Despite the protestations of CND, the first ground launched cruise missiles arrived at Greenham Common in December 1983, almost exactly four years since the initial deployment decision was made. The subsequent Russian walk-out from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces talks in Geneva left both sides of the nuclear debate to draw separate conclusions. Primarily because the controversy over nuclear weapons in Europe has focussed exclusively on particular weapon types — cruise and the SS-20 — rather more substantive issues have been ignored. In particular, the relationship between military technology and doctrine is conspicuous by its absence from public debate. But since the focus of attention is on Russian and American European nuclear forces it is worthwhile to look at the historical and technical origins of the present situation.
Nuclear weapons were first deployed in Europe by the United States in 1954. Russia did not follow until 1957. At one time the US had about 7,000 warheads in Europe spread over several types; nuclear bombs on aircraft, short-range missiles, nuclear artillery shells, anti-aircraft missiles and nuclear mines. However, this figure has been reduced to about 6,000 as military commanders in NATO have grave doubt about the military utility of such short-range battlefield weapons. More reductions are possible. However, the fissile material from these weapons will be reused for the planned expansion of the American strategic arsenal.
The political rationale for the deployment of 464 GLCMs and 108 Pershing II missiles was the need for a response to the Russian deployment of SS-20s. Although SS-20s were first deployed in 1977, it took NATO two years to “discover" their existence. The whole tenor of NATO’s argument suggested that the SS-20s are a new threat. However, it needs to be stressed that Russia has had the ability to attack Western European cities with medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles since 1955. (ICBM range of 5500 km + , Intermediate RBM (IRBM) 2.400 5.500 km. medium RBM (MRBM) 800-2,400 km, short RBM (SRBM) 800 km or less).
Despite the fact that the Russians were the first to launch an ICBM in 1957, their technological backwardness meant that this achievement was not translated into an extensive deployment programme. The first Russian ICBM was the SS-6, and of these only four were ever deployed. Resources were devoted instead to the creation of M/IRBM, which made sense both technologically and strategically. For instance, since the United States had nuclear capable aircraft and IRBMs in Western Europe their prompt destruction formed an essential aim for the Russian military. Furthermore, Western Europe could be held hostage against American behaviour until such times as Russia could deploy many ICBMs. At this time Russian bombers were incapable of two-way intercontinental missions.
The first MRBM deployed by Russia was the SS-3. which was basically an improved version of the German V-2 rocket, in 1955. (SS stands for surface-to-surface). Large scale deployment, however, did not start until 1959 with the appearance of the SS-4. The first SS-4s were radio-command guided, but later ones were equipped with inertial guidance systems. In 1961 the SS-5 IRBM appeared. These missiles suffered from several major drawbacks, notably their inaccuracy which accounts for the large warhead of I MT. Furthermore, the SS-4s and 5s are liquid fuelled and take between 8 to 24 hours to prepare for launching. Their vulnerability is compounded by the fact that few are placed in underground silos and are closely packed in groups of three or four to a site.The peak of deployment appears to have been reached in 1964-65 when there were about 733 SS-4s and 5s of which 595 were in soft launchers and 135 in hard launchers. These systems are currently being withdrawn and replaced by the SS-20s. In addition to these missiles the aircraft of the Russian Long Range Aviation arm are available for use against Western Europe. If that was not enough about ISO to 360 SS-11s and SS-19s ICBMs were, in the 1970s. allocated “theatre roles".
Given the technological obsolescence of the SS-4s and SS-5s there was. from the Russian point of view, a strong case to be made for the modernisation of long range theatre nuclear forces. Combine this factor with technological inertia in the Russian weapons procurement process and the SS-20 deployment decision, taken in 1976, begins to look inevitable. The SS-20 itself is the top two stages of the failed SS-16 ICBM. In contrast to its predecessors the SS-20 is mobile, but its tracked launch vehicle has an average speed of 10 mph. In addition, it carries three warheads of 150kt each and on account of its solid propellant and improved launch control technology it can be made ready to fire in an hour. Its increased range and improved accuracy permit a wider target coverage as well as affording a greater “counter-military potential" (range 5,000km compared with 2,000 for the SS-4 and 4,100 for the SS-5). Accuracy is measured by Circular error probable CEP. which is the radius of a circle within which fifty per cent of incoming warheads will land. The CEP of the SS-20 is 400km compared to 2,300 and 1,100 metres for the SS-4 and 5s.
It is the increased counter military potential of the SS-20 which causes NATO most concern; however, the SS-20 deployment does not represent any fundamental change in Russian doctrine. For example, military and C31 targets have always figured largely in their targeting plans. In any case the SS-20 is not the wonder weapon it is often made out to be. Although it is as mobile as cruise it has to be launched from pre-prepared, rather than pre-surveyed sites as is the case with cruise. Pershing II missiles can be fired from almost anywhere. The main point, however, is that the Soviet Union has had the ability to hit Western Europe with nuclear weapons for well over twenty years. NATO has rejected the claim that the SS-20 is only part of a long overdue modernisation. The continued deployment of SS-20s since 1979 (there are now about 360 SS-20s, of which between 108 to 118 are deployed in the Far Eastern Military District) has merely confirmed NATO’s view that the Russians are intent on tilting the nuclear balance in their favour. Whether this is the case or not, NATO is using it as a rationale for their own build up.
Ever since NATO announced its decision to deploy GLCMs and Pershing II missiles Russia has mounted an intense propaganda campaign against them. There are, from the Russians’ point of view, very ready reasons for this. Opposition to Pershing II in particular stems largely from estimates of its technical characteristics. Pershing I SRBMs were deployed in 1962; however, since their range is limited they cannot reach targets in Russia. On account of technical improvements, primarily warhead miniaturisation which makes more room for fuel, the range of the Pershing II is, according to NATO, 1,800km. The Russians, however, maintain that it has a range of 2,500km. This difference is crucial. Although the exact range is classified, a range of 2,500 km would allow Pershing II to strike Moscow and its command and control installations of which there are about 75. Even assuming a range of 1800 km Pershing would be able to attack vital targets in Western Russia.
In addition to being a ballistic missile which allows very short flight times from West Germany of between four and twelve minutes, Pershing has a very high accuracy. The accuracy achieved by its radar area guidance system — RADAG — makes possible a CEP of about 30 to 40 metres. In one test flight in 1978 an accuracy of 25 metres was achieved. But there are doubts about the ability of Pershing to reproduce this kind of accuracy in wartime. It has not been tested over its full range. In fact there are 12,000 separate parts in the missile and it is this technological complexity which has contributed to several test failures — four out of fourteen. One missile missed its intended target by over four miles.
Pershing represents a valuable addition to US strategic capabilities. Targets would include such time-urgent places as the Launch Control Centres of the ICBM fields in Western Russia at Kozelsk, Teykovo, Yedrovo, Kostroma, Tatischevo and Yoshkavola. In fact more than half of the twenty-six ICBM fields are located west of the Urals, as are twenty-two of the thirty-two major air bases. Two of the three Soviet early-warning over-the-horizon back-scatter radar systems are within range of Pershing one near Nikolayev and the other near Kiev. Other command centre targets would include the Army HQs in the western military districts, such as the Zhitomir base of the 8th Guards Tank Army.
Even with a maximum range of 2,500 km the 108 Pershings would still be unable to destroy all time-urgent targets, as there are many east of the Urals. The Pershing deployment cannot be seen in isolation from other proposed US missile developments. in particular the Trident D-5 programme. Russian ICBM fields and C31 installations east of the Urals are strung out along the Trans-Siberian railway. Trident D-5 warheads are very accurate and if fired on depressed trajectories from submarines in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific the Russians would have very little warning time. Satellite tracking stations such as those at Irkutsk and Ussuriysk would be prime targets. Since Russia relies heavily on satellites for secure long-range communications, the destruction of such installations in addition to other command and control centres would in effect destroy the nervous system of their military power.
The Ground Launched Cruise Missile is being built by General Dynamics and is only part of a much wider cruise missile programme. Both the United States Air Force and Navy have ordered the air and sea launched versions. The land based version carries a W-84 warhead of 200kt, but its real strategic value is its accuracy. Its guidance system includes both an inertial system as well as the terrain contour matching system — TERCOM. Digital maps of the intended flight path are stored on the system’s computer. Periodical checking of the ground below with the maps stored in the computer’s memory allows the missile to correct its flight path. This, theoretically, provides an accuracy of about fifty metres.
There are, however, doubts about the ability of cruise to match these high performance requirements under combat conditions. Although successful in 84 out of 111 test flights, cruise was only tested over the Nevada desert. Whether the GI.CMs would be able to fly from Britain over snow covered terrain in Sweden on its way to Russian targets is an unknown factor. It is for this reason that the United Staters wants to test the ALCM Over North-West Canada. There have been problems with the TERCOM system as well as with the mobile launch and control vehicles. In short cruise, like the SS-20, is not the super weapon it is often made out to be.
Despite its great accuracy, the long flight times preclude the use of cruise as a first strike weapon against Russian ICBM silos. But it could be used against empty ICBM to prevent their re-use; the Russians have taken several days to re-load in training exercises. While the air, sea and ground launched cruise missiles cannot by themselves be used for a first strike, they do, nevertheless, represent a valuable addition to the US Single Integrated Operational Plan — SIOP 6.
Nonetheless both cruise and the SS-20 illustrate the significance of technological inertia. For example, the SLCM Programme started in 1972.
The cruise missile is a sadly typical case of advanced military technology — in this case the combination of computer guidance, highly efficient jet engine and miniature warhead — looking for a strategy to justify its production. (Guardian 30 August 1983).
Competition between ICBM design bureaus in Russia contributed to the SS-20 decision. For instance, the bureau of Nadiradze was established to develop solid-propellant missiles. The SS-16 was one such rocket. However it was not deployed. but its production line and long-lead time parts were allocated to the SS-20 instead. Existence of the SS-16 production line made the decision a lot easier.
This fact is overlooked by campaigns which direct themselves, almost exclusively, to specific weapon systems. At the root of the problem is the way society is organised. The arms race process, weapons research and development, production and deployment and strategic doctrine cannot be divorced from the nature of society. Lengthy vigils outside airforce bases or mass demonstrations do not take account of this and for that reason are doomed to fail.
John Walker
*Glicom is derived from the acronym to cruise. GLCM Pioneer is reputed to b a Russian name for SS-20.
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