the latest intelligence reports that the Soviets have set up surface-to-surface missiles in the Wakhan salient overlooking the Karakoram highway linking Pakistan and China. (Far Eastern Economic Review, 23-29/1/81)
Additionally, recent evidence suggests that strategic military considerations were certainly not the only factors that influenced the decision to invade. In fact, there was also a blunt economic motive behind Moscow's military action, which originated in the 1950s. According to Louis Dupree, a specialist in the politics of West and Central Asia from the mid-1950s, Afghanistan became “a primary ‘guinea pig' in the Soviet plan to penetrate developing countries economically” (Asiaweek 30/1/81). Since an American loan of $100 million to Afghanistan in 1955, Russia has been steadily increasing economic aid to Afghanistan in an attempt to beat the American ruling class at securing a hold over their neighbour. Dupree adds:
Just as the Soviets tested the US and its allies militarily in Korea, so they have tested the US economic reaction in Afghanistan. The country has a number of characteristics that make such an experiment tempting, among them, a common boundary with the USSR that facilitates commerce and communications.
Furthermore, Afghanistan has many of the features typical of certain Afro-Asian countries, such as a history of European imperialist penetrations; possession of a “false'’ national border, cutting across various ethnic groups; a slowly developing capitalist class and wage-earning class, products of the industrialising process; and a dictatorial, highly centralised political system. If a Russian plan of imperialist infiltration could be formulated and successfully applied to Afghanistan, then such a scheme could be implemented in other, similar, developing nations.
Between 1955 and 1979 Russian investment in Afghanistan, Excluding military aid, reached a mammoth $1.5 billion compared to the American investment of $1 billion, the aim, according to Dupree, being “the ultimate exploitation of Afghanistan’s natural resources”. So what exactly are these natural resources which make the Russian government (and the American government?) so interested in Afghanistan?
First, natural gas. Before the invasion, Russia imported about 3 billion cubic metres of Afghan gas each year through a pipeline running over the Ainu Darya River. Absurdly, loans to Afghanistan which have yet to be repaid include the cost of installations and pipelines transporting gas to Russia! Since 1967, when gas production started, Russia has extracted over 30 billion cubic metres of Afghan gas, mainly all for use in the industries of Soviet Central Asia.
Furthermore Russia gets this gas at well below the world price. It also seems a little more than coincidence that, at the time of the Soviet military take-over of Afghanistan in December 1979, a deal regarding Iranian gas sales to Russia had fallen through. Iran’s price was too high, and by April 1980 Russia had ceased to import gas from Iran. In turn, since the collapse of the deal, Afghan “natural gas output has risen to 3.5 billion cubic metres a year, almost all of it going to meet the growing energy demand of Soviet Central Asia” (Far Eastern Economic Review, 23-29/1/81).
Finally, for many years, Afghan governments have made frequent requests for Russian help in building internal gas pipelines in order to power the wheels of Afghanistan's own industries. Russia has declined to give help on the grounds that such a scheme would be too expensive and that the mountainous Afghan terrain would render such a project technically impossible. This appears a strange line of argument in view of the Russian construction of a longer gas pipeline at considerable cost, erected over equally mountainous areas from Afghanistan to Soviet Central Asia. Subsequently, until 1978, when Afghan “freedom fighters” took to the hills making many roads impassable, Afghanistan had to import bottled gas from neighbouring Pakistan.
Second area of interest — oil. Like its neighbour Iran, Afghanistan has immense untapped reserves. It is commonly believed by disgruntled Afghans that the Russian government was well aware of these oil deposits. This suspicion does seem to have foundation as in a recent article deceitfully entitled “New Horizons: tasks of the Afghan Revolution”, which appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda, the official journal of the Youth League in the Soviet Union, it was stated that several oil deposits have been located and oil extraction organised by Russia. No doubt much of this oil will be pumped north to power Russian industry.
The third source of attraction is Afghan’s mineral resources — coal, copper, iron ore and emeralds. The article mentioned above also reported that copper deposits at Atinak, south of the capital Kabul, are “huge” and that Russian finance would help build an ore mining and smelting works, to be completed by 1985. The article also described Afghan iron ore deposits as “the world’s biggest”, while also commenting that Afghanistan was rich in emeralds. Finally, according to the World Bank, Afghanistan has about 100 million tons of coal reserves and an estimated potential for approximately a further 400 million tons.
Fourthly, cement, of which Afghanistan produces a very high standard. This commodity comes mainly from two plants, both built under a 1954 loan agreement by Czechoslovakia. Of the 150,000 tons of cement produced in Afghanistan between 1977 and 1978, most was exported to Russia. In an absurd exchange, Russia exports an equal amount of cement to Afghanistan, but of a much lower quality.
The fifth and final area of interest is citrus fruits and olives. Most of these goods grown at the Russian-financed and directed Ningralar Valley project are exported to Russia, but, like Afghan gas, their price is much lower than that which would be offered on the world market. Russia then sells much of this produce to its Eastern Bloc allies at a high profit.
Thus, one cannot help but agree with Louis Dupree’s assessment that Russia’s “aid projects remind one of the Afghan system of gerau, under which a farmer borrows a sum of money and agrees to give the borrower one half of his annual crop as interest until the debt is fully repaid. Russian assistance developed into exploitation, and Afghanistan has been virtually mortgaged into perpetuity”. (Asiaweek 31/1/81)
In conclusion, it is clear that Afghanistan is a virtual colony of the Russian ruling class for strategic, experimental and especially for economic purposes, as is South Korea to the USA and Niger is to France. One cannot distinguish a difference of “aim” in the foreign policies of the Western capitalist nations or the Eastern Bloc state capitalist nations, but there is some difference in the means. To secure markets and sources of supply of natural resources, the ruling classes of America and Europe generally use multinational companies; the Russian ruling class tend to use “foreign aid” programmes.
RSB
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'RSB' was the pen name of Bill Robertson.
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