‘The battle of commodities is fought by the cheapening of commodities. The cheapness of commodities depends, all other circumstances remaining the same, on the productivity of labour, and this in turn depends on the scale of production. Therefore the larger capitals beat the smaller.’ (Capital, Volume 1, chapter 25, section 2)
Thursday, May 16, 2019
Big Fish Swallow Small Fish (2013)
Wednesday, February 6, 2019
Concentration of Industry (1967)

Output has risen greatly since 1935, but the number of plants has risen much less, and in recent years has been falling. There has been a movement towards fewer, larger plants in most industries . . . Further the average size of the largest plants, measured by employment, has in general increased, and large plants now account for a higher proportion of total employment in nearly all industrial groups than formerly. The same is true of their share of total output. Finally, plants are, in general, being operated by fewer enterprises, and the extent to which many industries are dominated by a few “giant” enterprises seems to be increasing.
Employment is used rather than output as it is easier to measure. But as the larger enterprises will tend to be more efficient the concentration in terms of output will be greater than the figures given here. For oil refining the percentage is 84; for man-made fibres 81; for sugar between 70 and 91; for Tobacco between 66 and 85; for watches and clocks 70; for margarine between 59 and 75; for steel tubes between 49 and 79; for asbestos 63; and for soap, detergents and candles and linoleum both 60. The top four enterprises in dyestuffs employ 88 per cent of those in the industry and in cement between 71 and 85.
The need for more concentration and rationalisation to promote greater efficiency and international competitiveness of British industry, which was emphasised in the National Plan, is now widely recognised.
There is no evidence that we can rely on market forces alone to produce the necessary structural changes at the pace required.
Wednesday, December 12, 2018
Neither London nor Brussels, but World Socialism (2012)
Thursday, November 9, 2017
Archetypal Fat Cats (2004)
It was the growth of limited liability from the early nineteenth century that gave rise to the modern capitalist corporation and hence to the CEO Firms were originally run by their founders (or their heirs), but the owners faced the debtors’ prison if they went bankrupt. So few would buy shares in a company unless they could be personally involved in supervising how it was run. Limited liability meant that shareholders were no longer personally liable for any misdeeds or bankruptcies, so owners could delegate day-to-day control to a salaried manager, with a board of directors overseeing the whole thing.
As the title of this short volume suggests, the CEO has become a kind of cult figure, with in many cases a celebrity status and a pay packet to match (averaging over $30 million a year in large US companies in 2002, for instance). Many CEOs work long hours, apparently, though of course a lot of this time is spent in luxury hotels and swanky restaurants, and they are seemingly surprised when their employees fail to share their taste for sixty-hour weeks. Their income is reinforced by the curious idea of a ‘guaranteed bonus’, and of a ‘golden parachute’, paid to them if they are sacked by the board of directors.
And what does a CEO do in return for this generous remuneration? It’s clear that they do not in any real sense run the company, since big corporations are far too complicated to be managed by individuals. Rather, they concern themselves with the company as a business, often having little detailed idea about what it actually produces, and give orders that others have to implement. The impression gained from Haigh’s book is that if the share price keeps rising, irrespective of any medium- or long-term benefits to the company, then shareholders and directors are happy. Reducing costs by cutting staff is a favourite, and none too sophisticated, approach.
With golden parachute in pocket, a number of CEOs go into politics - President Bush’s cabinet, for instance, is full of them, from Dick Cheney to Donald Rumsfeld. As Haigh quips, “the Bush administration is more a CEOcracy than a theocracy.” The extent of this cosying-up is fairly new, but governments do not have to be full of ex-businessmen in order to serve capitalist interests.
Haigh makes the useful point that, while workers are urged to keep wage demands in check so that they can compete with other workers (especially those in other countries), CEOs instead always want to be paid more so as to be in line with their counterparts overseas — the idea of ‘internationally competitive’ has different meanings for bosses than for workers. While he is well aware of the absurdities of CEO pay, he has some odd ideas about the way capitalism works. For instance, he claims that “Companies do not exist to make profits; they make profits in order to exist” He seems to think this is an important correction to a common myth, but in whichever version it just means that companies are motivated by profit-making. Nevertheless, his book does give a useful picture of what CEOs do and don’t do, and of why we have no need of them and their fellow-exploiters.
Saturday, March 6, 2010
Why doesn't big business support a national health service?
Cross-posted from the blog, Stephen's Blog.
It is often argued that a "single payer" health insurance system run by the federal government or a national health service would be in the interests of American big business apart from the health insurance companies. The growing burden of healthcare costs on the economy would be brought under control, and companies would no longer have to pay insurance premiums for their employees. Companies in Britain and Canada are quite happy with the national health service in those countries.
So why does big business not promote a real healthcare reform? This is the question asked by Doug Henwood in Issue 120 of his Left Business Observer (a publication that I highly recommend for its astute analysis of American economic and political developments; see here).
Apparently some people offer a "web of influence" explanation that focuses on interlocks (overlapping membership) between insurance companies and other companies and on the role of insurance companies as a source of finance for other companies. Henwood presents detailed evidence to show that these are not very significant phenomena.
Basing himself on testimony from researchers who have interviewed top executives on the issue, Henwood states that some (perhaps even many) executives support "single payer" in private but are reluctant to make their views public for two reasons.
First, they worry about the possible reaction of other firms with which they do business. Small companies especially are considered hostile to "single payer." They do not stand to gain in terms of costs because they do not provide health insurance to their employees, while they would have to bear part of the additional tax burden. So they would see such a reform as an attempt to shift costs from big business to small business.
Second, they are afraid of "encouraging would-be expropriators." One informant formulates this fear as follows: "If you can take away someone else's business -- the insurance companies' business -- then you can take away mine." In other words, the politics of capitalist class solidarity trumps the economics of cost reduction.
Henwood adds another consideration: "Employers like workers to feel insecure. Fear of losing health coverage makes workers less willing to strike or resist pay cuts or speedups."
At least in this case, it is misleading to view reform politics solely as an arena of conflict among diverse business interests. It is also an arena of class struggle.
Stefan



