We are now in the heaviest trade depression since World War II, with little expectation that recovery will take place in the near future. This has caused dismay and confusion among the economists, dividing them into half a dozen groups each with its own remedy and denouncing their rivals. Not only did they not foresee the depression but nearly all of them denied that it could happen. They had accepted the belief that it is possible for a government to prevent unemployment if it wishes to do so.
First in the field was the Labour Party. In its Election Programme. 1918. Labour and the New Social Order, it stated: "It is now known that the Government . . . can arrange the public works and the orders of National Departments and Local Authorities in such a way as to maintain the aggregate demand for labour in the whole kingdom”. (While they were the Government, 1929-1931, unemployment rose by 1½ million.)
By 1944. under the influence of J.M. Keynes, the three parties. Tory, Labour and Liberal (and the TUC), had all accepted the commitment to maintain "full employment”. It was set out in a document Employment Policy issued by the three parties represented in the war-time national government. Confidence in the policy was confirmed by the Committee on the Working of the Monetary System in a Report in 1958. In Paragraph 484 they said: "When discussing with witnesses the impact of restrictive monetary measures we have been constantly reminded that, as compared with earlier decades, restrictive developments have a much less frightening aspect now that Governments are always committed to full employment policies”.
Commenting on this. Professor F.W. Paish wrote: “This belief springs directly from the expectation that no government will in future allow any really substantial amount of unemployment to appear, even temporarily”. (The Banker, October 1959.) Actually, at the time the Committee published their report, unemployment was already on an upward trend after the very low levels of the ten years after the war. Unemployment rose again while the Labour Party was in office from 1964-1970, though they declared they would not let this happen, and it more than doubled under the Labour government of 1974-1979.
Towards the end of that government's office Prime Minister Callaghan and Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey began to question the validity of the Keynesian “full employment” doctrine. Later, for the first time since the war. a government — under Thatcher — formally repudiated it. But they still claimed to be able to deal with unemployment, firstly by curbing inflation and secondly by reducing taxation: “The State takes too much of the nation's income; its share will be steadily reduced. When it spends and borrows too much, taxes, interest rates, prices and unemployment rise”. (The Conservative Manifesto — 1979.) After four years of office unemployment has risen from 1,300,000 to over 3 million.
The one economist who comes well out of this confusion is Marx. He showed that, in competition with each other to gain a larger market share, capitalists are always seeking to reduce prices by means of labour-displacing machinery and that inevitably depressions occur from time to time: "Capitalist production moves through certain periodical cycles. It moves through a state of quiescence, growing animation, prosperity, overtrade, crisis and stagnation". He never accepted that unemployment and depression could be avoided by some change of government monetary, taxation or investment policy. Nor did he accept the validity of the argument that unemployment would fall and depression be avoided by putting up wages. (The policy which the Independent Labour Party sought to popularise in the 1920s.) Marx showed that not only do wages rise in every boom, but at that time the working class “actually get a larger share of the annual product intended for consumption”. (Capital Vol. Ill. Kerr Edition, p. 474.) Far from remedying the situation this is, said Marx, "always . . . a harbinger of the social crisis".
Marx showed the limitations of the trade union struggle for higher wages. The aim of the capitalist in carrying on business is "the augmentation of his capital”. Wages can therefore go on rising only as long as the rise “does not interfere with the progress of accumulation". (Capital Vol. 1, p. 678 in the Kerr edition). Beyond this, accumulation slackens, "because the stimulus of gain is blunted", in other words, the employer does not for long employ workers out of whom he cannot make profit. Marx saw as inevitable a fall of the workers’ standard of living in depressions when, owing to heavy unemployment, the supply of workers overshoots the demand. Though he did suggest that “it might in such circumstances be necessary to test the real state of demand and supply by a strike, for example, or other method". (Value Price and Profit).
After Marx's death, Frederick Engels put forward the idea that Marx's cycle no longer applied, and had given way to "permanent and chronic depression”, but events soon showed that he was wrong and he returned to Marx's “cycle” theory. In the depressions of the 1880s and between the wars, a considerable number of workers and even some economists became convinced that Marx was right about unemployment and depressions. Then Marxist theory was pushed into the background by Keynes. John Strachey, who had claimed to be a Marxist, told how reading Keynes’ book General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money made him change his views. (He became a Minister in the Attlee Labour government). Richard Crossman. Minister of Housing in the 1964 Labour government, said that Keynes demonstrated that capitalism is not "an inherently unworkable system” and, by so doing, undermined “the old economic case for socialism". (The Times, 24 February 1956)
Even before Keynes dominated the scene most economists rejected Marx's labour theory of value, including the few who looked favourably on other parts of Marx's writings. It is interesting to notice the irrelevance of some of the more common objections to the labour theory, clearly the result of not troubling to understand it.
Marx explained carefully that he was dealing with commodities, articles regularly produced for sale and capable of reproduction. Because Marx showed that commodities have a value and a price the critics assumed, without any justification, that Marx must also be saying that everything which has a price had to be a commodity and have value. They have instanced the enormous prices paid for old master paintings, forgetting that these are incapable of reproduction and are therefore not commodities.
Marx answered the critics:
Objects that in themselves are not commodities. such as conscience, honour etc. are capable of being offered for sale by their holders and of thus acquiring, through their price, the form of commodities. Hence the object may have a price without having value. (Capital Vol. I p. 115. Kerr edition).
The late Harold Laski. who wrote quite sympathetically about Marx, gave an astonishing interpretation to the labour theory, in his book Communism (Home University Library 1927, p.95):
Thus we can measure the amount of labour-power in each man's effort, and so determine scientifically how he ought to be paid.
Laski borrowed this from A.D. Lindsay's book Karl Marx’s Capital (page 61). Lindsay wrote “The Labour Theory of Value is misleading. It is primarily interested in what a man ought to get in reward for his labour”. Both Lindsay and Laski were quite wrong. No such idea entered Marx's head and it is impossible even to guess what can have given Laski and Lindsay this strange notion.
Much has been made by critics of the allegation that in Volume I of Capital Marx put forward the theory that commodities exchange at value and then changed his mind and concluded in Volume III that some commodities permanently sell above their value and others below their value. The critics failed to notice Marx’s explanation in Volume I that he was first dealing with value and would later deal with its price form and that they were not identical. There was, for example, the footnote on page 244 of Volume I (Kerr edition):
The calculations in the text are intended merely as illustrations, and in them, therefore. it is assumed that prices are equal to value. In Book Three we shall learn that even in the case of average prices no such simple assumption can be made.
As for the critics' assumption that the alleged change of mind took place later, Louis Boudin pointed out that "most of the third volume, and particularly those portions of it which are supposed to modify the first Volume, were actually written down by Marx in its present form before the publication of the first Volume". (Theoretical System of Karl Marx, page 133.)
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Cartoon by George Meddemmen. |
The almost total disregard of what Marx had to say about inflation is less easy to explain. That it should have been disregarded in this country in the period of nearly 100 years before 1914 when the gold standard operated is understandable, because there was no inflation. Why then has there been no interest in Marx’s explanation in the nearly forty years of continuous inflation since World War II? One reason is that, while much has been written about other aspects of Marx's writing, his economics have stayed out of favour even among many people who profess to be Marxists. A second reason is that many of the latter appear to be unaware that Marx had something to say about inflation. A third reason has been that when Keynesian doctrines began to fall into disrepute because of the failure of the “full employment" policy, attention went to the monetarists led by Professor Milton Friedman, who added to the confusion with his absurd remark that Marx, too, was a monetarist.
It is beyond dispute that the policies of Labour and Tory governments have led to the present price level being at least ten times what it was in 1945. (Prices have risen by over 50 per cent under the Thatcher government). It is also beyond dispute that all the governments up to 1979 have claimed to be following Keynesian policies; yet the Keynesian document, the 1944 Employment Policy endorsed by the Tory, Labour and Liberal parties in the national government, proclaimed the intention of seeking to maintain a “more or less stable price level". It is also true that while Keynes himself advocated short term use of inflation to reduce real wages in certain circumstances, his long-term aim was “allowing wages to rise slowly while keeping prices stable" (General Theory page 271). It is at least arguable that if Keynes had lived to see what was being done in his name he would have disowned it.
Why then have prices been rising continuously for over forty years? Marx’s answer would have been that it became a possibility with the abandonment of the gold standard in 1931, and became an actuality through the increase of the currency (notes and coin) in circulation with the public, from under £500 million in 1938 to nearly £11,000 million. The gold standard background is important. While the gold standard operated the pound sterling was. by law, a fixed weight of gold (about a quarter of an ounce). The effect was that the notes could never deviate, except marginally, from the value of the legally fixed equivalent weight of gold. As it was said at that time, "a Bank of England note is as good as gold", and it was everywhere accepted as such. Now the notes are “inconvertible" and their purchasing power steadily declines through excess issue.
Marx defined it as follows:
If the quantity of paper money issued were double what it ought to he, then, as a matter of fact. £1 would be the money-name not of a quarter of an ounce of gold but of one-eighth of an ounce of gold. The effect would be the same as if an alteration had taken place in the function of gold as a standard of prices. Those values that were previously expressed by the price of £1 would now be expressed by the price of £2. (Capital. Vol. I page 144 in the Kerr edition)
Several points have to be noted. What Marx meant by "what it ought to be" was the total quantity of gold that would circulate with a wholly gold coin currency. It was an application of his labour theory of value, gold having value like all other commodities. He was not saying (as did some quantity theorists) that any increase of inconvertible paper currency causes prices to rise. The rise occurs only to the extent that the quantity of notes is in excess of “what it ought to be". If, for example, production and population increase, the "necessary" amount of gold in circulation would increase. Other factors also affect this, including the tendency for the “necessary" amount of currency to decline with the development of transport and the banking system.
Marx also pointed out that there are other, "non-currency" factors, which affect prices, including changes in the value of commodities and the rise of prices in a boom and fall in a depression. (Also, while the gold standard operated, a fall in the value of gold would raise prices and a rise in the value of gold would reduce prices.) Marx made another valuable contribution to the whole issue of inflation and deflation. In accordance with his labour theory of value wages too are prices, the price of labour-power. So inflation which raises prices also raises wages. And deflation, which lowers prices, also lowers wages. Both situations are however affected by whatever ability the workers have to gain wage increases beyond the rise of other prices, or to prevent wages falling as much as other prices.
Some people have been misled by Milton Friedman's talk of controlling “money supply" into believing that he and Marx were thinking on similar lines. This is not so. Marx was talking about "currency", notes and coins, while Friedman’s doctrine is concerned with bank deposits, based on an old fallacy that the price level is related to the rise and fall of bank deposits. Keynes held the same view. In his Monetary Reform (1923 p. 128) he wrote: "The internal price level is mainly determined by the amount of credit created by the banks, chiefly the Big Five . . . The amount of credit, so created, is in its turn roughly measured by the volume of the banks’ deposits"
One last word about Keynes. Now that the Keynesians are in disarray perhaps some of them will look again at Keynes’ statement that Marx’s Capital was “an obsolete economic textbook which I know to be scientifically erroneous and without interest or application for the modern world".
Do they still find that convincing?
Edgar Hardcastle