Troubled waters (1983)

From the October 1983 issue of the Socialist Standard

After ten years of intermittent discussion the Law of the Sea Conference finally came to a close last December when a Convention was signed by 117 states at an official ceremony at Montego Bay, Jamaica. Several key states, however — most notably the United States, Britain. West Germany and Japan — have refused to sign on the grounds that the proposed International Seabed Authority limits the freedom of their mining companies to exploit the resources of the seabed. The creation of an international organisation to manage seabed mining threatened the existence of the Conference throughout the last ten years and even now poses a threat to the workings of the new Law of the Sea. In fact the central issues which predominated during the conference were the thorny ones of ownership and control of resources. It could be said, however, that the aim of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference was to establish the rules of the game for the use and abuse of the oceans. This proved necessary since there was an increase in the recoverable economic value of the seabed combined with a polarisation of interests between the industrialised states of the north and the developing states of the south — a factor promoted by the increase in the number of new sovereign states since the post-1945 de-colonisation. The interests of the south are articulated by the Group of 77, which in 1980 comprised 117 states. This coalition is determined to ensure that there will be no new colonialism in relation to the wealth of the seabed.

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) started in 1973. UNCLOS was divided into three main committees — for deep sea mining; traditional law of the sea problems such as navigation, continental shelf and fisheries; and marine research and pollution. These issues were not without controversy since disputes exist over national boundaries, rights within national boundaries, those over rights in the ocean beyond national jurisdiction and those arising from non-ocean sources. Around the world there are numerous contested zones, islands, archipelagos, not to mention rights over navigation. There are more than 100 strategically important straits such as the Malacca strait between Malaysia and Indonesia, through which the bulk of Japan’s oil supplies pass. There are disputes over fishing where the interests of the maritime states — the Soviet Union and Japan for example — with large distant water fishing fleets collide with those of the coastal states with large fishing grounds off their shores.

The establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone — EEZ — would allow states to claim exclusive rights to the seabed out to 200 miles from the shore. There are, however, numerous islands whose ownership is hotly contested, the Falklands for instance. Although islands are defined as naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water at high tide and therefore entitled to an EEZ, this does not prevent states from demanding EEZ rights for rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life on their own. The reason for this is simple: states commanding rocks in resource-rich areas can use them to claim the contiguous resources. In this respect the dispute between Britain. Ireland and Denmark over Rockall, a tiny rock about 400km west of the Hebrides, came into focus since it commands an area of 201,250kms of the continental shelf with potential oil reserves. It is not surprising then that Britain has consistently argued that existing international law makes no distinction between different types of island and that to do so is likely to result in ambiguities. The resolution of this particular squabble — ownership and whether such rocks are entitled to an EEZ — will set an important precedent as there are similar disputed “rocks" in the Pacific and Caribbean.

The Falklands war was not unrelated to the question of EEZs since the continental shelf contains oil reserves and the seas are rich in fish stocks. It is for this reason that seemingly insignificant islands as the Falklands Dependencies, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, assume strategic significance as they can be used to stake claims to the resources in the surrounding seas and on the seabed. Furthermore such islands are useful as a staging post to the Antarctic, another area potentially rich in untapped resources. Shortly after the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands Lord Shakleton was moved to remark:

What is at stake and what undoubtedly is in the minds of the Argentinians is not just the Falkland Islands but their claim to Antarctic territory. (3 April 1982 Hansard (Lords) vol. 448 col. 1585.)

Two supposedly allied NATO states, Greece and Turkey, were at one time more likely to go to war with one another than with the Soviet Union over the resources of the Aegean Sea. According to Barry Buzan, “The conflict of interest between Greece and Turkey arose, like many others, after discovery of oil by an American exploration company” (Adelphi Papers No. 143, A Sea of Troubles? Sources of Dispute in the New Ocean REGIME).

In the Far East. Japan, in addition to the long-running dispute with the Soviet Union over the Kurile Islands, contests the ownership of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea with both China and Taiwan. The significance of potentially large off-shore oil is not lost on states dependent on oil imports such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Moreover, the continental shelf and economic zone boundaries cannot be drawn until this dispute is resolved.

The Barents Sea and the conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and Norway is. perhaps, typical of many of the problems associated with delimitation. The contested area constitutes roughly 153,000 square kilometres of the continental shelf between Novaya Zemlaya and Spitsbergen. For the Norewegians substantial fish and seabed resources, principally oil, depend on how the boundary is drawn. This is particularly important for the Norwegians since oil is vital for their economy. The existence of indigenous oil reserves, as in the North Sea and possibly in the Barents Sea, allows Norway to avoid the vulnerabilities associated with dependence on Middle Eastern oil. It is for this reason that Norway is concerned about the activities of a Russian oil drilling ship, the Valentin Shashin (Guardian, 2 May 1983). Energy supplies, even for resource-rich Russia, may become critical in the next decade since Soviet oil and gas supplies may be insufficient to meet both domestic and growing Eastern European demands. Despite the disputed zone the Norwegians have recently signed a deal with the Russians which will, according to the Guardian (27 April 1983) permit the Norwegian Petroleum Consultants to evaluate exploration costs to decide where to drill and to frame the timetable of the operation. Offshore oil exploration is an area in which the Russians lack the technological expertise of Western states and are, therefore, heavily dependent on Western assistance. In fact, “the Norwegian offshore industry is keen to get in on the act, and the yards have been pressing the Government to be allowed to sell to the Soviets” (Guardian, 17 June 1983). Furthermore, the British and the French are keen to sell the Russians oil-exploration-related technology even though the American government would rather they did not. However, “this is not in the interests of West European industry and commerce” (Guardian, 27 April 1983).

In addition to the availability of oil and gas the Russians have a keen military interest in the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. The Russian Northern Fleet has bases at Pechanga, Murmansk and Severomorsk, all of which are situated on the Kola Peninsula in the Leningrad Military District. Moreover, one of the two Soviet ballistic missile submarine bases is at Polyarny at the Eastern end of the peninsula. However, as the British and Norwegians discovered, increased commercial traffic and oil exploration do not mix — as they had to transfer their joint manoeuvres from the North Sea to the Shetlands. UNCLOS allows for the concept of “innocent passage” whereby ships are entitled to passage provided it is not prejudicial to the “peace", "good order" or “security" of the coastal states. Warships and submarines, however, pose problems but all attempts to restrain their passage have been opposed by the major maritime states.

Perhaps the greatest controversy facing the Conference relates to deep sea mining. The resources at stake are large deposits of potato-shaped polymetallic nodules — “manganese nodules". They contain traces of vital “strategic metals" such as cobalt, nickel, copper and manganese. On average each nodule contains 30 per cent manganese, 1 per cent nickel and ¼ per cent cobalt. Cobalt, for instance, is an indispensable element in the manufacture of small high-powered magnets necessary for weapons guidance systems. In a uranium enrichment plant employing the gaseous diffusion method nickel plated steel is used since it is able to withstand the highly corrosive uranium hexathoride gas. However,

The nodules themselves have lost glamour to deposits of polymetallic sulphides containing copper and other metals in much higher concentrations, first encountered at volcanic vents in the Pacific rift near the Galapagos Islands and off the coasts of Oregon and Washington. Similar deposits are certain to be found elsewhere along the 40,000 mile world-gridling submarine rifted ridge. (“The Law of the Sea. Elisabeth M. Borgese, Scientific American, March 1983, Vol. 248. No. 3. p. 33.)

Hitherto such metals were only available from relatively few states which were either politically unstable or unfriendly to the West. Since the EEC’s import dependence for materials such as manganese is 99 per cent and copper 91 per cent, “The European Community's industrialised countries are keen to see that seabed mining for cobalt, copper, manganese and nickel begins as soon as possible and with as little restraint as possible” (Guardian, 23 November 1982). Japan is 95 per cent dependent on imports of manganese and 98 per cent on nickel. It is, therefore, not too difficult to appreciate the interests of Western states in the possibility of achieving independence in relation to the supply of industrial materials. This chiefly explains their opposition to the deep sea mining provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention. Britain and the US vigorously oppose the insistence of the developing states that an International Seabed Authority should regulate the market, transfer technology and ensure that the benefits accrue to the developing states. In short, the key problem is who will be permitted to exploit seabed nodules?

The Group of 77 argued that since the new resources of minerals threatened the economics of those states in the developing world dependent on the export of one or two minerals such states should be compensated for the loss of export earnings. Moreover, it urged that an ISA should have stronger powers; for example, to regulate production and to carry out mining operations and related activity in the name of the Authority. The United States however, largely at the behest of its multinational mining companies, opposed the treaty on the grounds that such an Authority would limit their commercial freedom, specifically by obliging them to pay taxes on earnings from mining to such an authority as well as to supply it with technology. Although the Group of 77 insisted that the establishment of an ISA is an integral component of a New International Economic Order and sees the ISA as very much a test case for future resource redistribution, the Group has been unable to maintain its unity. It has been dominated by coastal states, especially those with large coastlines and significant offshore resources. This has been achieved at the expense of the “geographically disadvantaged states” — landlocked states and those without large coastlines or significant offshore resources. Even though the industrialised states oppose the content of the ISA proposals, not all are in favour of unhindered access and exploitation since this would work to the unilateral advantage of American mining companies. Britain, West Germany and Italy share the American view, but Ireland, Denmark and Greece “recognise the advantages the treaty could provide for countries lacking the industrial base for seabed mining” (Guardian. 23 November 1982).

At the signing ceremony of the Convention the US representative, Thomas Clingan, stated unequivocally that:

The US has an extreme national interest in having access to strategic metals from the oceans . . . the Treaty just doesn’t meet our interests in terms of deep sea-bed mining provisions. (International Herald Tribune, 8 December 1982.)

And that, in the end, is what the Law of the Sea Conference is concerned with: the pursuit of the “national interest" — the owning minority. The resources of the seabed beyond the 200-mile EEZs are designated “the common heritage of mankind”; nothing could be further from the truth.

John Walker

Johnny Mushroomseed (1983)

From the August 1983 issue of the Socialist Standard

In American folk history there is a character called “Johnny Appleseed" who is reputed to have crossed the North American continent planting appleseeds and thus, in the space of a few years, bringing apple trees to America. A cartoon in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists borrowed the idea of Johnny Appleseed to portray American nuclear policy since the Atoms for Peace programme launched in 1953. The new character was Johnny Mushroomseed who disseminated civil nuclear reactors throughout the world and in doing so created the possibility of future nuclear weapon states. This is because any nuclear reactor — Magnox, AGR, PWR or Candu — produces plutonium even though its principal function is power generation. Plutonium, or rather the plutonium isotope 239, is bomb-making material and as little as 4kgs are required to manufacture a nuclear bomb; therefore, the expanded production of plutonium resulting from civil nuclear reactors poses a serious proliferation threat. The central problem of nuclear non-proliferation has been how to have one — nuclear power — without the other — nuclear bombs. America has never been able to reconcile the interest of its nuclear industry with those of non-proliferation; in other words, profits come before the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

The Atoms for Peace programme was a contrast to the first eight years of American nuclear history, when the MacMahon Act prohibited the disclosure of nuclear secrets and the transfer of nuclear materials. The fledgling American nuclear industry feared that it was in danger of being excluded from a highly lucrative market by the more advanced British state controlled nuclear industry, and it was this which contributed to the change in policy. However, there was no assessment of the political implications of selling nuclear reactors since the risks of proliferation from a civil nuclear fuel cycle were not considered relevant. The uranium route to the bomb was reckoned to be too technologically sophisticated for most states, and since plutonium produced by a civil reactor was thought to be of no military use on account of the existence of the heavier plutonium isotopes, plutonium 240 in particular (weapons grade plutonium constitutes ideally 93 per cent Pu-239) the sale of nuclear reactors did not constitute a proliferation risk.

The Atoms for Peace programme, however, let loose an avalanche of nuclear hardware and knowledge; for example, over 11.000 technical papers on plutonium were de-classified. This has, in effect, enabled such states as Brazil to produce their own nuclear weapons. In fact Brazil, according to a report in the International Herald Tribune 4 February 1983, has taken a significant step towards developing a nuclear weapons potential by producing its own plutonium in a US supplied research reactor. The plutonium was produced in the 5-megawatt Babcock and Wilcox reactor at Brazil’s leading atomic research centre on the outskirts of Sao Paolo. South Africa’s research reactor, SAFARI-1 — South African Fundamental Atomic Research reactor — was also provided by the US. and according to Dan Smith, “the aid South Africa has received under the Atoms for Peace programme has had a central role in the development of a military potential'' (South Africa’s Nuclear Capability, Dan Smith. World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, London, 1980, p!4). SAFARI-1 is a light water reactor which uses highly enriched uranium and was provided by the Allis Chalmers Corporation. For years the Americans rationalised their continued sale of nuclear reactors and provision of nuclear fuel on the grounds that this allowed the US to exert leverage over the recipient states and thereby prevent them from developing their own nuclear weapons.

This was to change. Although the French and German nuclear industries were based on American technologies, the light water reactor, Framatome and Kraftwerk Union began to challenge the Americans for a share of the world nuclear reactor market. Furthermore, the development of uranium enrichment plants in Western Europe by Urenco (West Germany, Britain and the Netherlands) and Eurodif (France, Spain, Belgium and Italy) threatened the American monopoly for the supply of enriched uranium. The ensuing competition undermined the already flimsy international safeguards system. In 1975 West Germany agreed to supply Brazil with a complete nuclear fuel cycle which would, theoretically, lay the basis for Brazilian nuclear self-sufficiency. Not to be outdone the American company Bechtel offered to build Brazil a uranium enrichment plant, even though official US policy sought to prevent Brazil from obtaining such a facility.

In contrast to the Atoms for Peace era of American nuclear policy, the US government was now more proliferation conscious. However, the attempts of the State Department to dissuade the West Germans from going ahead with the deal were regarded as little more than a thinly veiled attempt to protect US commercial interests rather than an expression of proliferation concern. But since the German nuclear industry has come to depend on the export market, American non-proliferation policies were unlikely to be well received. The nuclear market favours the buyer who is more likely, therefore, to prefer suppliers who are less insistent on full scope safeguards for the transferred nuclear plant and material. The recent French decision to supply enriched uranium to India might not have been reached if the French had insisted on stricter safeguards. Indeed French eagerness to conclude the nuclear fuel deal was not unrelated to the fact that:

The French were understood to be eager to resolve the Tarapur dispute quickly so that they can cultivate the government of Prime Minister Gandhi for lucrative arms contracts and deals for transfer of technology to compensate for tight Western markets. International Herald Tribune, 24 November 1982, p3.

The Americans were powerless to stop this deal going ahead.

The oil crisis of 1973 had a major impact on the energy policies of Western Europe, North America and Japan. The desire to avoid external dependence for energy supplies was instrumental in confirming the need for nuclear power largely because it appeared to offer the best road to energy independence. In terms of energy independence reactors based on plutonium were considered, even from the early days of nuclear power in the years after 1945, to be the best option; the fast breeder reactor produces more fuel than it consumes. In order to establish a fast reactor programme it is essential to reprocess the spent fuels from the earlier thermal reactors to provide the initial load of plutonium fuel. Even without commitment to the fast reactor reprocessing was, and remains, desirable because it makes more efficient use of the original uranium fuel, and when doubts exist about the future availability of uranium supplies the attractions of a fast reactor seem obvious. There is, however, a major proliferation risk associated with expanded use and production of plutonium since there is nothing to stop such material from being diverted from ostensibly civil stocks to military programmes. Accounting of plutonium is very imprecise and even a one per cent loss in the “statistical noise” would release enough plutonium to build several atomic bombs. For example, India has had a long standing commitment to reprocessing and fast reactor technology since it corresponds to a national policy of nuclear self-sufficiency. India commenced large scale reprocessing at the end of 1982. When we consider that India’s nuclear test (107m down a shaft at Pokharan in the Rajasthan desert on 18 May 1974) used about 15kgs of plutonium derived from the Canadian supplied CIRIUS reactor, the proliferation risk associated with large quantities of separable plutonium is only too apparent.

The Americans, beginning with the Ford Administration and carried on by its successor, concluded that moves toward undue reliance on reprocessing and the “plutonium economy” were events to be avoided; therefore. Carter’s nonproliferation initiative deferred American commitment to reprocessing, and the fast reactor project at Clinch River, Tennessee, was indefinitely postponed. This was done in the hope that such self-sacrifice would persuade others, primarily the Europeans and the Japanese, to do likewise. They were, however, unimpressed primarily because they had extensive plutonium projects which they regarded, especially the French, as vital to their energy security and hence political independence. Moreover, they suspected that concern with proliferation was yet another attempt by the US to regain its nuclear monopoly since the Americans were lagging behind the Europeans in reprocessing and fast reactor technology. In fact it was doubts about the reliability of the US as a supplier of nuclear materials that had provided the impetus for the development of indigenous nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing and uranium enrichment, in Europe and the developing world. In short, American opportunities to influence the behaviour of states through relationships of dependence were disappearing fast.

Profit first

Although non-proliferation was ostensibly a major issue for the Carter Administration, reflected in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the interests of profitability came first; for example, the US continued to supply India with uranium fuel notwithstanding India’s refusal to sign the NPT and submit all her nuclear plants to international inspection. In Hazards of the International Energy Crisis (eds. I). Carlton & C. Schaerf, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1982, p 11) it is argued that “the export of reactors is now vital to the economic viability of national nuclear industries and has a higher priority than the overall main goal of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation”. Even a Commissioner with the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Victor Gilinsky, was able to remark that:

despite international safeguards, the NPT and various international co-operative arrangements, the history of the past 25 years suggests that in reality commercial considerations have tended to dominate security concerns, complicating and even undermining efforts at control. (“‘Plutonium, Proliferation and the Price of Reprocessing", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1978/9 No.2, Vol.57, p376.)

In an attempt to forestall the dissemination of “sensitive” nuclear technology the supplier states, including America, came together in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. The object was to restrain the spread of proliferation sensitive technology and impose stricter safeguards on all exports. Items on the list included isotopic separation plants, reactors, reactor control rods, fuel fabrication plants, heavy water manufacturing equipment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities. However, states in the developing world have no time for what they see as the technological colonialism of this nuclear cartel. In any case, as has been shown, commercial imperatives tend to outweigh any notional commitments to non-proliferation. Furthermore, those states on the nuclear weapons threshold can no longer be denied the expertise and hardware since they already possess them; moreover, such states as India and Argentina, both of whom are outside the NPT. can now export their own nuclear materials and know-how.

The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Programme, largely instigated by the US. was another attempt to find a technical solution to a political problem since its aim was to find a more proliferation resistant fuel cycle. The INFCEP failed to do this, nor did it generate any new radical ideas on how to deal with the proliferation problem. Needless to say the American nuclear industry was none too keen on the restrictive policies of the Carter Administration; therefore, it was not surprising that the nuclear industry eagerly anticipated the advent of Ronald Reagan.

According to the Reagan Administration nuclear proliferation was not really a problem. Mahlon Gates, Assistant Secretary for Energy, informed the Senate Appropriations Committee that he was "pleased to announce that the Department had embarked on a course of action intended to reverse the deterioration of our nuclear industry and restore us to a position of leadership in the international community”. Moreover, the earlier decision to deter reprocessing and the Clinch River reactor was revoked. But the principal threat to the non-proliferation regime comes from US military policy. Although there is a shortage of plutonium and tritium (necessary for thermonuclear bombs) the US military expansion requires an increase in the number of nuclear warheads. Previously fissile material from older warheads was re-cycled, but with an expansion of 15,000 warheads planned, existing plutonium stocks will be insufficient. This shortage is generating pressures to reprocess spent fuel from commercial pow'er stations, which will, as The Guardian notes (10 March 1982, Reagan atomic plan ‘breaks rules’), violate the principle laid down by the International Atomic Energy Agency — and incorporated into the NPT — that civilian facilities should never become involved in military programmes. The most likely consequence of this development will be the further weakening of the already fragile non-proliferation regime. The technical relationship between civil and military technology is again proving to be the undoing of non-proliferation policies.

After almost forty years the nuclear arms race continues unabated. Civil nuclear technology figures prominently in the energy policies of many states in the developing world, and despite their assurances that such programmes are purely for peaceful purposes, bomb manufacture is within their grasp. It has been said that the nuclear genie is very definitely out of its bottle; therefore, the main aim of policy must be to put it back; however, the chances of achieving a successful non-proliferation policy, whether American or international, within the confines of capitalism are as great as finding the Lost Dutchman Mine.

John Walker

Glicoms* and the Pioneer (1984)

From the March 1984 issue of the Socialist Standard

Despite the protestations of CND, the first ground launched cruise missiles arrived at Greenham Common in December 1983, almost exactly four years since the initial deployment decision was made. The subsequent Russian walk-out from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces talks in Geneva left both sides of the nuclear debate to draw separate conclusions. Primarily because the controversy over nuclear weapons in Europe has focussed exclusively on particular weapon types — cruise and the SS-20 — rather more substantive issues have been ignored. In particular, the relationship between military technology and doctrine is conspicuous by its absence from public debate. But since the focus of attention is on Russian and American European nuclear forces it is worthwhile to look at the historical and technical origins of the present situation.

Nuclear weapons were first deployed in Europe by the United States in 1954. Russia did not follow until 1957. At one time the US had about 7,000 warheads in Europe spread over several types; nuclear bombs on aircraft, short-range missiles, nuclear artillery shells, anti-aircraft missiles and nuclear mines. However, this figure has been reduced to about 6,000 as military commanders in NATO have grave doubt about the military utility of such short-range battlefield weapons. More reductions are possible. However, the fissile material from these weapons will be reused for the planned expansion of the American strategic arsenal.

The political rationale for the deployment of 464 GLCMs and 108 Pershing II missiles was the need for a response to the Russian deployment of SS-20s. Although SS-20s were first deployed in 1977, it took NATO two years to “discover" their existence. The whole tenor of NATO’s argument suggested that the SS-20s are a new threat. However, it needs to be stressed that Russia has had the ability to attack Western European cities with medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles since 1955. (ICBM range of 5500 km + , Intermediate RBM (IRBM) 2.400 5.500 km. medium RBM (MRBM) 800-2,400 km, short RBM (SRBM) 800 km or less).

Despite the fact that the Russians were the first to launch an ICBM in 1957, their technological backwardness meant that this achievement was not translated into an extensive deployment programme. The first Russian ICBM was the SS-6, and of these only four were ever deployed. Resources were devoted instead to the creation of M/IRBM, which made sense both technologically and strategically. For instance, since the United States had nuclear capable aircraft and IRBMs in Western Europe their prompt destruction formed an essential aim for the Russian military. Furthermore, Western Europe could be held hostage against American behaviour until such times as Russia could deploy many ICBMs. At this time Russian bombers were incapable of two-way intercontinental missions.

The first MRBM deployed by Russia was the SS-3. which was basically an improved version of the German V-2 rocket, in 1955. (SS stands for surface-to-surface). Large scale deployment, however, did not start until 1959 with the appearance of the SS-4. The first SS-4s were radio-command guided, but later ones were equipped with inertial guidance systems. In 1961 the SS-5 IRBM appeared. These missiles suffered from several major drawbacks, notably their inaccuracy which accounts for the large warhead of I MT. Furthermore, the SS-4s and 5s are liquid fuelled and take between 8 to 24 hours to prepare for launching. Their vulnerability is compounded by the fact that few are placed in underground silos and are closely packed in groups of three or four to a site.The peak of deployment appears to have been reached in 1964-65 when there were about 733 SS-4s and 5s of which 595 were in soft launchers and 135 in hard launchers. These systems are currently being withdrawn and replaced by the SS-20s. In addition to these missiles the aircraft of the Russian Long Range Aviation arm are available for use against Western Europe. If that was not enough about ISO to 360 SS-11s and SS-19s ICBMs were, in the 1970s. allocated “theatre roles".

Given the technological obsolescence of the SS-4s and SS-5s there was. from the Russian point of view, a strong case to be made for the modernisation of long range theatre nuclear forces. Combine this factor with technological inertia in the Russian weapons procurement process and the SS-20 deployment decision, taken in 1976, begins to look inevitable. The SS-20 itself is the top two stages of the failed SS-16 ICBM. In contrast to its predecessors the SS-20 is mobile, but its tracked launch vehicle has an average speed of 10 mph. In addition, it carries three warheads of 150kt each and on account of its solid propellant and improved launch control technology it can be made ready to fire in an hour. Its increased range and improved accuracy permit a wider target coverage as well as affording a greater “counter-military potential" (range 5,000km compared with 2,000 for the SS-4 and 4,100 for the SS-5). Accuracy is measured by Circular error probable CEP. which is the radius of a circle within which fifty per cent of incoming warheads will land. The CEP of the SS-20 is 400km compared to 2,300 and 1,100 metres for the SS-4 and 5s.

It is the increased counter military potential of the SS-20 which causes NATO most concern; however, the SS-20 deployment does not represent any fundamental change in Russian doctrine. For example, military and C31 targets have always figured largely in their targeting plans. In any case the SS-20 is not the wonder weapon it is often made out to be. Although it is as mobile as cruise it has to be launched from pre-prepared, rather than pre-surveyed sites as is the case with cruise. Pershing II missiles can be fired from almost anywhere. The main point, however, is that the Soviet Union has had the ability to hit Western Europe with nuclear weapons for well over twenty years. NATO has rejected the claim that the SS-20 is only part of a long overdue modernisation. The continued deployment of SS-20s since 1979 (there are now about 360 SS-20s, of which between 108 to 118 are deployed in the Far Eastern Military District) has merely confirmed NATO’s view that the Russians are intent on tilting the nuclear balance in their favour. Whether this is the case or not, NATO is using it as a rationale for their own build up.

Ever since NATO announced its decision to deploy GLCMs and Pershing II missiles Russia has mounted an intense propaganda campaign against them. There are, from the Russians’ point of view, very ready reasons for this. Opposition to Pershing II in particular stems largely from estimates of its technical characteristics. Pershing I SRBMs were deployed in 1962; however, since their range is limited they cannot reach targets in Russia. On account of technical improvements, primarily warhead miniaturisation which makes more room for fuel, the range of the Pershing II is, according to NATO, 1,800km. The Russians, however, maintain that it has a range of 2,500km. This difference is crucial. Although the exact range is classified, a range of 2,500 km would allow Pershing II to strike Moscow and its command and control installations of which there are about 75. Even assuming a range of 1800 km Pershing would be able to attack vital targets in Western Russia.

In addition to being a ballistic missile which allows very short flight times from West Germany of between four and twelve minutes, Pershing has a very high accuracy. The accuracy achieved by its radar area guidance system — RADAG — makes possible a CEP of about 30 to 40 metres. In one test flight in 1978 an accuracy of 25 metres was achieved. But there are doubts about the ability of Pershing to reproduce this kind of accuracy in wartime. It has not been tested over its full range. In fact there are 12,000 separate parts in the missile and it is this technological complexity which has contributed to several test failures — four out of fourteen. One missile missed its intended target by over four miles.

Pershing represents a valuable addition to US strategic capabilities. Targets would include such time-urgent places as the Launch Control Centres of the ICBM fields in Western Russia at Kozelsk, Teykovo, Yedrovo, Kostroma, Tatischevo and Yoshkavola. In fact more than half of the twenty-six ICBM fields are located west of the Urals, as are twenty-two of the thirty-two major air bases. Two of the three Soviet early-warning over-the-horizon back-scatter radar systems are within range of Pershing one near Nikolayev and the other near Kiev. Other command centre targets would include the Army HQs in the western military districts, such as the Zhitomir base of the 8th Guards Tank Army.

Even with a maximum range of 2,500 km the 108 Pershings would still be unable to destroy all time-urgent targets, as there are many east of the Urals. The Pershing deployment cannot be seen in isolation from other proposed US missile developments. in particular the Trident D-5 programme. Russian ICBM fields and C31 installations east of the Urals are strung out along the Trans-Siberian railway. Trident D-5 warheads are very accurate and if fired on depressed trajectories from submarines in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific the Russians would have very little warning time. Satellite tracking stations such as those at Irkutsk and Ussuriysk would be prime targets. Since Russia relies heavily on satellites for secure long-range communications, the destruction of such installations in addition to other command and control centres would in effect destroy the nervous system of their military power.

The Ground Launched Cruise Missile is being built by General Dynamics and is only part of a much wider cruise missile programme. Both the United States Air Force and Navy have ordered the air and sea launched versions. The land based version carries a W-84 warhead of 200kt, but its real strategic value is its accuracy. Its guidance system includes both an inertial system as well as the terrain contour matching system — TERCOM. Digital maps of the intended flight path are stored on the system’s computer. Periodical checking of the ground below with the maps stored in the computer’s memory allows the missile to correct its flight path. This, theoretically, provides an accuracy of about fifty metres.

There are, however, doubts about the ability of cruise to match these high performance requirements under combat conditions. Although successful in 84 out of 111 test flights, cruise was only tested over the Nevada desert. Whether the GI.CMs would be able to fly from Britain over snow covered terrain in Sweden on its way to Russian targets is an unknown factor. It is for this reason that the United Staters wants to test the ALCM Over North-West Canada. There have been problems with the TERCOM system as well as with the mobile launch and control vehicles. In short cruise, like the SS-20, is not the super weapon it is often made out to be.

Despite its great accuracy, the long flight times preclude the use of cruise as a first strike weapon against Russian ICBM silos. But it could be used against empty ICBM to prevent their re-use; the Russians have taken several days to re-load in training exercises. While the air, sea and ground launched cruise missiles cannot by themselves be used for a first strike, they do, nevertheless, represent a valuable addition to the US Single Integrated Operational Plan — SIOP 6.

Nonetheless both cruise and the SS-20 illustrate the significance of technological inertia. For example, the SLCM Programme started in 1972.

The cruise missile is a sadly typical case of advanced military technology — in this case the combination of computer guidance, highly efficient jet engine and miniature warhead — looking for a strategy to justify its production. (Guardian 30 August 1983).

Competition between ICBM design bureaus in Russia contributed to the SS-20 decision. For instance, the bureau of Nadiradze was established to develop solid-propellant missiles. The SS-16 was one such rocket. However it was not deployed. but its production line and long-lead time parts were allocated to the SS-20 instead. Existence of the SS-16 production line made the decision a lot easier.

This fact is overlooked by campaigns which direct themselves, almost exclusively, to specific weapon systems. At the root of the problem is the way society is organised. The arms race process, weapons research and development, production and deployment and strategic doctrine cannot be divorced from the nature of society. Lengthy vigils outside airforce bases or mass demonstrations do not take account of this and for that reason are doomed to fail.

John Walker

*Glicom is derived from the acronym to cruise. GLCM Pioneer is reputed to b a Russian name for SS-20.

Hi-tech horror (1983)

Book Review from the December 1983 issue of the Socialist Standard

Andrew Wilson: The Disarmer's Handbook of Military Technology and Organisation (Penguin. 1983).

The NATO “dual track" decision of December 1979 to deploy ground launched cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe as a political response to continued Russian deployment of SS-20s was soon followed by the British government's decision to replace Polaris with the Trident C-4 missile. This theatre nuclear force modernisation programme, coupled with strategic systems modernisation programmes in the United States, marked a disturbing escalation of the arms race. In addition, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the election of Ronald Reagan seemed to confirm the emergence of a new Cold War. These events forced many people to question their acceptance of the concept of nuclear "‘deterrence" — one being Andrew Wilson. Defence Correspondent of the Observer for sixteen years. The Disarmer’s Handbook of Military Technology and Organisation is the product of his change of heart.

The book may be divided into three sections; the first deals with theories of war; the second with military technology itself, including nuclear, conventional, chemical and biological warfare; and the latter part with efforts aimed at halting and reversing the arms race.

In the chapter on the theory and history of war there is an outline of the thinking of modern theoreticians such as Clausewitz, A.T. Mahan and Herman Kahn. It was Kahn in his book On Thermonuclear War, mentioned by Wilson, who outlined ways in which nuclear weapons could be used in crises or wars to effect tolerable outcomes. Kahn's book appeared in I960, but it was by no means the first articulation of a theory or doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons in war. US targeting plans of the 1940s. such as “Dropshot" formulated in 1949, called for the delivery of atomic weapons against Russian industrial and military centres. In referring to “counterforce", Wilson notes that it began in 1980, but qualifies this statement by referring to McNamara's “no cities" doctrine of the early 1960s in which it might be possible to limit damage to the US by concentrating nuclear strikes on military targets. But ''counterforce" targeting had always been a part of United States strategic doctrine.

Wilson devotes some space to Marx and Engels, especially the latter’s writings on military science. It was not for nothing that Engels was known to his contemporaries as "The General". It is, however, not true to say that Marx and Engels “turned to military science as a means of establishing the ‘revolutionary state’ after the failure of the barricades" (p. 23). Although in the 1840s Marx thought that a revolution could only result from violent insurrection, he and Engels had completely changed their view by the end of the century. For example, writing in the 1895 Introduction to Marx’s Class Struggles in France, Engels noted, "Let us have no illusions about it: a real victory of an insurrection over the military in street fighting, a victory as between two armies, is one of the rarest exceptions . . . even where the military are in the minority, the superiority of better equipment and training, of single leadership, of the planned employment of the military forces and of discipline makes itself felt"

Illustration by George Meddemmen.

The nuclear arms race has continued unabated since 1945, as has the conventional arms race the world over. In 1947 the US had only thirteen atomic bombs; the most recent estimate of world nuclear weapon stockpiles is 50,000 but since the nuclear arms race is more than just a numbers game, or what the Americans would call a "bean count", Wilson attempts to outline the qualitative differences between the American and Russian forces. For instance, the Russians lag behind he Americans in warhead miniaturisation and microelectronics. Intangible factors such as warhead accuracy and overall system reliability and performance are more important than mere quantity. The key to the whole system is the durability of command, control, communication and intelligence systems, which is a factor that Wilson does not really deal with at all.

It is not unusual to come across widely diverging estimates of weapons characteristics, or widely exaggerated estimates of weapon systems performance. For instance, data about Russian nuclear forces comes primarily from US intelligence estimates, hardly an impartial source. In Britain there has been no official announcement about the number of warheads on the new Chevaline warhead for the Polaris missiles. Andrew Wilson estimates that the number could be as high eight (p. 66). Other estimates have come up with numbers as low as two and as high as six.

The chapter on “Sick War — Chemical and Biological" makes clear that nuclear warfare is not the only form of potential mass murder. In describing chemical agents and their effects, such as the nerve gas Sarin and 2,4-D a defoliant, Wilson highlights the possibility of destroying not only people but whole ecological systems without any assistance from nuclear weapons — a factor which tends to be forgotten by the peace movement.

The Disarmer’s Handbook is aimed primarily at the resurgent peace movement. Although it provides a useful collection of technical details as well as notes on further reading, its conclusion is not one with which socialists agree. For example, in the Postscript Wilson writes:

  Spontaneous demonstrations of popular feeling — in Central Park or Bonn or at Greenham Common — are one element, and an indispensable one, of the process needed to bring governments to action.

How this is supposed to square with the evidence in the preceding chapters, such as the failures of disarmament, the technological momentum which propels the arms race and the causes of war, is not made clear. The military hardware described in the book bears adequate testimony to the horrific society in which we all live, and that is the book's main achievement.

John Walker

The Sorcerer's Apprentice (1983)

From the June 1983 issue of the Socialist Standard

How do the views of both CND and the government relate to the current state of military technology and its impact on arms control? Are their propositions — respectively preventing the deployment of Cruise and Trident and multilateral and verifiable disarmament — tenable within capitalism in general and contemporary military technology and doctrine in particular?

The main focus of present CND policy is to prevent the deployment of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and the replacement of the Polaris A-3 missile with the Trident D-5 missile — a qualitiative improvement, they argue, which brings the doctrinal concept of nuclear war-fighting closer. Moreover, Britain can only avoid being a major target in the event of war by cancelling Trident and Cruise as a step towards unilateral nuclear disarmament. While it is correct to say that the Trident D-5 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) is a qualitative improvement on Polaris (it has a longer range, 11,000 km compared to 4600 km; 14 independently targetable warheads with a yield of 150 kt each compared to 3 re-entry vehicles each with a yield of 200 kt; improved accuracy and terminal guidance) its cancellation will not make Britain any less of a target in the event of war.

Targeting is the key to military doctrine. The CND argument loses sight of this, focusing on particular weapon types, such as Cruise and Trident, without attempting to relate them to overall force structures and strategic doctrine or to the political and economic conflict from which they originate. In terms of military doctrine CND miss the main point — the vital importance of command, control, communications and intelligence (C3') to the capacity to wage and win a war. Without C3’ Cruise and Trident are useless. The location and targeting of C3' installations determines priority in target selection. In this respect Britain is high on the list, irrespective of existing military-targets, because of its strategic importance in relation to C3'.

C3’ includes all modern communications systems: radio, telephone, air traffic control, early warning systems, satellite tracking stations and airports. In war installations such as those at Cheltenham, Rugby, Preston and Fylingdales would be priority targets. These facilities are elemental to the use of weapon systems; for example, C3' is necessary for the rapid transmission of targeting information and directions to offensive forces. The vulnerability of C3’ is not restricted to a direct hit by a nuclear device. The air detonation (the higher the better) of a thermo-nuclear bomb several kilometres from a C3’ target is just as effective. This is because such an explosion produces an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) which creates a voltage surge in electrical circuits strong enough to be permanently- damaging; moreover, EMP can obliterate information stored in computer software. Other affects include “TREE" — transient radiation effects on electronics. The combined effect is the disruption and dislocation of C3', a communications blackout which seriously inhibits the capacity to wage war. An explosion at an altitude of 100 km would be more than sufficient to affect all of the British Isles.

Soviet military commanders could not allow C3' facilities in Britain to remain intact even though Britain possessed no nuclear weapons. (John Erickson, The War About Peace, Central TV, 21 April 1983 and a Radio Scotland Broadcast 2 April 1983). They would have to be "denied" to the Americans. So Britain is a major target, and from a military point of view, when C3' is so vital this is an eminently sensible policy. In this respect unilateralism is irrelevant. In fact, for Britain to avoid being targeted all telecommunication systems and airports would have to be dismantled, in effect reducing Britain to the level of a medieval agrarian society, and would then need to be towed to somewhere like the South Atlantic.

Target identification and location plays a major role in modern military strategy. Here the technical improvements to weapons, increased accuracy and yield to weight ratios for example, militate against a doctrine of "minimum deterrence" in which about 200 to 400 warheads would be enough to destroy either superpower. The identification of potential targets is no problem; there are 40,000 in the Soviet Union alone, and when one considers that there are only about 200 Soviet cities with populations in excess of 100,000 and relatively few specifically military targets, then it is clear that there are numerous non-military targets. C3' has already been mentioned, but other targets include petroleum refineries, power stations, railway yards, docks and shipyards. This form of targeting is known as "countervalue" and Britain has no shortage of such targets either; for example Grangemouth, Drax. Millerhill and Southampton.

The targeting of military sites, missile silos and troop concentrations is known as "counterforce” and despite the CND argument that preparation for fighting a nuclear war is something new, counterforce has been around since the late 1950s and early 1960s. The US Airforce was committed to counterforce by the early 1960s; this provided a rationale for the development of the Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) which would make more targets available per missile.

In 1964 . . . the Mark 12 Task Group realised that the MIRV system it was developing could not be justified by any existing mission requirement. Its members made a conscious effort to find a strategic rationale. Counterforce targeting and growth of Soviet missile forces promised the solution. MIRV could be justified by the need for greater target coverage.

(Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making, Ted Greenwood, Ballinger. Cambridge. Mass.. 1975. p.53).

So what appears to be happening is that technology is running out of control in relation to weapon systems, doctrine and C3’. In short it is the technical improvements to weapons that shapes doctrine and not the other way around. Just how the banning of Cruise and Trident is supposed to reverse this process is not clear.

As civil and military technology develop the distinction between nuclear and conventional weaponry becomes blurred. In effect the major difference between different types of weaponry is time — conventional, chemical and biological weapons will take a rather longer time to destroy the world. The notion that war can be sanitised by the removal or barring of specific weapon systems is ludicrous; for example, there is a fuel air explosive (Arms Control and Technological Innovation, eds. D. Carlton & C. Schaerf. Croom Helm, London, 1977, p.65) which can create the same overpressures as a small yield nuclear weapon; secondly, the new Soviet 5.45 x 39mm bullet contains a mild steel core surrounded by lead which forms a plug toward the tip of the bullet but fails to fill the tip. The centre of gravity is far to the rear ensuring that it will flip over when hitting the human body. It will thus very effectively deposit its energy in the body, causing an “explosive type wound". (World Armaments and Disarmament 1982, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Taylor & Francis, London, p.451). Efforts to contain these technological developments have not been conspicuous by their success. This brings us neatly to the whole question of arms control in relation to technological development.

The British government insists that multilateral arms control is the best road to disarmament; however, it is clear that disarmament has never been a serious possibility. The Russians claim that they have tabled 150 separate disarmament proposals since the 1950s, all of which were rejected. The West could no doubt make the same claim. Such proposals were, and still are, for propaganda purposes and chiefly for internal consumption; arms control, on the other hand, seeks to “stabilise" the arms race; it can never provide “security". The object is to institutionalise the arms race by avoiding or limiting major quantitative improvements to existing forces. The superpowers agree to put certain areas out of bounds to save the expense of developing or deploying new weapon systems; for instance, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty and the Seabed Treaty. In contrast, SALT actually fuelled the arms race since it placed no restrictions on qualitative improvements which in any case are very difficult to monitor, let alone enforce. SALT only limited launchers — holes in the ground or in submarines — not warheads or accuracy. The MIRV was left unchecked permitting a legitimate increase in the number of warheads. The US had 6784 in 1973, but 9000 in 1981. Since a Mirved missile is externally indistinguishable from a non-mirved one it is impossible for satellites to tell the difference. In this respect arms control achieved its principal aim which was to put the arms race on a more predictable course and avoid de-stabilising events. In any event technological improvements in weapons makes existing arms control procedures increasingly redundant.

As one American general said you cannot compare “apples and pears”; this refers to not only the asymmetries in superpower force structures, but also to their strategic doctrines. The Russians prefer large land based missiles, reflecting technological inferiority, 72 per cent of Russian warheads are land based. The Americans prefer to put their deterrent to sea, 50 per cent of warheads are on SLBMs. This presents accounting problems. Considerable time was spent in SALT II disputing the status of the Soviet Tu-22m, Backfire bomber. The Americans insisted that it was a strategic delivery system (intercontinental) whereas the Russians argued that it was for the Eurasian theatre only.

In the European theatre the asymmetries and technical complexities are even more acute making arms control more difficult, if not impossible, to come by. For instance, in the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks both sides cannot agree on what to count or include. The question of nuclear capable aircraft (those able to drop nuclear bombs) is a case in point; for example, should the Russian Mig 23/27 Flogger be classed as a “Primary long-range theatre aircraft" or a “marginal long-range nuclear aircraft"?

The inclusion of British and French forces is another area of contention. Both insist that their forces should be excluded; the Americans agree, but the Russians argue that anything that can hit Soviet territory, irrespective of origin, must be counted. All this despite the fact that a rationale for Britain’s “independent deterrent" is that it allows access to the “top table". Indeed the Nassau Agreement of 1962. when Britain bought Polaris from America, specifically allocated Polaris to NATO for targeting purposes, in other words a theatre role as opposed to a strategic one.

Conventional weapons control in Europe is equally confused and unsuccessful. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks have been going on since 1973 and have achieved little. NATO considered the number of Warsaw Pact divisions and tanks a problem, but then discovered that it could not even count its own. Arms control is more than a numbers game. The case of the British government, that deterrence has kept the peace since 1945, is quite irrelevant to the state of military technology. In fact no one really knows what deters in deterrence in the first place, and when one considers the technical barriers to arms control, the government’s position is untenable.

Nor has Britain been active in the field of arms control. Lawrence Freedman in Britain and Nuclear Weapons notes that Britain has judiciously avoided arms control since it would involve the complete dismantlement of Britain's nuclear force. Despite the fact that Britain signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 in which Article VI puts the onus on the signatories "to negotiate in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race", Britain avoided the SALT talks, fearing that the US would bargain away the Polaris force or be restrained from transferring weapon systems in the future. Furthermore Britain has no interest in a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and as Thatcher has stated, "The British deterrent has no place at the INF negotiations" (Hansard, 18 January 1983. col. 109 written answers). Therefore, in addition to the technical obstacles to arms control, Britain has little enthusiasm for it, as is made clear by the decision to buy the Trident D-5. Just how arms control is supposed to lead to disarmament is never made clear.

Many in the arms control fraternity fear that technology is out of control making arms control an impossibility. The focus of concern is that it will be impossible to reassert human control; likewise with the talc of the Sorcerer’s apprentice who, having summoned up magical powers, lost control and was unable to regain it by himself since he did not understand the power he had brought into existence. The reassertion of social control over military technology is impossible even within the confines of capitalism; arms control, whether unilateral or multilateral, is an irrelevancy. Supporters of CND or the government would do well to consider such a proposition.

John Walker

Nuclear options (1983)

Book Review from the October 1983 issue of the Socialist Standard

Nuclear Power, Walter C. Patterson. (Pelican, 1983).

Ever since the first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction in Chicago Pile Number 1 in December 1942, nuclear technology has never been far from controversy. The first public display of nuclear power came in August 1945 with the destruction of Hiroshima by a bomb made with the fissile isotope of uranium. From the outset the inherent connection between the civil and military uses of the atom was recognised. The British Maud Committee, convened to examine the feasibility of a “uranium bomb" in 1941. and the 1946 Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, realised that the civil and military applications of nuclear technology were interchangeable and interdependent. If that was not enough to contend with, nuclear technology has given rise to such controversies as reactor safety; the effects of low-level radiation; the disposal of high-level waste; the economy and reliability of nuclear power stations compared to coal-fired stations; and, of course, the nuclear arms race which has continued unabated since 1945. In the new edition of Nuclear Power Walter Patterson condenses all these problems into about two hundred pages and in doing so provides a very useful summary of nuclear power issues.

Many of the controversies that surround nuclear technology make little sense without an understanding of the fission process itself and the nuclear fuel cycle. Part One of Nuclear Power is devoted to the technicalities of nuclear fission, such as how plutonium is produced in a reactor. There are chapters on how a nuclear reactor works; the different types of reactors favoured by the world’s nuclear industries; and the nuclear fuel cycle which, as Patterson notes, “gives rise to many of the most controversial aspects of nuclear technology". In this respect Patterson’s book remains one of the best introductions to nuclear technology, a fact which was reluctantly conceded by the then Chairman of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, Sir John Hill, a few years after publication of the first edition in 1976.

Patterson’s description of the development of the H-Bomb, however, is a little misleading. In the 1940s. the H-Bomb was widely referred to as the super bomb. On page 113 Patterson states:

The Americans are commonly credited with having detonated the first thermonuclear explosion . . . but it was in no sense an H-bomb. It was an explosion of a large-scale experimental installation, nearly sixty tons of delicate equipment.

The Americans in the "Mike” shot of 1952, referred to above, used liquid deuterium as the thermonuclear fuel. This material has to be stored under high pressures and very low temperatures involving complicated pressure vessels and refrigeration plants; this would explain the enormous weight of sixty tons. However, the Mike shot was a superbomb since it was made possible by a small fission explosion which ignited a large fusion explosion. Patterson states that “the Soviet thermonuclear explosion of 12 August 1952 was a true H-bomb, portable and droppable". Although it was a thermonuclear device, or as the Russians would say “one of the types of thermonuclear bomb”, it was not a superbomb. It used lithium deuteride as its thermonuclear fuel which is considerably easier to handle than liquid deuterium. The Soviet test ignited a fairly small amount of thermonuclear fuel with a comparatively large amount of fissionable material producing a yield in the region of 200-400 kilotons — much less than the American fission bomb test of November 1952. In March 1954 the Americans in “Operation Castle" detonated a superbomb, codenamed “Bravo", fuelled by lithium deuteride which had a yield of 15 megatons. Hie Russians tested their first superbomb in November 1955, but it only produced a yield of 1.6 megatons.

One thing, however, is clear: the development of nuclear technology is subject to the limitations imposed by the type of society in which it exists. For example, in the chapter entitled “Nuclenomics” Patterson outlines the intense economic competition of the major nuclear supplier states to sell nuclear technology to the developing world. Indeed the competition between the United States and the Europeans represents the conflicting interests of different sections of the capitalist class over sensitive nuclear technologies and materials, like complete reactors and uranium fuel — commodities like any other of capitalism's wealth.

Nuclear power produces dangerous long lived waste products, but it is not the only dangerous technology. The emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, for example, may have equally damaging environmental consequences. Other industrial processes produce highly toxic chemical wastes which are dumped into the world's seas and rivers.

In his concluding chapter, “The Nuclear Horizon”. Patterson states:

We stand today before an abundance of potentialities and possibilities, the options are still open. Within the present generation they will almost certainly be foreclosed. The decisions now impending will affect not merely global energy supply and demand. but the entire organisation of our global society . . . Before we commit ourselves and our descendants to a nuclear future, it is vital that we concur in understanding the nature of our commitment.

It is, however, not a question of nuclear power or no nuclear power; but rather one relating to the entire re-organisation of society when the abundance of possibilities and potentialities is translated into reality.

John Walker