Capitalism—the real enemy: The case of Germany (1977)

From the September 1977 issue of the Socialist Standard

“Fascism is not an alternative to the capitalist
 system, but a way of running it”

The word “fascism” is one of the most loosely used terms in the political vocabulary. To call every other opponent a fascist, as the more hysterical elements of the left often do, is to reduce a term of political description to the level of political insult. Socialists do not oppose fascist parties, like the National Front, specially because they are fascist. We oppose them for their support of capitalism.

Fascism is not an alternative to the capitalist system, but a way of running it. When it seems inexpedient for the working class to have whatever exists in freedom of speech, assembly, press, and trades unions, and if the working class can be persuaded to support a regime which withdraws these rights (which a non-Socialist working class can), then capitalism is run along fascist rather than liberal lines. The working class can only positively defend democracy by organizing for Socialism.

That fascism is a part of capitalism, governed by the profit system as much as “bourgeois democracy” is can be seen by the events which took place in Germany under the Nazis. Like most groups which see themselves as being revolutionary the German National Socialist (Nazi) Party did not stand on an original platform. Indeed, at the outset they hardly stood for any programme at all, but for the negative policy of anti-semitism and the revival of Prussian greatness.

The dissatisfaction exploited by the Nazis related to the particular post-war problems of German capitalism. It was a non-competitive, highly concentrated, high-priced industrial economy; the political influence of the rural landowners was disproportionate to their size; there had been a high birthrate before 1914 with the resulting problem of an expanding working class demanding more and more from the developing German industries; and there was a large “middle class” of small businessmen with no political expression. The crisis produced by the first World War made matters even worse. The monarchy collapsed in 1918, leaving political instability; demobilized soldiers returned from the war feeling bitter and angry; a flood of east European refugees entered the country, many of them Jews; the liquidation of war credits meant that millions who had previously seen themselves as members of the “middle class” were thrown into extreme poverty; there was the additional frustration of an imbalance between the numbers of men and women. These problems are not new to capitalism in a crisis, and crises are an integral part of the capitalist system.

The Nazis were able to direct their political propaganda towards certain sections of the working class. Small shopkeepers, for instance, were easily attracted. Between 1882 and 1907 the number of small shopkeepers grew, but after 1907 they faced fierce competition from new department stores, some of which were owned by Jewish immigrants. The Nazis, because of their anti-semitism (and, to some extent, a leftist opposition to “big business”) exploited this discontent. White-collar workers, small farmers, and students were further groups to which the Nazis had a special appeal. Then, as now, the fascists realised that they would get nowhere without the support of the working class. The Nazis won it; the modern fascists may not.

Two things must be remembered about the rise to power of the Nazis. One is that without the support of the majority of workers it could not have happened. Capitalist government, be it fascist or liberal, could not be imposed upon a working class which does not want capitalism. Had the German workers been united for Socialism, then nothing could possibly have stood in their way. The second is that the Nazis had the support of important sections of the capitalist class.

When they came to power, what was more significant than the atrocities committed by the new tyrants (which are of interest to historians who like to see the past in terms of a battle between “goodies” and “baddies”) was their inability to offer the working class anything new.

They had promised to create a strong central authority to safeguard law and order (a cry of the British Tories). The Nazis succeeded in strengthening the rule of the state by uniting the party with the government: Hitler became not only total leader of the National Socialists, but complete leader of all Germany. The Enabling Act of March 1933 made the Reichstag powerless and invested full political power in the Chancellor. Adolf Hitler. A law of July 1933 outlawed all other political parties, and a law of January 1934 enabled the Nazis to change the Weimar constitution at will. The German army was taken over by the party, which was clearly satisfactory for the military as fascism meant a growing arms budget, evident diplomatic strength, popular support for militarism, compulsory conscription and, of course, a greater political role for the military.

Economically, the Nazi policies were consistent with the needs of the strongest section of the capitalist class. This was to cause division within the party. The business interests had financed the Nazis as an alternative to the power of the unions or, worse still, Bolshevism. On the other hand, there was a powerful left wing of the National Socialist Party, led by Strasser and Muchow, which preferred to stress the “socialism” of the Nazi Party, by which they meant nationalization.

For all their talk about destroying “big business” the Nazis failed to change the face of German capitalism, even refusing to close down Jewish department stores because they needed the taxes they were receiving from them. Income distribution did not alter under the Nazis and wages fell between 1934 and 1940, while the average net income of the better-off sections who paid tax rose by 46 per cent. As usual under capitalism the rich got richer while the poor stayed poor.

Essentially, fascism created no major changes in German society except, of course, for certain minorities, such as the Jews, the Catholics, and the dissidents. But these were a minority. For the majority it was work as usual; exploitation as usual. As Schoenbaum states:

In 1939 the cities were larger, not smaller; the concentration of capital greater than before; the rural population reduced, not increased; women not at the fireside but in the office and the factory; the inequality of property and income distribution more, not less conspicuous; industry’s share of the gross national product up and agriculture down, while agricultural labour had it relatively good and small business increasingly bad.

In September 1934 at Nuremberg Hitler declared:

The revolution has achieved without exception all that was expected of it . . . in the next thousand years there will be no new revolution in Germany.

Hitler was speaking of a change in the circumstances of German capitalism, not a social revolution. The former happens all the time—leaders come and they go—but the latter means a fundamental change in social relationships. The Socialist Standard of June 1939 clearly explained the Socialist attitude to fascism and democracy:

Democracy for the working class can only be consolidated and extended to the extent that the working class adopts a socialist standpoint. To renounce Socialism so that democracy may be defended means ultimately the renunciation of both Socialism and democracy. It cannot be emphasised too much that the struggle for democracy is bound up with the struggle for Socialism and not the struggle for Socialism bound up with the struggle for democracy.

Steve Coleman

Editorial: The Rise of Hitler: A Warning to the Workers (1933)

Editorial from the April 1933 issue of the Socialist Standard

The rise of Hitler to power in Germany is an event which the workers of all countries should study with care. It is not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a world-wide overflowing of discontent. It is not a coincidence that the three years since the oncoming of the crisis late in 1929 have witnessed the abrupt and sometimes violent overthrow of governments in different parts of the capitalist world. “National” Governments in the United Kingdom and many of the British Dominions; the advent of De Valera in the Irish Free State; the colossal defeat of “Prosperity” Hoover in the USA; repeated cabinet crises in France; political revolutions and counter-revolutions in South America; the Republic in Spain; political crises in Scandinavia; expulsions of leaders and reversals of policy in Russia; no country has escaped the economic consequences of a capitalist world which is seriously out of joint.

Each country has witnessed the consequent political stresses and strains of new discontents, and new slogans, which had generally brought about new political groupings and new figure-heads. The universal insurgency expresses itself in different ways according to the traditions, experience and constitutions of the various countries. A century ago such economic crises brought to a head deep underlying social conflicts and produced the revolutions of  ’30 and ’48, with their violent overthrow of kings and absolutist constitutions. Nowadays the more advanced countries have developed systems which permit easier adjustment to new pressures, avoiding the disturbance and expenses of the appeal to violence. Countries which have not travelled so far along the road of capitalist democratic government still resort to the old method of the bomb, the rifle, and the machine gun, the mass demonstration, the barricade, and the organisation of insurrection in the armed forces.

In a broad way the cause and the effect are the same everywhere. Everywhere capitalist private ownership reigns. Everywhere the rulers must serve the interests of the capitalist class, but everywhere it is an over-riding condition of social life that rulers cannot ignore the active discontent of the mass of the population. The discontent, even the open rebellion, of individuals and minorities can be bludgeoned into acquiescence, but when great masses of the population are driven by intolerable conditions into organising for common action then the rulers must sooner or later provide a safety valve; placate the movement or find means of dividing it; turn it into new directions or harness it directly to the capitalist state. In no other way can capitalism maintain itself.

Long before the war the British ruling class learned how to incorporate radical politicians and labour leaders in the parties of capitalism. The German capitalists in 1918 jettisoned the Kaiser for a similar end. Fifty per cent of the German voters had registered their disillusionment and war-weariness by voting for the reform programme of the Social Democratic Party. German capitalism thereupon “digested” the SDP and watched it stabilise German capitalism in the troubled post-war years. The military and civil associates of the Imperial Kaiser humbled themselves to the “upstart” labour leaders because they had to have someone who could control the workers and keep them loyal to the fundamentals of capitalism. So for fourteen years the Social Democrats, either in coalitions or in “friendly opposition”, worked out their policy of bargaining for reforms as price of their support. The outcome was inevitable. They have shared the fate that has always overtaken “Labour” politicians and parties when they accept responsibility for the administration of capitalism. Discontent with the effects of capitalism cannot for ever be stifled by Labour promises of better times or apologetic assurances that things might be worse. The membership and influence of the German SDP declined year by year until it had shrunk to a third of its former size. Part of the loss was picked up by the Communist Party, but in the meantime a new group had arisen, led by Hitler. At the election on March 5th he received 17,266,000 votes (43.9 per cent) and his allies, the Nationalists, received 3,132,000 (8 per cent), giving him a clear majority. The Social Democrats received 7,176,000 (18.3 per cent) and the Communists 4,845,000 (12.1 percent).

In one important respect Hitler’s Nazis are just like the Social Democrats and the Communists; they are all parties of discontent. Hitler promises work for the workless; secure government jobs in the police, the Army or the Civil service for 100,000 of his members; higher prices for agricultural products to help the peasants; and protection for the small investor and little shopkeeper squeezed by the big stores and the banks.

Immediately on taking office Hitler imposed fresh taxes on the big departmental stores and chain stores with the professed object of helping the small shopkeepers. He promised also to find posts for out-of-work professional men (doctors, lawyers and others), and it is because a relatively large number of bankers, proprietors of big stores and the more successful professional men are Jews that the party has taken on a violently anti-Jewish character. Every Jewish doctor driven out of practice, every Jewish lawyer barred from the courts, every Jewish schoolmaster and civil servant dismissed, makes another vacancy for one of his members. He was supplied with funds by German heavy industry, by armament manufacturers both in Germany and in France, and by American and other business men and financiers who had investments in Germany for which they needed protection. With the help of these funds Hitler’s party has known how to rally all kinds of discontent into a great movement representing half the electorate of Germany. Therefore Hitler has had to be “digested” as fourteen years ago were the Social Democrats. The stately and imperious Hindenburg and the aristocratic Von Papen, representing the military caste and big landowner, have had to receive on terms of equality the Austrian house-painter Adolf Hitler. Dr Hugenberg and the Nationalist Party, representing big industrial capitalists, have had to enter into coalition with him. Hitler will now have to administer capitalism. He will have to curb the demands of his followers, disappoint them, and ultimately lose many of them to new political adventurers, whereupon the capitalists and landlords who now use him will scrap him and use his successor.

The great lesson to be learned from the decline of the Social Democrats is the sterility of the policy of reforms and of reform parties. The day on which a reform party reaches power is the day on which the evil effects of capitalism begin to sap and undermine the strength of the party, turning the members’ blind loyalty first into bewilderment and then into dissatisfaction, causing them to drift into new parties.

The depths of mental bankruptcy of the reformists are shown by the comment of the Fabian New Statesman (London, March 11th, 1933). After explaining that Hitler scored because he appealed, with banners and uniforms and parades, to the electorate’s love of glamour, the German correspondent of the New Statesman says that the Social Democrats should have done the same, and should have given more prominence to pageantry and less prominence to social reforms. In other words, the workers are to be enticed, not even by the old plan of “bread and circuses”, but by circuses without the bread! This is what forty years of Fabian reformism has brought to the working-class movement!

The second lesson is one which has been entirely missed by the Labour Press in Great Britain, that is the evidence given by the Hitler episode of the overwhelming importance of controlling the political machinery. Six months ago, although the largest party in Germany, Hitler was not in control of the German Parliament and the machinery of government. He was ridiculed and derided by the members of the Government, and insulted by President Hindenburg. His party officials were hauled into court on charges of treason, and thrown into prison. Others were forced to flee the country. His newspapers were suppressed, his offices were raided by the police, his troops were forbidden to parade or wear uniforms in the street. When they attempted defiance they were driven off just like the Communists.

Now, having become possessed of the political machine and confirmed in power by the electors, he is able to turn the tables on his former opponents. He has removed the Governments of all the States of Germany. Former Cabinet Ministers have been arrested, beaten and made to suffer many indignities. Newspapers have been suppressed and their offices raided – from Conservative Catholic newspapers at one end of the scale to Social Democratic and Communist newspapers at the other. The Communists, in spite of their 5,000,000 voters and their year-long boasting of their belief in “mass action” and military revolt, have been cowed into complete submission without offering any real resistance whatever. Events are proving to them what they refused to learn. The organised political majority which controls the political machinery of the modern State is in a position to dominate, and can enforce submission on minorities. There is no road to Socialism except through the control of the machinery of government by a politically organised majority of Socialists.

The German Communist Party (1933)

From the April 1933 issue of the Socialist Standard

A correspondent asks if the Communist Party of Germany represents a real revolutionary backing to the extent indicated by its vote of five millions. If not, what is the programme on which this vote is obtained.

The German Communist Party, like the Communist Party of Great Britain, is a party based in the main on discontent without any serious understanding of capitalism or Socialism. Because the German Social Democratic Party ever since the war has been associated with the Governments of Germany, discontent with capitalism has undermined the popularity of that party and built up the Communist Party and Hitler's Party. Although all three parties (including Hitler's Party) claim to be Socialist, none of them has tried to do more than to exploit every kind of discontent. Consequently, at all times, many items have been common to all three programmes. But beyond these common items each party has made its own particular appeal. The Communists have stressed their doctrine of street-fighting and armed uprising. Hitler has beaten the big drum of patriotism, and has exploited sentiments hostile to Jews, bankers and large-scale capitalism. The Social Democrats preached social reform, and appealed to anti-war sentiment and sympathy for internationalism and the League of Nations.

One consequence of the overlapping programmes of the three parties has been a large number of voters supporting now the one and then another. In the elections at the beginning of March, Hitler gained several million votes and the Communists lost nearly a million. The Manchester Guardian's Berlin correspondent says that "a great proportion" of the votes lost by the Communists went over to Hitler. (Manchester Guardian, March 7th.)

The Times' Berlin correspondent (March 2nd) said that the “really organised Communists, infected by the Russian Communist religion, number, at most, a few hundred thousand." The millions who voted Communist were described by this correspondent as disgruntled Social Democrats, "unemployed rendered desperate by poverty and insufficient food," and "even petty bourgeois ruined by the inflation."

A pamphlet published by the British Communist Party ("What Next in Germany?"— August, 1932) gives a summary of the programme of the German Communist Party early in 1932 : —

Already, some time before the elections, the Communist Party had issued its appeal for a United Anti- Fascist Front of the working-class with a programme which included; Resistance to all wage cuts and unemployment benefit cuts: for the extension of Social Insurance benefits; for the provision of funds to give work to the unemployed; for the reduction of hours to 40 per week with no reduction in earnings. For the withdrawal of prohibition against all working-class organisations, meetings and demonstrations; for the release of all class war prisoners; for the stoppage of all foreign debt payments and payments to the Hohenzollerns (the ex-Kaiser’s family) and other German princes.

Already this appeal had begun to receive increasing support from the workers in the factories and trade unions.

It will be seen that the programme was composed entirely of reformist demands. One disgusting feature of German Communist propaganda has been the appeal to national hatred, in the form of the demand that the debt payments and reparations (paid by German capitalists to foreign capitalists) should cease. This appeal was in the forefront of Hitler's programme also, and with it the Communists knowingly fostered the illusion that not capitalism, but foreign debts, are the cause of the misery of the German workers. Even the German Social Democrats and the breakaway party, the German Socialist Workers' Party (which rejoined the S.D.P. at the end of February) protested against this Communist exploitation of ignorant nationalism, bound to play into the hands of Hitler.

Ed. Comm.

Editorial: The Dependence of Government on Parliament. (1933)

Editorial from the January 1933 issue of the Socialist Standard

We are often told by opponents that it is useless to organise for the capture of the political machinery because the capitalists who control it can at any time suitable to them stop holding elections and refuse to hand over control to a Socialist majority. What these critics fail to appreciate is that modern highly developed capitalism cannot function with any degree o£ efficiency without the machinery of representative government, which the capitalists have had to build up.

This has been illustrated by the events in Germany. Hindenburg was elected President by a huge majority over Hitler. In the Reichstag, however (the German Parliament), Hitler’s party is the largest single party, although it has not a clear majority. In these circumstances, and as the parties could not agree to form a coalition which would provide a majority as basis for a government, Hindenburg used his powers under Article 48 of the Constitution—an article for which the Social Democrats are responsible—to appoint his nominee, Von Papen, as head of the Government. Faced with a hostile Reichstag, Von Papen decided to seek the support of the electors at a General Election. It was held but failed to give him the support he needed. In consequence of that failure, Von Papen had to go, and his place has been taken by Von Schleicher. Von Schleicher, in order to stabilise his position, promptly had to withdraw his predecessor’s unpopular measures in an endeavour to secure the support of a parliamentary majority. To do this, Von Schleicher has had to placate not only several of the political groups, but also the trade unions, whose leaders he consulted. He has even made concessions sufficiently far-reaching to attract a section of the principal opposition party— Hitler’s party—so that there is now a distinct likelihood that Hitler’s forces will be divided.

And the immediate reason for this change of front? It was given in reports from Berlin correspondents to several London newspapers. A continuance of Von Papen’s Government, lacking a parliamentary majority, and imposing an unpopular policy, would lead the supporters of the opposition parties to express their discontent outside parliament. There would be disorder which would at once endanger property and disturb the functioning of the capitalist system. The Berlin correspondent of the Daily Express wrote (December 3rd): —

A revival of the Von Papen Chancellorship would mean riots and strikes ana bloodshed all over the country.

The Berlin correspondent of the Daily Herald (November 30th and December 3rd) wrote:—

                                                    Rumbles of Revolt 

                                                    Scare Berlin 'Change.

FEAR OF RETURN OF VON PAPEN. 

Shares tumbled headlong on the Berlin Bourse today in fear of an upheaval, when it was reported that Von Papen would be appointed Chancellor to form a “Fighting Cabinet" against Parliament.

(Daily Herald, November 30th.) 

"Up to the very end the old President fought for his favourite. Von Papen. 

But at the last moment, three of the most important Ministers of the last Papen Cabinet refused to support him.

(Daily Herald, December 3rd.)

The Times and other papers printed similar accounts.

Another aspect of the influence of political instability on capitalist finance was the refusal of foreign financiers to ratify an agreement to provide a loan of 60 million marks for development of the German Post Office. The German Government wished to take advantage of the lower interest rates obtainable abroad and had made practically all arrangements for borrowing the money when the political situation was rendered uncertain by the fear that Von Papen’s Government might try to dispense with Parliament. Immediately the foreign lenders withdrew from the almost completed negotiations, leaving the Post Office no alternative but to borrow a much smaller sum in Germany at higher interest rates.

The new Government, led by Von Schleicher, assured of trade union support or at least their tolerance, is now offering a programme of social reforms (increased unemployed pay, etc.), the release of political prisoners, and the abandonment of proposals to alter the constitution—all in order to secure a parliamentary majority and, with it security for capitalist industry, trade and finance to continue functioning.

So far, there never has been in any country an organised Socialist Majority face to face with the defenders of capitalism. When that situation arrives, that organised majority will be able to deal with every eventuality. The idea that a clique of capitalist politicians, shorn of support among the electorate, could bar the road to Socialism is ludicrous.

Letter: Machinery and Socialism (1932)

Letter to the Editors from the December 1932 issue of the Socialist Standard

A correspondent asks us what is our attitude towards those who condemn machine production and want to go back to handicraft methods.

“Some time ago, within the past year, I read an issue of the Saturday Evening Post, one of the most widely circulated weekly magazines in America, and a correspondent, Marcossan it was, gave an account of the character, aims and objects of the Nazi, or National Socialists in Germany in that issue of the Post.

Among the points he listed and described as features of that movement, was one that struck me as having a lot in common with the Socialist philosophy, and it was this : —

The Nazi’s organisation deplore the predominant role that the machine occupies, in this day and age, in the lives of the masses living within those countries that are for the most part industrialised.

They go in for rites and ceremonial functions that are reminiscent of Mediaevalism, as a reaction to the machine age, and they would revive the colourful picturesqueness of the people lived back in the period of the Holy Roman Empire.

However fallacious all this may seem to us, is there not something wholesome and worthy in a resentment against the necessity for being dominated by the machine, both in economic and social phases of life ? Many authorities agree in this; that the machine age has all but done away with a desire in the present generation for the acquisition of culture, i.e., literature, music and art, and the tendency on the part of the younger generation, so far as the development of their mental capabilities go, are all too one-sided, in the direction of motor mechanics and the repair of engines, etc. The types of people who can carve wonderful designs in wood-work, plaster or clay are only to be found in remote districts like the Bavarian Alps, the Black Forest, Sicily, and other places where the spirit of the Middle Ages still lingers on.”

Reply.

It may be as well to start off by explaining that the name used by the Hitler Party in Germany—”National Socialists”—does not justify the assumption that they have something in common with Socialists. Hitler, in the attempt to build up a large working class following, has found it useful to talk in the phrases of his opponents, the Social Democrats. But neither in his mouth nor in their mouths do these phrases betoken knowledge or acceptance of socialist principles.

Nor do we share Hitler’s alleged longing for medievalism and hatred of machine production. That such a hatred should exist is natural enough among workers who knew or have heard from their parents of the easier conditions under which handicraft production was carried on before the craftman’s products were swept off the market by the cheaper products of the capitalist factory. But it is not correct to describe the workers’ subjection to the capitalist as being simply a condition of “being dominated by the machine,” and it is also fallacious to assume that the course of industrial development can be reversed. If it were possible to reproduce the greatly overpraised conditions of the Middle Ages the same developments which undermined feudalism and led to its replacement by capitalism and machine production would be at work, leading on to the same results.

The chief objection, however, to our correspondent’s argument is the belief that the disabilities under which the workers now suffer are due to their subjection to machines. It is true that machine production, like every other form of production, imposes certain restrictions on the producers. It is true, for example, that it is necessary for all the crew of a boat or a train to be ready for work at a stated time, although this may involve considerable discomfort for those who would prefer to stay in bed for another hour. But what of the discomfort of having to get up early to milk the cows ? What of the inconvenience of having to make hay while the sun was shining, instead of at some other time more pleasing to the mediaeval peasant ? Some machine work is monotonous under capitalist conditions (perhaps some monotony is unavoidable under any conditions), but what of the deadly monotony and brutal exhaustion of primitive agriculture, and of housework ?

Machinery possesses two associated possibilities. It will, when socially owned, act as a saver of much unpleasant and exhausting labour, and it will make it possible so to increase the production of articles needed by the population as a whole that the necessary hours of labour will be greatly reduced. When this happens the majority will have opportunities of recreation and self-development now denied to them. It is not the machine which prevents the workers from living full lives, but the private ownership of the machines, along with the remainder of the means of production and distribution.

Editorial Committee.

A Socialist Searchlight. (1930)

From the December 1930 issue of the Socialist Standard

An “intellectual” on Marx.

“To avoid any confusion in the reader’s mind it must be explained that at the time when this Manifesto was given to the world, what we know to-day as Socialism, was generally referred to as Communism. Karl Marx was therefore attempting to forecast the evolution of Socialism towards world power. That being so, and considering his confident prediction of class conflict, how can anyone honestly uphold Marxism while in the next breath accepting the theory of Parliamentary evolution as opposed not only to revolution but also to direct action in any form.

It is true that the ballot-box and the doctrines of Marx do not mix very well together.” (H. H. Tiltman, in his Life of Ramsay MacDonald, p. 31.)

Such a mass of confusion in one paragraph shows the shallowness and stupidity of Marx’s “critics.” Class conflicts didn’t happen, but Marx predicted them ! This from a writer who spends many pages dealing with the miners’ lock-out and the General Strike ! Mr. Tiltman, full of regard for the sanity of MacDonald, scorns Karl Marx. He does it by erecting a bogey. Any reader of the Communist Manifesto can read Marx’s own statement, that the first step in the emancipation of the working-class is the conquest of political power—the winning of the battle of democracy. MacDonald’s biographer does not tell us where Marx opposed the use of “the ballot box”—because he can’t.

The insinuation that Marx was the apostle of “direct action” clearly shows how little Ramsay’s admirer knows of Marx’s conflict with Bakunin and the other believers in direct action. Mr. Tiltman evidently conceives of revolution as a drama of knives, noise, fireworks and barricades. The use of Parliament by revolutionaries is unknown to these men who “make their own history.”

* * *

How Great Men don't make revolutions.

THE BLOKE IN THE SIDE STREET. 

“The course of revolution, like the course of true love, never did run smooth. All revolutions have some features in common. They are born, not made. They never run to programme, and they can he led down a side street hy a great man. It is never possible to have the mass so drilled or imbued by common ideals that a combined push for an agreed goal can be made.”

This picturesque view of history, more like a six-reel film than actuality, appears in “Forward,” the I.L.P. paper (July 19th). It is the brain wave of John P. Hay, M.A., of the I.L.P., and Workers’ Educational Association. Picture the revolution being led down the alley by the great man ! These people think every attempted uprising is a revolution. They never explain why leaders are able to shepherd their ignorant flock ; nor do they explain why this great man fades out and another supplants him. Our “great man” philosopher wrote the above while reviewing the situation in China. He tells us that “the revolution happened too soon,” and refers to “the frequent splits and divisions among the revolutionaries” there. The great men who make history, according to the hero-worshippers, surely ought not to let little things like starting in advance of the conditions, or meeting with other great men, stand in their way.

Mr. Hay, who always likes to sneer at the Marxist, supplies the knock-out to his own theories in the same article.

FACTORS IN SOCIAL CHANGE.

“The Manchu dynasty fell, not on account of a powerful push from the rear, but simply because it could stand no longer. The use of telephone, telegraph, and railway, foreign pressure from the international money lenders, were factors which induced an increase in the number of Chinese with an outlook on the fate of their country. The return of foreign educated Chinese with ideas of the run of history and economics in the West, gave a powerful impulse to the searchings of heart among the thoughtful.”

That’s what comes of being an opponent of the materialist conception of history. No powerful push by a great man lurking in the rear, but all the factors of modern development are brought in to explain the rise of revolt.

He next tells us that “the lump of national go-as-you-please was too big to be leavened for the economic change.” The “great men” could not lop off the “lump,” to use the scientific language of our Master of Arts. Sun Yat Sen, he tells us, had to teach economics in order to win support for his policy. Economics comes in, you see, even with the gift of being able to lead revolutions down side streets. Borodin, the Russian Communist, Mr. Hay tells us, could not work a Russian pattern into the Chinese material, conditions again defeating leaders making plans for coups and triumphs.

Mr. Hay, M.A., presents just as sad a picture trying to upset Marx’s Materialism as he does when trying to upset Marx’s Economics.

* * *

The German Fascists.

It is interesting to notice how the German Fascists, led by Hitler, outmanoeuvred the reformist parties, the Labour Party and the Communists, by promising reforms of capitalism more drastic than either of them had thought of.

According to the News Chronicle and Star (17th October), Hitler’s programme, now embodied in Bills before Parliament, includes the following reforms : Limitation of interest rate to 5 per cent., of which 1 per cent. is to be taken in taxes ; incomes of company directors to be drastically reduced ; and all banks be taken over by the State without compensation to the shareholders.

Hitler’s attempt to outbid the reformists was so successful that some of his most spectacular successes were in working class constituencies, where formerly the Labour Party or the Communists had been strong. So much for the Labour-Communist theory about leading the workers to Socialism by dangling reforms like carrots in front of their noses. They overlook two things of importance, first, that the workers occasionally want to bite the carrot, and, second, that rival reformists can always step in with sweeter-looking carrots.

Adolph Kohn

Editorial: Lessons from the German elections. (1930)

Editorial from the October 1930 issue of the Socialist Standard

Germany has just had a general election, the results of which call for some comment.

One of the most striking lessons of German politics since the war has been the steady fall in the voting for the German Social Democratic Party. In 1919 they had the vote of 45 per cent. of the electorate ; since then the vote has steadily declined until in this election they have secured only about 25 per cent. of the votes cast. Yet in 1919 German Social Democracy had control of Governmental power, and one of its leading members, Ebert, was German President until his death in 1925 !

What is the explanation of the fall in the Social Democratic vote? The answer is simple.

In the years before the war our “labour” opponents, who opposed our revolutionary attitude, brought forward the alleged progress of the movement in Germany as evidence to support their reformist policy, and pestered us with “the growth of the Socialist vote in Germany.” The war destroyed a good deal of this sand castle and made plain what little progress Socialism had actually made among the people who made up the German Social Democracy. The post-war years have made the position still more plain, and have gradually disillusioned and discouraged a large number of the blind followers of the one-time worshipped “leaders.”

The millions who voted “Socialist” in Germany were like the millions who voted “labour” in England—they did not understand or desire Socialism as they did not know what it involved. At the most what they wanted and expected was an amelioration of the worst of the evils that they suffered, and they relied on the promises of the German Social Democratic Party and the English Labour Party to obtain this result. But Socialism is the only means by which the workers’ position can be materially improved; while capitalism remains in existence it must necessarily go on producing the evils of capitalism. Therefore, as neither of the Parties had a Socialist electorate behind them, conditions have got worse instead of improving—to the disappointment of the electorate.

The failure of the Gorman Social Democratic Party to live up to its promises, although it has been easily the largest Party in Germany since the war, and also the fact that it has in various ways assisted the German capitalists in their exploitation of the workers, is the explanation of the disappointment and disgust of increasing numbers of its former supporters.

It will be noticed that the Communist vote is higher this election than in the last, but they have obtained a lower percentage of the votes cast this time than they did in 1924. They have temporarily gained owing to the political ignorance and hopelessness of part of the electorate. However, the life of a Communist Party is one of ups and downs—mainly downs of late years.

The Fascist Party (or German National Socialist Party, as it calls itself) represents in the main the groups of officers, small investors and small proprietors that have suffered economically during the post-war period, but its main actions are determined by German heavy industry, from which it draws a considerable part of its funds. It suits the large German capitalists to use this body as strike breakers and bogey men to keep down wages and frighten any drastic reforms out of the minds of the Social Democrats.

The irony of the situation is that the German Social Democrats are largely responsible for the existence of this body, as they directly and indirectly assisted in its formation. When in power in 1919, they welcomed the returning soldier back “to his own country,” but decreed that the private soldier should lay down his arms whilst the officers could retain theirs. The S.D.P. also assisted in the formation of armed bodies that were afterwards used against them.

The German Fascist Party came into being as the result of the dissolution of groups which originated from the “Orgesch,” a group formed in Bavaria by a state official named Escherich. The elements composing it were in the main the same then as now. Its aims were similar to those of the Italian Fascisti, to whom it gave, assistance in 1921-22.

Anyone who reads, in the “18th Brumaire,” Marx’s description of the “Society of December,” the hirelings of Napoleon III in the middle of the last century, will recognise the similarity in constitution and methods between it and the German and Italian Fascisti, and also how large capital uses such bodies for its own ends.

The German election was fought on the question of increased taxation to meet the growing unemployment problem. The issue was one that admirably suited the Fascists, who put forward airy phrases about better management of funds and the reduction of expenses ; and also endeavoured to play upon patriotic feeling aroused by the heaviness of the war indemnity.

As the German S.D.P. have not advocated anything beyond ordinary capitalist measures to meet Germany’s difficulties, their answer to the opposition is weak, and they suffer from the swing of the pendulum.

The leaders of German Social Democracy who took over power with quaking knees after the war were afraid to stand or fall by their former protestations. Now, after devoting themselves during these years to the salvation of German capitalism, they are losing support among the workers. Some of their members, such as Noske, have acquired reputations for blood-thirstiness and treachery to the working-class that will be remembered and will help the German workers to realise that they must rely upon their own knowledge and their own efforts to free themselves from capitalist bondage, and cast off the outworn and slavish idea of leadership.

The Origin and Growth of Nazism (Conclusion) (1943)

From the October 1943 issue of the Socialist Standard

Link to Part 2.

Like a thunderbolt, the world slump struck German economy amidships towards the end of 1929. The capitalist magnates of New York, London and Paris who had financed Germany’s industrial comeback, hastily called in whatever part of their loans they could lay their hands on. Thus the German crisis assumed even more disastrous proportions than that of other countries. Her industry had rehabilitated itself on foreign credit and when this credit vanished, the bottom fell out from Germany’s reservoir of production.

This crisis of “overproduction” is an inevitably recurring feature of capitalism. It is “overproduction” indeed, over-production of the surplus value accumulated by its capitalist owners and which they cannot use or dispose of profitably. But for the workers it means unemployment and reduced standards of living. For the German masses the post-war years had been a continuous ordeal of extraordinary strain. The new republic had never settled down politically because the economic background was seldom stable enough (in the capitalist sense of “stability”) to allow for the mental adjustment necessary. When, therefore, the government of Bruening (Right Wing Catholic) was defeated in the Reichstag in July, 1930, the electorate went to the polling booths on September 14, 1930, in an atmosphere of a world  crisis which appeared to them as the consummation of years of distress and bewilderment. From this election the Nazis emerged as a mass party. They secured 6,400,000 votes and 107 seats in the Reichstag – eight times the number polled by them in 1928. The percentage of total voters who actually voted jumped from 50 per cent to 73 per cent: nearly four million new voters had entered the lists. It is estimated that most of these, probably three million, hitherto non-political elements, went to the Nazis. Thus the party of  “National Socialism” is revealed as a product of the world crisis – a party of wild despair and wild hopes.

The Nazis owed this unparalleled success to the fact that in the eyes of many their policy and make-up promised a complete break with the past. The fanatical fervour of the “Brownshirts,” their demagogy and displays, did not appear out-of-place under the circumstances. It reflected the neurosis of the modern troubled world. Compared to them, the parties of the republic, particularly the Social Democrats, were compromised with the “old order” and completely lacking in  “dynamic.” The German Communist Party, under the circumstances prevailing a possible rival to the Nazis, secured 3 ½  million votes. They, too, competed for the votes of those who wanted a break with the “old system” (in fact, large blocks of votes repeatedly fluctuated backwards and forwards between the Nazis and the Communists), but their past inconsistency and support of Social Democracy lowered their standing as a political party. And their ties with Moscow limited their appeal as a Russophile organisation. German industrialists  and big business owners now turned in increasing numbers to Hitler’s party as a means of helping them to give Germany what they were pleased to call “political stability.” They themselves, as “Nationalist” and  “Conservative” parties, had dismally failed to secure any backing of consequence among the people. In the September elections they had even lost a good deal of their previous support to the Nazis. In the “National Socialist” movement they saw an organisation that could compete for “mass appeal” with the Social Democratic and Communist  parties whilst at the same time providing a check to the political and economic threats of the disgruntled workers.

The union between the Nazis and a large section of the German capitalist class was publicly sealed by the parliamentary co-operation of Hitler’s party with the “nationalist” bloc led by Huegenberg, the leading business magnate. This does not mean, however, that the two parties had merged or that the capitalists of Germany were willing to commit their fate into the hands of the Nazi leaders. Nor would it be correct to assume that the Nazis from then onwards became the puppets of the German capitalists. There was in fact a great deal of distrust between the two groups. The Nazi movement was at no time comparable to the orthodox political parties which capitalism had hitherto thrown up. They were not a “class” party in the sense that the Conservative Party in Britain is the party of present-day British capitalism. Their membership and supporters held views as varied as the colours of the well known chameleon. The Race-mythology which attempted to concoct a special philosophy of its own, was merely one wing, and not the whole, of the Nazi movement. Its spokesmen is Alfred Rosenberg (this is definitely a Jewish name). The mass-appeal of the Nazis certainly does not rest on the race-myth. The S.A. (Storm-troops) led by Captain Ernst Roehm was largely composed of unemployed as wells as those dregs of society which Marx called very descriptively the “Lumpenproletariat.” It was this body that carried the terror against the Jews and other opponents of the Nazis. Numerically the most powerful section of this political hybrid was the “radical” wing led by Gregor Strasser. Strasser later attempted to detach this wing from the party and come to terms with trade union and Social Democratic elements. He, like Roehm, was later murdered by his former “comrades” in the “blood-purge” of June, 1934.

This political incoherency is the real explanation of the “Leader-cult.” The more backward and confused politically a people are, the stronger is the gravitation toward absolute personal leadership as a unifying force. Conversely, to the extent that the masses become politically enlightened, the need  for “leadership” disappears.

These differences, as well as the appetites for power of individual Nazi politicians, caused serious conflicts within the movement. But the momentum of the crisis, plus the powerful financial backing from the capitalists, boosted the Nazi Party from strength to strength. In July, 1932, the Nazis polled nearly fourteen million votes, and thus became the strongest single party in the country. To illustrate the unscrupulous lengths to which these political adventurers relied on the credulity of the German electorate (or a large part of it), the following items from their “Immediate Economic Programme,”  published at this election, can be quoted:

“Four hundred thousand houses for single families to be built within a year!”

“To increase the annual yield from German agriculture by two milliard marks,” a fantastic notion.

And, of course, these “revolutionary economists” proposed to abolish the gold standard!

What was the reaction of the so-called “working class” parties to this mortal challenge to all the principles and traditions which the workers since the time of Marx and Engels have built up by their historic struggles? Now, after the event, accusation and counter-accusation are hurled at each other by the parties involved. The worker who has no knowledge of the recorded events is confused. The facts, however, condemn both the Communist Party of Germany and the Social Democrats as equally guilty. The Communists who still claim that they proposed a “United Front” would have defeated the Nazis are, as usual, lying. They had no intention of combining forces with the Social Democrats against Hitler. On the contrary, their avowed purpose was to destroy the German equivalent of the Labour Party by every means, fair or foul. So intense was their hostility that they supported the plebiscite on August 9, 1931 organised by Huegenberg’s reactionary “Stahlhelm” and the Nazi Party, to turn out of office the Social Democratic Government of Prussia. As late as May, 1934, after more than a year of Nazi tyranny, Palme Dutt, the well-known British Communist, declared in his book, Fascism and Social Revolution:

“It would be more correct to say of Social Democracy and Fascism: their aims are the same (the saving of capitalism from the working class revolution); they differ only in their methods.” (Page 155.)

It was a year later, in 1935, when the Russian Government had reason to fear  the threat of war from Nazi Germany, that the Communists obediently turned themselves inside out again and clamoured for “Unity against Fascism.”

And yet no argument can be shown to prove that a combination of Social Democracy and “Communism” would have stayed the Nazi onslaught against the Weimar Republic. This Republic had virtually ceased to exist when Bruening became Chancellor in the spring of 1930. Bruening governed the country by emergency decrees which were authorised by Hindenburg (President of the Republic since 1925). Hindenburg, the Monarchist General, who had not a good word for the republic, but who nevertheless had taken the oath of loyalty to the Weimar Constitution. Bruening’s emergency decrees violated the constitution, but the only party in the Reichstag, who genuinely upheld the principles of Weimar, the Social Democrats, shrank from challenging Bruening and the popular figure of the President who was behind him. They feared that the defeat of Bruening would mean the triumph of Hitler. It was the age-old reformist illusion of compromise; the suicidal tactic of the “lesser evil.” In pursuit of this self-destructive policy the Social Democratic Party of Germany first linked itself with the Junker Generals, then with the catholic Centrists, and lastly again with the militarist Junker, Hindenberg. These alignments sapped the German Labour movement of most of its strength, destroyed the hopes and enthusiasm of  its working class supporters, and finally handed the sorry remains to the Nazis for the death blow. How many more tragic lessons must the workers learn before they abandon once and for all the folly of the lesser evil?

By the end of 1932, the world crisis was at its climax. The markets of the world, glutted by the fertility of modern wage labour, became additionally restricted from the high tariff walls erected by the frightened governments. The Ottawa Agreement barred the way to the raw materials of the British Empire. The capitalist class of Germany were confronted with problems involving their very existence. One half of their industry was at a standstill (the unemployed numbered six and seven millions). Their attempts to impose a semi-military rule on the country through Hindenberg, Von Papen, and general Schleicher, had broken down owing to the hostility of the Reichstag. Germany, although its peculiar development and abnormal condition had, for the time being, brought the democratic forces to failure and disaster, was yet too highly developed to be governed by a regime which did not grow out of a mass political organisation in the country. The Nazis, although they suffered a set-back at the election following their triumph in July, 1932 (they only polled 11,730,000, and thus lost two million votes within a few months, i.e. on November 6, 1932), were the only hope of consolidating German capitalism. Consequently, an agreement was reached between Von Papen (the confidant of Hindenburg) and Hitler, and by it Hitler was installed as Chancellor by Hindenburg in January, 1933. Immediate preparations were made for a further election in order to present the new government to the country as a “national” government so as to strengthen the popular support. The elections, held March 5, 1933, gave the Chancellor, with the backing of the President, attracted millions of additional Nazi votes. Seventeen million votes were cast for them at this election. The seats in the Reichstag were divided as follows:-

Nazis………………………………………….288

Social Democrats………………………….......120

Communists………………………..……….......81

Centre…………………………………..…….....73

Huegenberg’s Nationalists ……….…..................52

All others……………………………..…….........14

 Total                                                                     647

88 per cent of the total electorate voted.

Thus the Nazis together with the nationalists, with whom they were in coalition, held a clear majority. The question arises: To what extent were these figures representative of national opinion freely expressed?

The Reichstag Fire (February 25, 1933) had been blamed on the Communists, and this party was certainly at a grave disadvantage. Nevertheless, the party lost only 19 seats compared with the previous election (November 6, 1932) and a mere eight seats compared with the elections previous to that (July 31, 1932). The Social Democrats lost only one seat.

This proves not only that the votes cast were, in the main, representing popular opinion (although it must be remembered the facilities for propaganda were almost wholly monopolised by the Nazis and their Nationalist allies), but more important still, despite the fact that Hitler was chancellor and his Brownshirt thugs roamed the streets at will, a considerable section of the German people, mostly the industrial working class, were yet determined enough to declare their opposition to the new regime, and the new rulers were not able to prevent them from doing so. Only later, when the government had managed to pass a special measure through the Reichstag, did they abolish the old constitution and establish the dictatorship of the “Third Reich.”

It is admittedly an impossible task to assess here comprehensively the import of events to which tomes have already been dedicated, and of which some aspects remain obscure. The main conclusions from the foregoing analysis are stated herewith:

Political democracy was born in Germany under most unpromising circumstances and against an unfavourable historical background. Its birth was not the result of a struggle by the workers nor the desire or need of the German capitalist class. It was thrown to the nation by the defeat of 1918 and the temporary impotence of ruling class elements.

Nevertheless, the power of the constitution was such that only a mass movement could break it. The Nazi Party was able to rally those sections of the masses who were most backward politically and who had not yet shed their dependence on absolutism. Their success was contributed to by the weak and compromising character of German Social Democracy which attempted to combine the role of working class reformist party with the guardianship of capitalist interests. The Communists drew a large section of the working class into opposition to the democratic method and so the elements whose co-operation was essential to ensure a popular basis for the Republic, were split from the beginning.

The militarist class or junkers who had been the real power behind the absolutist throne up till November, 1918, were seriously weakened by the army’s defeat. The re-arming of Germany placed them once again into a key position in German politics. This time, however, they were dependent on mass-parties for their link-up with the people; this was provided in the first period by Social Democracy and other Republican parties. The world crisis in 1930-33 barred the world market and access to raw materials to the capitalist class of Germany (most of whom are industrialists). This determined the capitalist and militarist elements to embark on a policy of territorial annexation involving war. The Nazi Party then appeared as a means of ending the violent political fluctuations and preparing the country materially and psychologically for the coming conflict. The Nazis, therefore, could never have formed a stable regime of any permanency. Their rule was bound to involve a series of climacterics leading to war. They were in the last analysis a party of crisis and war.

Finally, the Nazis owed their triumph directly to the world economic crisis. Thus the periodical crises of capitalism now emerge as a powerful force for the shaping of political mass opinion. In this particular instance the circumstances combined to give the spoils to a party of reaction. But the future may well atone for this setback. With the fuller experience of workers everywhere, the crises to come -“planners” notwithstanding – should provide an immense stimulus to the world movement for Socialism.

Sid Rubin

The Origin and Growth of Nazism pt.2 (1943)

From the September 1943 issue of the Socialist Standard

Link to Part 1.

In January, 1919, the first elections under the new Weimer constitution were held. German Social Democracy polled more than 11½  million votes. Eighteen months later these votes dropped to less than half. As the new republic was synonymous with the German Labour Party – indeed it was there own handiwork – this meant only one thing: sooner or later the democratic republic of Germany would fall and bury the founders beneath the its ruins. The question was: Which political force would achieve the assassination  of German democracy?

The enemies of the republic were numerous. There were the avowed capitalist parties, representing the German industrialists and big business. These parties called themselves “Nationalist.” They feared the working class backing the Social Democrats; above all, they were afraid that the more extreme section of the workers, organised in the “Spartakus” group (later the Communist Party of Germany) and in the “U.S.D.P” (Independent Socialists), would gain the upper hand over the moderates. There were the numberless right-wing splinter organisations which only a system of proportional representation could call into a precarious existence. The real threat, however, came from the army, or more properly speaking, its “illegal shadow”, the “Free Corps.”

However, all of them lacked the one essential which in the last analysis can alone carry a political party to victory – they lacked mass-support. Political murders, putsches and intrigue were the order of the day in Germany in the early post-war years. Governments came and went at yearly intervals or even less. The inflation in 1922-1923 sent the mark into the pit of depreciation – so bottomless that even the best mathematical minds could not peer into it without toppling. Nevertheless,  the ramshackle structure of the newly-born republic held, because none of its enemies had succeeded as yet in building a mass-party. The mass-parties at that time were still on the side of the republic. Apart from the Social Democrats, who believed in the republic to the very last (and, let it be stated, kept a solid core of support among the industrial working class numbering about six million), three main parties, all of them openly capitalist, proclaimed their support for the Weimer constitution and participated in the coalitions which governed Germany for ten years until 1930. There were the Democratic Party (Liberals, never strong, soon to disappear), the Catholic Centre Party (party of the agrarian Catholic South), and the German Peoples’ Party (Conservative, leader Gustav Streseman). The last two parties ratted on the Republic at the critical moment.

During the first two years of its existence, the Nazi movement had to content itself with the province of Bavaria as its main sphere of influence. In this locality it quickly gained a notoriety quite out of proportion to its numbers. Bavarians are by temperament the least stolid and by political standards the most backward of the “German” people. The showy effects and fury of language and methods used by Hitler and his colleagues drew their attention even if it did not at first gain their support. It is by no means paradoxical that Bavaria, the first stronghold of the Nazis, had also been the first and only German province to proclaim itself a “Soviet Republic” – as short-lived as its first President, Kurt Eisner, who was assassinated shortly after assuming office. Conditions and people alike provided fertile ground for an “extremism” that was utterly irrational as it was based merely on violent discontent without an inkling as to the real cause of the post-war distress. And the foundations of centuries had been swept away: the Bavarian Monarchy, the semi-feudal hierarchy – in short, dependence on the older order was no longer available and the population as a whole was not ready as yet to work along the lines of the new, democratic constitution which demanded at least a modicum of political self-reliance. Into this political vacuum the Nazis poured their crude mixture of “radical” and patriotic propaganda. Their theme song was simple and catching: “The people of Germany were suffering for their defeat of 1918. But this defeat was not achieved honestly on the field of battle! No, the German army was not beaten by its foes abroad; it was stabbed in the back by the enemies of the people in Germany itself, the ‘Marxists’.” (All supporters of the Weimar constitution were dubbed “Marxists.”)

Granted the premise, the rest was not difficult to swallow. And no political party in Germany denied it. Only a Socialist movement  could explain that victory and defeat do not materially affect the economic position of the workers, but a socialist movement did not exist in Germany. The Communist Party, forced through its dependence on Moscow to sacrifice working class interests to the varying needs of Russian foreign policy, bewildered and disgusted by their political somersaults the more militant workers who were looking for an alternative to Social democracy. Able and tested men such as Paul Levi and Daumig left the Communist Party rather than serve as stooges to the Comintern.

The lessons of the Russian and Italian dictatorships were not lost on Hitler and his associates. The method of intimidating opponents by physical violence suited the social riff-raff of military adventurers and professional thugs that constituted the active core of the early Nazi party. Already, in 1920, Hitler had been sentenced to a month’s imprisonment for breaking up an opponent’s meeting. During these early years the Nazis were only one of many small nationalist and anti-semitic organisations. Three factors, however, soon gained it more prominence than any of its rivals. (1) Its useful connections with groups in the army; (2) The oratorical powers of Adolf Hitler; (3) That it made serious attempts to influence the workers, shopkeepers, professional men, etc., by means of a theoretical platform containing all the “radical” ingredients that look so attractive to the strugglers for existence. The Nazi party, like its bitter opponents in later years, the Communists, was never thought of as “Reformist,” although its economic programme simply stunk of the old hash served up by every reformist party throughout the capitalist world. “Provision for the aged,” “Protection for the small trader,” “Education for the talented children of the poor,” and so on, ad nauseum.

Its “revolutionary” content was signified by its title, “National Socialism.” State capitalism, misnamed “State Socialism,” had been a feature of German capitalism since Bismarck. Long before that, Marx had dealt contemptuously with the trickery of certain capitalist elements to palm off their cry for help from the State as “Socialism” (see Communist Manifesto, 1848, chapter on “True” or “German” Socialism). The defeat of 1918 had weakened the German capitalist class considerably and many of them were looking to State control as a solution. The Nazis were thus bidding for capitalist support whilst at the same time deluding the workers who had been taught to regard Nationalisation as “Socialism.”

Further, the Nazis posed as “Unconstitutionalists.” In 1923 they were in fact determined to overthrow the existing government of Bavaria in a coup d’état. With the dismal rout of the Nazi street-fighters on November 9, 1923, the Nazis abandoned the idea of a coup and set themselves the task of winning the masses. Hitler, who together with the late General Ludendorff had led the “insurrection,” received a sentence of nine months’ imprisonment. Altogether Hitler had cut a sorry figure during this affair. He – the man who claims to have won an Iron Cross, first class , during the last war – fled at the sound of the first shot. After his release from prison, Hitler reconstituted the party into a legal, parliamentary organisation. Nevertheless, the opposition to “the system” (as the Nazis cleverly called the Weimer republic) plus their vicious abuse of the opponents, as well as their incessant baiting of Jews, maintained for them a reputation of being “revolutionaries.” And let there be no misunderstanding: they were “revolutionaries” in the sense that they aimed at a political revolution: the elimination of the democratic constitution which permitted minorities, including the Nazis, to exist. And the army of thugs, the “S.A” and “S.S.” (“stormtroops”), ostensibly maintained to keep “order” at Nazi meetings, provided the sinister substance to Hitler’s demagogic threat: “When our Party comes to power, heads will roll.”

But in those days few took the Nazis seriously. The stabilisation of the German currency and the world-wide economic recovery after the post-war slump, kept the party small. In the elections of May, 1928, they polled 800,000 votes. Comparing the figure with the vote given to the Social Democrats (9 million) who could have foreseen that in less than five years the Nazis would be the political masters of Germany?

Sid Rubin

(Final part published next month, October 1943)

The Origin and Growth of Nazism pt.1 (1943)

From the August 1943 issue of the Socialist Standard

The phenomenal growth of the Nazi movement posed new problems. Hitherto the autocratic state had been associated with backward countries, and the establishment of dictatorships in Russia and Italy had not weakened this theory to any serious extent. But Germany, a highly industrialised country, also leading the world in many fields of scientific endeavour and cultural achievement, could not be included in this rather simplified category. Here was a precedent in the world of politics demanding a new approach.

Two main viewpoints emerged as deserving of some consideration. The first, produced by the Communists and since abandoned by its sponsors, held that German Fascism — and Fascism in any other country — represented the last stage of capitalism. The workers, it was claimed, were on the point of storming the citadel of capitalist society and the ruling class had erected this barrier as a means of holding the revolution at bay. (This view, incidentally, suited these leaders of totalitarianism, and supported their claims to be “world saviours from Bolshevism”.)

This idea has led the Communists into strange political twists. Their enmity was concentrated on the Labour Parties, whom they dubbed “Social-Fascists” rather than the Fascists, whom they hoped to succeed in power. Their slogan: “After the Fascists come we!” was based on the mistaken assumption that a Nazi regime would give rise to civil war, from which the Communists would emerge as victors.

The second theory is still extant in some quarters and has been argued at length, though with little basis, by Mr. James Burnham in his book The Managerial Revolution. This claims that the Totalitarian State is not capitalism at all, but a new kind of social arrangement in which the power of the capitalist class has been broken and the control of society passed into the hands of “the managerial class,” managers, supervisors, highly paid technicians, etc. This view owes its origin to an American doctrine known as “Technocracy.” It is a superficial generalisation which has avoided specific inquiry into the economic anatomy of the totalitarian states. Franz Neumann, in what is probably the most penetrating analysis of the Nazi State, has conclusively answered the “managerial school.” (Behemoth. Left Book Club edition.)

The fundamental error common to both these schools of thought was to assume that capitalism in every country must have identical features, political and economic, forgetting that in each case exists a different historical background which is bound to give varying trends and twists to each country’s evolution. The development of capitalism in Germany was held back at first owing to her geographical position (e.g. inadequate coastline). When capitalism did appear in the middle of the last century, it limited itself to districts around the Rhine, the river facilitating the transport of coal and iron from the nearby Ruhr. This late beginning put German capitalism at a disadvantage with the already well established manufacturing centre of Britain, which by then had a firm grip on the only market open to Germany, the European continent. This commercial rivalry was to play an important part in shaping the history of the world and has already helped to scourge mankind with two world wars.

The lack of raw materials such as oil, rubber, nitrate, etc., further increased the difficulties of German capitalists and made them more dependant than any of their other competitors on the world market. (It also encouraged the research for substitutes, “Ersatz,” and gave a spur to German chemical industries.) Under the economic laws of world capitalism the import of goods from abroad must be met and balanced by payment in cash (gold) or the export of home — manufactured wares. This is merely an extension of home grown capitalist economy and demonstrates the validity of Marx’s analysis of capitalist economics, yet the capitalist economic rivalry which is the root — cause of modern wars is obscured to many by propaganda about “ideals” of “justice,” “freedom,” etc.

The late national unity of German capitalism (achieved in 1871) also was a factor restricting the growth of the economic and political power of the German capitalist class. This class, therefore, did not feel strong enough to govern Germany and leaned upon another, more ancient, ruling class, the group of Junkers, the Prussian landowners. This social element, strictly belonging to Feudalism, was consequently extending its reign into capitalism. Its main hold upon modern Germany was in the role of organising and officering the German Army, a vital necessity for a capitalist land – power which by its very nature was predestined to play a military aggressive role in world politics.

The defeat of Germany in 1918 drove the figurehead, the Kaiser, into exile, but left the ruling class groups of capitalists and generals still in a dominating position. German Social Democracy (the equivalent, more or less, of the British Labour Party) took on the powers of government, not with the idea of interfering with the property — rights of the German capitalists, but merely to give Germany the political constitution of a capitalist democratic republic after the style of France or the United States. 

But for this moderate project they encountered immense difficulties. The economic distress of the workers could not be remedied by capitalist reforms and large masses of workers, guided by the Bolshevik Revolution on the one hand and encouraged by temporary capitalist impotence on the other, threatened the Government’s overthrow. Here German Social Democracy was faced with a dilemma, a dilemma of its own choosing. Their self–appointed task of saving German capitalism brought them into inevitable conflict with the working class interests which they had promised to safeguard. They solved the dilemma by calling the reactionary junker class of generals and officers to their rescue and so paved the way for the eventual downfall of the German republic.    

The South of Germany, especially Bavaria, being still in the main an agricultural area, soon led the swing back to reaction. Already in 1920, barely two years after the armistice, an openly pro-monarchist, anti-democratic regime was established, carrying on anti-republican propaganda. Numerous groups of officers, not legally employed by the German central government but permitted to exist in order to evade the restriction on military forces imposed by the Allied victors, participated in political intrigues. In addition, numberless political parties, open enemies of the democratic republic, existed under various guises. Among these was a small group calling itself “The German Workers’ Party,” which had been founded in Munich, capital of Bavaria. This party based its policy on ideas derived from the mediaeval guilds with their handicraft labour, a form of labour that still existed in Bavaria.  Adolf Hitler, who at that time was living in Munich, a soldier not yet demobilised, joined the “Inner Council” of this organisation.

The most authoritative work on the growth of the Nazi Party is  the History of the National Socialism,  by Konrad Heyden. In it the author alleged that Hitler joined the group as an agent of a number of German officers. It is certain that Hitler owed his rapid domination over this party to his control of funds which he was handed by his officer friends, who included Captain Roehm. (The latter he had murdered in the “Blood Purge” of June, 1934.)

Besides his control of funds, Hitler also quickly showed his ability as a mob-orator as well as certain talents for political intrigue. At his suggestion the party changed its name to the “National Socialist German Workers’ Party,” a title worthy of a group whose policy was not National but Racist and Imperialist, not Socialist but Capitalist; which did not represent the workers and whose leader was not even German. The new title was matched by a programme of “Twenty-Five points,” most of which consisted of the usual reformist eyewash which the Nazi leaders have long since forgotten.

Two distinct features have of the new Nazi programme deserve to be mentioned. One was opposition to “unearned income.” This point was designed to appeal to workers, but its real meaning was quite different. At that time German industry was being financed by capitalists in France, Britain and the United States, who were thus drawing the rake-off from the proceeds from the proceeds of German industry. The German industrialists, like their brothers everywhere, objected to having to part with some of the surplus value they wrung from the workers: they wanted to keep the lot. So the cry “unearned incomes” was a cry from the heart of the German capitalist exploiters.

The other point was the hostility to the Jews. To be understood, anti-semitism must be placed in its proper historical setting. Under Feudalism the Jew was a social outcast. The land as a means of livelihood was closed to him. Trading and the money-transactions it involved formed an infinitesimal part of an economy that largely restricted itself to production for local consumption. Money-lending itself was forbidden by the Church. Thus the Jew found himself willy-nilly burdened with an economic role that stamped him as an outsider to feudal society. And though under capitalism trading and finance have long ceased to be the prerogative of any religious sect, anti-semitism persists as a tradition. It is in fact a hangover from Feudalism, particularly vicious in countries where feudal customs and ideas still exert a strong influence. This tradition is of course continuously nourished by the prejudices, national  and religious, which only a classless society can fully eliminate.

The Nazis found a fruitful field for their Jew baiting propaganda in backward Bavaria. But the real significance of their “Racist philosophy” appeared later, when the intention to avenge the defeat of 1918 became obvious. The buffer states of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland contained strong German-born and German-speaking elements. These countries formed the first stepping stones to the mastery of Europe. The Nazi doctrine proclaiming the “Unity and Purity of the German Race,” was nonsense indeed from the scientist’s point of view, but as propaganda it prepared the way for conquest.

Sid Rubin

(Part 2 follows in September’s issue)

On Leaders (1940)

From the August 1940 issue of the Socialist Standard

The tragedy for Socialists is the manner in which the Nazi movement captured the minds and support of the German masses. Many factors contributed towards this end, but one thing stands out above all else, the misunderstanding of the principles of Socialism. Had this not been so there would not, and could not, have been a mass following for the spurious National Socialism. Throughout the world this method is being employed. Why does it succeed? Because the Labour, Communist and Social Democratic organisations are daily filling the minds of the workers with reformist notions and labelling them Socialism. Thus is provided the foundations of illusion. It is absurd to ask German workers not to believe false ideas, whilst workers everywhere else are taught to believe them. If it is wrong for the workers of Germany to believe blindly in a leader called Hitler, then it is equally wrong for the workers of Russia to believe blindly in one called Stalin, or the workers of Britain in one called MacDonald. This belief in a “Leader” is one fostered through the ages and aided by the reactionary as well as reformist sections. On one occasion, whilst lecturing in Manchester, the writer was asked by a young man, “Who is your leader?” His attendance at other meetings had left him with a psychological reflex resulting in this one question.

A century ago Thomas Carlyle laid down the fashion followed a few years later by Emerson in his “Representative Men,” which reaches its height in Hitler as the “Fuehrer.” From this comes the story of the “self-made man,” as does “Dick Whittington,” and has served Capitalism well as a theme to delude the worker with the belief that he could do it, and so adroitly sidetracking the workers’ class outlook. Individuals there are, of outstanding ability, who, given suitable conditions, stand out as historic figures and may become a Karl Marx or a Charles Peace, but only under the suitable conditions. The world has yet to produce “great” men who can make a fortune selling ice-cream in Greenland. How does Hitler fit in with this? Is he one of Carlyle’s “heroes,” or one of Emerson’s “representative” men? Demosthenes, in his “First Phillipic,” says it would make no difference if Philip were to die, because, if the Athenians acted as they had been doing, they would soon raise up against them another Philip.

Hitler had a secondary school education, had a taste for drawing, considered himself an artist, went to an art school and failed to pass the examination necessary to go further. He was a builder’s labourer, painter and paper-hanger, and lived a down-at-heels life in Vienna and Germany until the outbreak of war in 1914. Now, here was a “born” leader who should have made a fortune and become a power, because, according to conventional ideas, he had it in him. In spite of all the sacredness of his ego, he managed in four years to become, not a General, but only a Corporal. Turn again, Dick Whittington.

The collapse of the Kaiser’s Germany gave a shock to the officer caste. They realised the Army’s position in the nation could no longer be taken for granted. They must exert influence in civilian life by political support, spies, propagandists and political agents of their own. They sent Hitler as their spy, and for propaganda to the public houses in Munich, then under an ill-starred Soviet. When the Army reconquered the city, Hitler’s information sent many Communists and others before a firing squad. He was next sent to spy on the tiny groups formed by Gregor Strasser, known as the German Workers’ Party. He introduced numerous members (private soldiers specially sent) and swamped the group, changing its name to the one now known as Nazi. The first Defence Troop, forerunner of the S.A. (Storm Abteilung) was organised by a paid soldier, whilst the money needed to buy for the party (and Hitler) their own paper (The Beobachter) was raised and supplied by the officer commanding the Munich Army, General von Epp. Thus Hitler had “greatness” thrust upon him. He was not Carlyle’s “hero,” but, due to the foregoing suitable conditions, became an Emerson “representative man.” There stood behind him a national force, the officers of the Army, and on their wings he soared upward. He fished in troubled waters, using the years 1922-1923 of currency depreciation to further his growth. From 1924 to 1929 no progress was made by Hitler, because a moderate but distinct period of “prosperity” showed itself, and in the election prior to obtaining power, Hitler dropped over a million votes. Then came the economic blizzard of 1932-1933. The small investor and business man was swamped; suitable conditions again prevailed; the Big Business needed him and his party, and Hitler turned again to become what he is, not a “born” leader, but a representative man, representing unbridled rapacity. He did not make, he was made.

Lew.