Corrections: "The Menace of Aerial Warfare" (1936)

From the October 1936 issue of the Socialist Standard

Mr. L. G. Savage, the writer of this series of articles, asks us to point out that the instalment which appeared in the August issue contained two errors. In column one, page 123, last paragraph, "magnetic or coil" should read "magneto or coil."

The figures in the last paragraph, column one, page 124, are incorrect. 27,000 square yards is not 15 square miles, but only a small part of a square mile. It will be observed, however, that 27,000 square yards is the area likely to be contaminated by liquid mustard gas, and bears no relation to the area likely to be affected by gas in vapour form.

Ed. Comm.

The Menace of Aerial Warfare - Part 3 (1936)

From the September 1936 issue of the Socialist Standard

Link to Part 2.

In 1923 the League of Nations arranged for an authoritative investigation of the possibilities of bacteriological warfare. The result of the investigation is summed up in Victor Lefebure's “Scientific Disarmament."

Open the book at page 215 and skim the pages which follow: —

. . . they referred to the use of cultures of cholera and typhus, mainly by infecting water supplies. Professor Pfeiffer, although pointing out the obstacles in the way of successful use by infecting the supplies of larger towns, stated, “There are, no doubt, other possibilities. Infectious germs might, for instance, be thrown from aircraft direct into pure water reservoirs. In such a case filtration would be ineffectual.” He refers to the possibility of inoculation, but goes on, “An epidemic whose very name recalls the horrors and devastations which it caused in former centuries, and which is, therefore, particularly likely to spread terror and dismay, is the human plague. The most likely way of spreading an epidemic of plague would, no doubt, be the scattering of plague-infected rats, which might very easily be achieved with the help of aircraft. In this way an epidemic of bubonic plague might almost certainly be brought about in the trenches, which in any case are alive with rats; in the interior of the enemy country, also, the dissemination of plague germs on a large scale would be possible, resulting undoubtedly in the formation of centres of infection. . . Professor Pfeiffer also deals with artificial infection of projectiles with . . . anthrax, glanders and perhaps rabies. . . . Professor Cannon comments on crop attack. . . . Professor Madsden gives a balanced view of the possibilities as to the present and the future. . . . The means which bacteriology possesses in its present state of development would certainly suffice to give rise to epidemics of greater or lesser extent; airmen or persons with a knowledge of the topography of localities might infect the central sources of the water or milk supply of a big city, and thereby propagate epidemics of typhoid fever, cholera or other intestinal diseases. Epidemics of this nature might even be fairly serious.

Major Lefebure continues to point out that, although Professor Madsden and some others believe that epidemics could be got under control without much damage being done, they obviously are not taking into full account the special circumstances of war and the fact that diseases would be propagated on a far larger scale than is usual under peace conditions.

He says, quite rightly: —

Now if an attack of this nature were to be made producing hundreds of thousands of casualties requiring (special) treatment quickly, it would take us far and away outside our normal medical facilities both as to appliances and personnel. (The word (special) here replaces a phrase of the same meaning to reduce the necessary quotation to a minimum. L.G.S.).

In addition, resistance to a particular disease is not nearly so high if the population is not exposed to the bacteria of the disease in normal life. It would, therefore, be very unsafe to prophesy the possible rate at which an epidemic of (say) Bubonic plague would spread, since Europeans have not been exposed to this bacteria for several hundred years.

The position at the present time cannot be calculated, but I think it cannot be denied that bacteriological warfare is an additional menace to the security of civilian populations as well as to combatants. Its possibilities we shall learn if we experiment, although the value of such an experiment is yet to be established, but it is certain that expert opinion is firmly convinced that, be the damage great or small, bacteria are definitely an addition to the armoury of destructive weapons.

The quotations I have used were taken from a report made in 1923—it is now 1936.

Protection

There is, and can be, no possible protection whatever for civilian populations against chemical warfare from the air—(Major-Gen. Jackson, ex- Assistant Director, War Office).

There is no protection for the civilian against aerial attack.

Nowhere must this be better realised than in Government circles which have access to knowledge denied to the general public, and the services of experts in all departments of warfare and technology.

They suggest, as a precaution, that the people be instructed in methods of protection, when they know quite well that there are none.

The very best that can be done is to arrange and organise essential services, such as power-stations, fire brigades and doctors, so that they can function and perhaps relieve some part of the suffering with a minimum of interference. That this much is possible, if only gas be considered, is admitted, but high-explosive, thermit and the inevitable stampede of the people, we have not even begun to take into account.

The Government plans decontaminating centres, i.e., receiving stations where the injured can be medically treated and have their dangerous clothing destroyed or made safe for use. It plans to make respirators available for the essential services, and, possibly, a modified form of mask for the civilian population which would afford partial or temporary protection for the lungs, the assumption being, presumably, that this latter type would be used as a subsidiary protection.

The cost of an efficient respirator at the moment is about £4, but mass production would probably result in a considerable drop in price—to (say) 30s. if the manufacture was unsubsidised. Taking war-time production as a basis for calculation, about six months would be required to manufacture 10,000,000 masks. This does not take into account the special needs of young children or aged persons, for whom respiratory protection is a very difficult matter. It has been suggested that very small children might be placed in a sack of some gas-proof material, the air to be supplied by a pump through a filter, but the efficacy of the idea is doubtful, and no useful suggestions have yet been made to overcome the fact that a gassed or injured parent would be unable to continue pumping. Presumably, too, it would be necessary to anaesthetise the child before inserting it into the sack. Otherwise it would probably act in the same way as a cat in a bag—struggle furiously to get out.

To the suggestion of gas-shelters I oppose the following facts and figures. If bomb- and gas-proof shelters could be constructed to house (say) 500 people, and such large shelters present a considerable engineering problem, about 10,000 would be required as a minimum to house the population of London in immediate danger.

These shelters, which at present exist on paper and in the minds of optimistic speculators, would take months, if not years, to build. They would need a reinforced concrete roof 13 feet thick, or to be sunk to a depth of 80 feet underground to provide reasonable safety from high-explosive. The walls, if the shelter was built above ground, would need to be strong enough to carry the roof and to withstand the shock of high-explosive on the roof or the side-thrust on the walls if it dropped in the immediate vicinity. Such shelters would have to be constructed to admit no air whatsoever except through special filters. Apart from the fact that no device is known that will go on filtering indefinitely, and, therefore, if intensive attacks were carried out over a period of several days the filters would probably release the gas in ever-growing quantities into the chamber, the smallest crack in the structure would admit air directly from outside and make the filters useless.

Chimneys could be used to draw pure air from above the gas-cloud, but to be reasonably safe they would have to be constructed to a height of at least 150 feet—an excellent target for high-explosive. The following facts should demolish any arguments in favour of chimneys: —

A 500/1,000 kg. explosive bomb can demolish a whole block of houses, even if it only explodes in the vicinity.

A 100/200 kg. explosive bomb can destroy a house of several stories.

A 50 kg. explosive bomb can cause serious damage.

(General Von Haeften.)

The chimney that could withstand the explosive force of a 100-200 kg. bomb planted reasonably near the base cannot be built.

Water would be a serious problem since mustard gas, in particular, sinks to the bottom of reservoirs and renders water drawn from such a source undrinkable.

Food supplies would have to be rigorously protected from mustard and lewisite, and as attacks on docks and wharves with high-explosive, thermit and mustard gas would be an enemy's certain course of action, it is difficult to see how it could be done.

If an air-raid on London was signalled, the city would be plunged into total darkness. At the same time the public would be told of the impending raid in some way or another, and, human nature being what it is, would attempt to evacuate the city. Almost the whole of London’s private car traffic would be thrown, in pitch darkness, on to roads already incapable of providing for normal traffic. Buses would leave their routes and head for open country. People would make for the country on foot, by cycle, lorry or any kind of transport they could commandeer. The rate of evacuation would not, perhaps, be very great until the raid commenced, but when the dead and wounded and fires springing up in every direction became an actuality, then it cannot be doubted that something {in the nature of a stampede would commence. Necessarily, thousands would be killed in the raid, but the problem would take on its most serious aspects when the question of food, shelter and sanitary arrangements for several million panic-stricken people became of urgent importance. It is more than possible that famine and epidemic diseases would have to be dealt with.

If it is thought that I exaggerate possibilities, here are the words of the military correspondent of the Daily Telegraph: —

It has been suggested that in the event of severe air attacks, 40 per cent. of London's population would leave the city within the first 48 hours, and 80 per cent. within the week. Such an estimate may be exaggerated, but it is, nevertheless, essential to consider ways of controlling any such mass evacuation and of feeding and housing refugees. 

Gerald Heard has expressed much the same opinion recently, and from occasional items of news it is permissible to assume that the Government are awake to this probability.

Even if efficient gas-shelters were in existence, it is mere likely than not that their protective capacity would be doubted and an evacuation take place on nearly as large a scale.

The imagination refuses to function except in vague generalisation. To fill in details would be beyond its scope.

For man, woman or child there is no sure protection.

Summary

War would inevitably lead to destructive air attacks on the cities, not only of England, but of all belligerent countries, with effects very much as I have described.

Modern warfare is, above all, a battle of productive capacity, and a necessary condition of the factory operative being able to function is that he shall be reasonably free from attack. It is therefore very much to a country’s advantage to harry its enemy’s centres of production and distribution.

It is more than possible that, after simultaneous raids on the capital cities of all the belligerents, the effects would be so grave that an immediate armistice would be sought by ail parties. The vulnerable spots in any country are its great centres of population and production, but without such centres it is impossible to wage war on a modem scale with modern weapons, and, in spite of opinions to the contrary, there can be little doubt that the full possibilities of unrestricted warfare in Europe are well-known to all European Governments and military experts. The present spectacle qf elderly statesmen trying to adapt the diplomacy of Metternich, the Napoleonic wars and the fin-de-siecle to modern conditions, would be amusing if it did not carry within itself the germs of gigantic tragedy.

We may observe the fear in action in the bluff and counter-bluff that has characterised the dispute between Italy and England. There is no doubt that Italy's action threatened British capitalists' African and Imperial interests, and, in pre-war days, strong military action would have been taken at the commencement of the dispute. Now the case is altered. By using the League of Nations to declare an economic siege against Italy, Britain hoped to protect its interests without resorting to that unknown quantity—war. Mussolini had already made tentative arrangements to evacuate Naples, but it is doubtful if his advisers would have allowed him to declare war.

It would be a very bold speculator indeed who would dare to predict the future, but the possibility of war will be more remote when its dangers are more widely realised.

L. G. Savage

[Concluded.]

The Menace of Aerial Warfare - Part 2 (1936)

From the August 1936 issue of the Socialist Standard

Link to Part 1.

Towards the end of the War we sat in our cellars and whispered after each bomb that dropped nearby, “Can you smell gas?” We didn’t know what it smelt like, but we sniffed apprehensively and hoped there would be no strange smell. What if we had smelt gas? We should have died like rats in a sewer. We should have been merely part of the dead incidental to war. And not even the useless consolation of a place on a Roll of Honour. The war-dead, whether they are civilians or civilian soldiers, are victims of a predatory anarchy, which exists between nations by virtue of the profit system. They are not even romantic victims. They die terror-stricken, in mud and filth. They crouch in holes, waiting for high-explosive and asphyxiating and excoriating gases to put a period to their lives. Their monument is an interim dividend.

What is the answer of capitalism to this? Aeroplanes, more aeroplanes, and yet more aeroplanes, with bombers in the ratio of two to one.

Let me give you another little picture, this time drawn by Major Endries, in his book, “Gift Gaskreig.” This is an English raid on the German manufacturing town of Dusseldorf: —

Light bombing squadrons arrive quickly in the darkness. They drop on the largest and most important factories, now working on night shift, bombs filled with white phosphorus. A torrent of inextinguishable flames overwhelm the buildings. Workmen attempt panic-stricken escapes to the cellars—the population, more panic-stricken, flies underground. The raiding party wireless to H.Q. “successful raid,” and calls for a second raiding party. These arrive with light gas bombs, spreading first an irritant gas that can pierce masks, followed by a second, stronger and more lethal gas, which kills the populace as they flee from underground cellars made uninhabitable by the first gas. Every two or three hours similar attacks are repeated on different parts of the town until everything is enveloped in flames, and clouds of poison gas mark the place where before hundreds of thousands of human beings lived and moved.

It has been suggested that an electric ray or system of electrical power projection might be used against hostile aircraft. Apart from widely scattered articles in the sensational press, there has been no evidence that such a ray or power projection is contemplated or possible, but presumably it would operate by interfering with the ignition, either magneto or coil, and—a remoter possibility—by exploding the fuel tank. It is a matter of fact, however, that intensive experiments have been in progress during the last few years with the application of the compression ignition engine (the Diesel) to aircraft, and the engine will be available for use in heavy aircraft within a matter of months. A ray of the type suggested would, therefore, be quite useless, since the Diesel has no electrical machinery to be affected, and the crude oil fuel is practically non-inflammable.

It is not difficult under a regime of unrestricted development to contemplate bomb and container designs which would release poison gas to dissipate uniformly in a low-lying cloud or death blanket not higher than our tallest buildings. But assume a blanket one hundred yards high, which gives a big margin of error, and we find that less than half a ton of chemical is sufficient to produce effective saturation over a square mile. Even if you multiply this by a thousand to allow largely for wind losses, barriers and higher concentrations, you are still far within the limits of practicable gas attack from the air.—“Scientific Disarmament,” Victor Lefebure.

Mustard gas, which, with Lewisite, is the gas best adapted for the destruction of civilian populations, is known technically as diclorethyl-sulphide. With Lewisite and chlorpicrin it is classified as a vesicant gas because it attacks not only the respiratory organs, but also the eyes, skin and surface tissue of the body. The mask, therefore, is not an efficient or a complete protection. Ordinary clothing will protect against mustard or Lewisite for two or three minutes, after which the gas, which is an easily vapourising liquid, penetrates to the skin. A complete suit of oilskin, so constructed as to be airtight, is a protection, but as such suits could not be worn for more than an hour or two without collapse, it is a matter of Hobson’s choice. As an emergency protection against low concentrations, motor grease smeared thickly on the exposed parts of the body, and especially between the fingers, in the elbow joints, and the parts of the head uncovered by the mask, is said to be effective. The manufacture of oilskin suits in useful quantities is impossible, and the cost would necessarily prohibit wide distribution among the class of people most in need of them—the workers.

Low concentrations of mustard do not kill if the respiratory organs are properly protected, although Lewisite, so far as effective concentration is concerned, is largely an unknown quantity. It causes painful lesions of the skin and tissue, and ulcers and sores, which may lead to prolonged invalidism. The ulcers may be gangrenous and, in the case of Lewisite, will, unless dealt with rapidly, be arsenically poisoned.

The injuries are very difficult of healing. A resultant tendency to despondency and lowering of morale in the patient is often seen. The combating of this must be made a special point in nursing these cases.—“First Aid in Defence Against Chemical Warfare” (Collins & Blackmore).

Both mustard and Lewisite are known as persistent gases, i.e., they persist in the place where dropped for periods varying between seven and fourteen days. The contaminated areas must be treated immediately with “ bleach ” (chloride of lime in powder form) if they are to be moderately safe for use. These gases also persist on the clothing of persons who have been in contact with them, and, if they entered a warm room or gas-shelter, unless their clothing was removed, they would injure the persons in the shelter. Mustard does not affect the skin immediately, the period of delay being from three to twenty-four hours. It is therefore quite possible for such persons to transmit the gas unknowingly for a considerable time. Used against disciplined troops, with proper respiratory protection, the proportion of deaths to casualties from mustard gas is very low, but it cannot be too greatly emphasised that the population of our large cities have not the necessary discipline and knowledge to protect itself.

On cold nights mustard is liable to lay in liquid form on the ground, becoming a dangerous vapour when the temperature rises in the morning.

Food contaminated by mustard gas is uneatable. Mustard burns are as painful inside as out— and fatal. It is certain that docks and wharves would be heavily bombed with mustard to contaminate essential food supplies.

Water is easily contaminated, and boiling is not a protection. To drink affected water might easily be fatal. Reservoirs are easily bombed, and cannot be covered, because water depends upon contact with air to keep it fresh.

Chloride of lime is an efficient neutralising agent, but it is doubtful (to say the least) if enough could be manufactured to supply the civilian population and the forces actively engaged, and since very large supplies of this chemical would be a tactical necessity for the armed forces, the amount available for civilian defence would be inadequate. It is not an exaggeration to say that adequate supplies of chloride of lime will be the deciding factor in any future European war. Lewisite has the definite disadvantage of being efficiently neutralised by water, large supplies of which are usually available. Mustard, on the other hand, can be used to infect large areas for several days, and during this time no troops could use the areas in question. To gain contact with the opposing forces it would be necessary to make “neutral” lanes through the gas by spreading large quantities of chloride of lime.

The most usual type of mustard gas bomb weighs 50 lbs. and contaminates about 600 square yards; the average load of a bombing aeroplane would, therefore, be 90 bombs capable of infecting an area of 54,000 square yards. In practice, of course, there would be a great deal of overlapping, and the figure given cannot be regarded as accurate. Even if we reduce the area by 50 per cent., however, we are left with 27,000 square yards, or 15 square miles, and, although the population of such an area would not necessarily be killed in its entirety, the total of fatal and non-fatal casualties would be extremely high, and it would be dangerous in the extreme for the survivors to move until the gas had been neutralised. There is, too, the additional problem of dealing with injured persons, which, at the present time, seems impossible of solution.

When, during the late War, it was proposed to use mustard gas in shells, it was discovered that the use of liquid presented serious problems in ballistics, which had to be overcome before it could be used. Although these technical difficulties were overcome, gas shells will always remain complicated and expensive things to make. The gas bomb, on the other hand, is not fired by percussion, but dropped. The difficulty, therefore, does not arise. A certain amount of streamlining is used for greater accuracy, but, quite apart from the fact that a gas bomb does not require to be very accurate, even petrol-tins filled with liquid gas and dropped, almost without discrimination, would be effective.

The practice of spraying gas from containers has not yet been used against civilians, but, given reasonable weather conditions, there is no reason why it should not be effective.

It is improbable that gases of the phosgene type would be used against large centres of population, chiefly because mustard is much more effective, easier to handle and as cheap to manufacture. A large distribution of masks capable of protecting the respiratory organs, the provision of gas-shelters arid the efficient gas-proofing of rooms (a comparatively easy job) in the better-built private houses, would provide adequate protection against this gas, which is deadly enough in its effects upon the unprotected, but non-persistent and relatively easy to keep out. Stemutator gases, to stampede the people, might be used, but to assume that the enemy in time of war (whoever the enemy might be) would wish to stampede the people when they could kill them as quickly and easily is a little naive.

It seems clear, then, that we shall have to deal almost entirely with the vesicant gases, high-explosive, thermit and possibly bacteria, and I therefore proceed to a consideration of these three last factors, which, in the anxiety to provide against the major threat of gas, are too often overlooked.

High-Explosive, Thermit and Bacteria

High-explosive is chiefly valuable in air attack for cutting essential connections, such as light, power, gas, water and drainage, in the spreading of general panic by reason of the violence of its effects, and in the destruction of shelters.

There has been great development in the destructive power of high explosive since 1918, and also in the technique of its use.

As an example, the time-delayed bomb may be considered. This bomb explodes between four and 36 hours after it has been dropped, the time of explosion being under full control. In regard to this weapon, the report of the German Red Cross in 1928 to the 13th International Red Cross Conference says: —

It is obvious that all rescue and protective measures would be practically useless if such a bomb exploded in a town after several hours or days. Even the best organised rescue services could scarcely be brought into action under such conditions, and such a step would really mean useless sacrifice.

High-explosive bombs used in aeroplane attacks on London during the last War weighed about 30 lbs. Airship bombs were somewhat larger. Bombs at that time were sufficiently “delayed" to explode after passing through two or three storeys, and could destroy a large house.

It is now possible to construct bombs carrying upwards of a ton of explosive.

In the section dealing with protection I quote some figures given by General Von Haeften, and there is no reason to regard them as exaggerated. Explosive is much more dangerous and destructive than it was twenty years ago.

Thermit has not yet been used against civilians. Its use in times of peace is for welding iron and steel, particularly under-water welding, It can produce a fire-centre of 3,000 degrees Centigrade— above the melting temperature of steel. There is-no method of extinguishing it.

Thermit is a mixture of magnetic iron oxide and aluminium powder, and it can be used equally well in shells or bombs. Thermit bombs weigh approximately 2 lbs., and each bomb is capable of starting a fire centre. Aeroplanes can carry large numbers of these bombs, and it would be a simple matter to start several hundred fires, which might or might not be serious, within the space of an hour or so.

The London Fire Brigade quite recently required most of its personnel and equipment, and the assistance of several fire-floats, to put out a wharf fire, and spent five days doing it. They could not even start to mitigate. the effects of several hundred fires springing up in rapid succession.

The question of the use of bacteria is one that has often been written round, but never seriously examined, in the public Press. This is probably because the effect of this type of warfare is largely incalculable.

It has been rumoured that, at the close of the last War, preparations had been made in several countries to use bacteria, and, in particular, that glanders cultures were discovered in a German embassy for the avowed purpose of infecting Rumanian cavalry horses. Rumour, of course, is proverbially the lying jade, but the technical resources of the time permitted it, and war, after all, is the art of inflicting the maximum of destruction upon the enemy with the minimum of damage to oneself. It would be absurd to expect any considerations of humanity or ethics to temper the tortuous workings of the military mind. The recent bombing of Red Cross units in Abyssinia was quite predictable. It is merely the military mind running true to type.

L. G. Savage

(To be continued.)

Blogger's Note:

The October 1936 issue of the Socialist Standard carried the following correction in connection with this particular article.

Mr. L. G. Savage, the writer of this series of articles, asks us to point out that the instalment which appeared in the August issue contained two errors. In column one, page 123, last paragraph, "magnetic or coil" should read "magneto or coil."

The figures in the last paragraph, column one, page 124, are incorrect. 27,000 square yards is not 15 square miles, but only a small part of a square mile. It will be observed, however, that 27,000 square yards is the area likely to be contaminated by liquid mustard gas, and bears no relation to the area likely to be affected by gas in vapour form.

Ed. Comm.

The Menace of Aerial Warfare (1936)

From the July 1936 issue of the Socialist Standard

(The following article contains a very full examination of the effects of aerial bombing on large centres of population. This writer is not yet a member of the party, but in view of the present importance of the subject, and the support the information gives to the Socialist attitude to war, we have decided in this instance to suspend our rule against including articles by non-members.

There may perhaps be some exaggeration of the probable effects of modern warfare, but on this the reader can form his own judgment from the facts set down. One thing is certain— the effects of another war on a large scale, with the weapons now available, hardly bear thinking about.

Ed. Comm.)

Dye Factories as “Merchants of Death."

Prior to 1914 the I.G. (Interessen Gemeinschaft) possessed a virtual monopoly of the world’s dyestuffs industry. In other countries the industry was in a crude and embryo stage of development. To the general reader it may seem a long way from the manufacturer of dyes to the “merchant of death”—so far, indeed, that this industry has not yet figured, as it deserves, in any of the recent enquiries into the arms traffic. It must remain undisputed, however, that all the motives of the manufacturer of guns, shells, aeroplanes and tanks, in keeping war to the forefront as an instrument of policy, must apply with equal force, to the manufacturer of dyestuffs.

The next war will find the Yorkshire dye factories the most important manufacturers of weapons of offence in England.

When considering all the information made available after the last War had ended, it seems certain that the I.G. played the major part in prolonging the German resistance and, furthermore, had the strategic advantages of this enormous plant been fully realised, the War would have terminated in a German victory by the end of 1915. That she did not understand is now history.

When the first shock of surprise was over, and the immense advantage gained by the German’s use of chlorine was not followed up, the manufacture of poison gas was started in England and France, and it was realised that the pre-War monopoly of the dye industry was making possible the large-scale use of poison gas by the German Army.

Dye factories can be changed over to the production of war gases in a very short time. Indeed, most of the gases have a legitimate industrial use in times of peace. It is for the latter reason that it will always be impossible to disarm, so far as gas is concerned.

Before the last War the dye industry was practically non-existent in England and France, and when it became necessary to manufacture mustard gas (dichlorethyl-sulphide) on a scale suitable to the requirements of modern warfare, new plant had to be erected, which, in many respects, was identical with the normal aniline dye plants. It was not until late in the War, after many failures and many casualties, that production was commenced, but, by the Armistice, it was possible for the Allies to boast that they were in a position to “drown the Germans in mustard gas.” If there had been a well-developed dye industry in England or France, the time required to start production could have been reduced by perhaps as much as 95 per cent.

The importance of the dye industry was realised by England during the Great War by reason of these costly and laborious experiments in gas-production, and, in 1919, the import of dyes was prohibited, except under licence from the Board of Trade. That this order was illegal, having regard to the law at that time, led, in 1920, to the Dyestuffs (Import Regulations) Act, which became operative in January, 1921, whereby the import of dyestuffs and intermediates was totally prohibited for ten years except under Government licence. About the same time France, the U.S.A. and Italy created high import duties to foster the development of the industry.

At the close of the year 1918, the world’s capacity to produce dyestuffs was double that of 1914, the figures standing at 300,000 tons.

The following tabulation of the annual production figures for 1929, of the principal manufacturing countries, is of interest:

Germany (tons) 72,000

U.S.A                 38,000

France         16,000

England         15,000

It will be seen that, at this time, the combined production of the three latter countries did not equal that of Germany. The next in order is the U.S.A., with 38,000 tons, and it is significant that the menace of chemical warfare has been realised more fully in the U.S.A. than in any other country, with the exception of Germany. The U.S.A., in addition to encouraging the manufacture of dyestuffs, possess a large factory (the largest of its kind in the world) at Edgewood, devoted to the manufacture of all types of poisonous gases and equipment.

In 1926 the Imperial Chemical Industries (I.C.I.) was formed with a capital of £65,000,000 to take over and co-ordinate the activities of Brunner Mond & Co., Ltd., Nobel Industries, Ltd. ' (manufacturers, among other things, of explosives), United Alkali Co., Ltd., British Dyestuffs Corporation, and a good many others. The ramifications of this huge combine are extensive, but largely unknown. The merger certainly has had the effect of unifying the potential producers of poison gas with the heavy chemical and high-explosives industry.

Nothing is more certain than that we have here a huge plant that could be mobilised at a moment's notice for the production of war material, and would make profit by the prosecution of war. Therefore, even in the absence of proof, the I.C.I. must be suspected, as must every other potential producer of war material on a large scale, of favouring war as a means of settling the international disputes of capitalists.

It cannot be denied that the chemical industry is of enormous benefit to man, but it is also his potential destroyer. Explosives are necessary to human progress, but the I.C.I. is not organised to help human progress.

For my own part I do not think that there is anything particularly dishonourable in the activities of armament makers in general, or this side of the I.C.I.’s business in particular, because they are merely working within the framework of a system or social organisation that determines their business methods. I do not intend this to be an apologia for armourers, but it is indisputable that, during the last year or two, they have been made scapegoats for evils inherent in the profit system, and my purpose is to draw attention to the wider issues involved.

Shortly after the War the I.G. concluded price-controlling agreements with the dye factories of France, Russia and Italy. It is more than possible that there has been some exchange of personnel and formulae. The I.C.I. also hold large blocks of shares in the I.G.

Even a substance so innocent as beet-sugar, the manufacture of which is subsidised by the Government, can be used as the means of producing supplies of glycerine, alcohol, acetone and hydrocyanic acid. Alcohol is a base for the manufacture of cordite, which probably explains what has been a very unprofitable subsidy.

Chlorine, used as a bleach for fabrics, is a war gas that has been largely superseded, but combined with so common a gas as carbon monoxide, it becomes phosgene, the deadliest of the non-persistent lung-irritants, with the power of corroding metals.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that profits can be made in the chemical industry from war, and the profit system being what it is, the industry’s motives must be suspect.

The Aeroplane

It is well for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can prevent him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. The only defence is in offence, which means that you have got to kill women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.—Stanley Baldwin.

Fighting in the air on a large scale only takes place by accident or by mutual consent.—Air-Marshal Sir R. Brooke-Popham.

CREATE A NEW WINGED ARMY OF LONG-RANGE BRITISH BOMBERS TO SMASH THE FOREIGN HORNETS IN THEIR NESTS.—Hands Off~Britain Air Defence League.

The last quotation is the only answer that has so far been evolved by the present system to the threat of the first two.

The development of the aeroplane since the close of the Great War has been rapid.

Within the last few years we have seen nonstop flights of over 4,000 miles; Australia reached in a little over three days; the Dornier DO X and Soviet aeroplanes to carry over one hundred passengers; aeroplanes annihilating conceptions of space and time remaining to us from quieter days. But we have not yet seen the aeroplane as the destroyer of cities and the slaughterer of millions. Yet, at the present time, this power could be demonstrated at almost any moment. Certainly within a few days.

Unless the people, on whom, ultimately, the power of governments depend, stop thinking in terms of war and think in terms of mass extermination, unless they can force the governments of the world to do something which, so far, has been found impossible, by reason of inordinate self-interest, to do—internationalise civil and military air-fleets, then the present civilisation will become a closed chapter in the history of man’s struggle against barbarism. The collapse that would immediately and inevitably follow the commencement of another war between industrialised countries would be bloodier—more destructive of human life and welfare—than ever before in man’s short history.

Knowing this, Lord Londonderry boasted in the House of Lords (in May, 1935) that he “Had the utmost difficulty, amid the public outcry, in preserving the use of the bombing aeroplane, even on the frontiers of the Middle East and India.” It seems as if Lord Londonderry wishes to immolate the population of our large cities for the convenience of the Indian Army and it is not surprising, therefore, that the Prime Minister should have taken the first possible opportunity to sacrifice him to political expediency.

The standard bomber now in use has an out-and-home range of about 1,000/1,500 miles. Greater range can be attained by substituting extra supplies of petrol for part of the bomb load. The average load is two tons of bombs, in addition to personnel and protective weapons. Fifty tons, a load for twenty-five such aeroplanes, is the quantity necessary, according to the Earl of Halsbury, to destroy every man, woman and child in the London area.

“ Mustard gas,” he says, “is the most deadly of known gases. In an area, say, Richmond to Barking and from Finchley to Streatham, an effective lethal dose would be only forty-two tons. In twelve hours every man, woman and child in that area might fail to live.”

“Fail to live” should be read “subjected to an agonising death.” I am sure that the Earl of Halsbury knows sufficient about the physiological effects of mustard-gas not to object to this trifling emendation.

In December, 1928, Brigadier-General Crozier, writing in the Times, said: —

”During the Great War 380 tons of bombs were dropped in and around London. That quantity could now be delivered in less than twelve hours.”

Although this is quite bad enough, I question the General’s figures. Three hundred and eighty tons is a load for about 200 bombers. I suggest that almost any country within striking distance of London could and would detach a good many more bombers from their air fleet for the important purpose of destroying the city, and could do this without appreciably weakening it. In addition, the large night-flying commercial machine would be very suitable for distributing mustard-gas and lewisite in large quantities. These machines have a lift of from three to six tons, and would require very little structural alteration. Normally they have a low ceiling and a slow speed, but this is not a serious handicap to night bombing, especially if the weather is cloudy.

Air manoeuvres have proved time and again that bombing aeroplanes can gain position over London as and when they like; that they can destroy between dusk and dawn nearly seven million people—almost as many as were killed on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918.

Let me draw a little picture. Towards the end of an evening in 1915 I was sitting in an armchair, reading, when, without warning, a terrific explosion shook the house and blew the window glass into the room. I knew at once that this was an air-raid, the first of the airships to reach London. There were several more explosions followed by silence. Obeying my primary impulse I ran for the cellar, which was an extremely flimsy affair, unlikely to offer much protection, and I knew that the bombs had fallen very close. In the morning I set out to see the damage, and found that, two streets away, most of the houses had been destroyed. I was fortunate enough to see the road before it was closed to the public, and to see for myself the aftermath of an air-raid that was, in relation to the destructive possibilities of modern armament, as a bow-and-arrow to a fifteen-inch gun. The fronts of several houses had been blown out. A bedstead stuck out of one at a sickening angle, the iron contorted into bizarre shapes by the violence of the explosion. The road was covered with debris and rubble, and the surface was gashed and torn. A young man had said “good-night!” to his fiancee, and crossed the road. When I saw the place the body had been removed, but his brains remained as a patch on the wall. I heard, subsequently, that the (inquest verdict was “ Murder against the Kaiser,” an interesting example of war mentality, but of very little use to the dead. 

L. G. Savage.

(To be continued.)