Showing posts with label Perestroika. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Perestroika. Show all posts

Friday, October 30, 2026

Where is Russia Going? (1988)

From the September 1988 issue of the Socialist Standard

Russia has — and at no time since the 1917 revolution ceased to have — a capitalist economy characterised by the existence of commodity-production, wage-labour and capital accumulation. What has changed, and is changing again under Gorbachev, is the way in which economic decision-making within this system is organised.

Capitalism is a class society in which those who do the actual work of production, whether manual or intellectual, are separated from the means of production and have to live by selling their mental and physical energies to those who monopolise the farms, factories, mines, warehouses, offices and other places where wealth is created.

What distinguishes capitalism from other class societies is the fact that the great bulk of wealth is produced by wage-labour, for sale on a market. It is a society where all wealth is produced with a view to being bought and sold, which is what Marx meant when he spoke of capitalism as involving generalised “commodity production”. A commodity is an item of wealth that has been produced for sale and, as Marx put it in the opening line of Capital: “The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an immense collection of commodities”.

Commodity-production in Russia
Wage-labour has never been abolished in Russia; on the contrary it expanded massively as more and more peasants were transformed into wage-workers for developing industry. The existence of wage-labour as the predominant form of productive work has been in itself sufficient proof of the capitalist nature of the Russian economy. But what about commodity-production? Can this too be said to have always existed in Russia since 1917?

There has never been any argument about consumer goods in Russia being commodities; they are quite obviously produced with a view to being sold and are just as obviously bought for money. In Stalin’s time, however, the official Russian position was that producer goods such as raw materials, machinery and other elements of production were not commodities.

The case for denying that producer goods, called “means of production” in the debate, were commodities rested on the nature of the system of central planning instituted in Russia in the 1930s. Under this system, the factories and other places where wealth was produced received strict instructions from the central state, not only about what to produce but also to whom they should deliver their products and from whom they should get their supplies. Factories were in effect supplied by the central state with the materials and equipment they needed for production.

Stalin argued that, as this amounted to a system of direct supply in kind, the products involved were not commodities but simply useful things being physically transferred from one unit in the productive system to another. As he argued in 1951 against a certain Notkin who, apparently, had dared to argue that producer goods in Russia were commodities:
“A commodity is a product which may be sold to any purchaser, and when its owner sells it, he loses ownership of it and the purchaser becomes the owner of the commodity, which he may resell, pledge or allow to rot. Do means of production come into this category? They obviously do not. In the first place, means of production are not “sold” to any purchaser, they are not “sold” even to collective farms; they are only allocated by the state to its enterprises. In the second place, when transferring means of production to any enterprise, their owners – the state – does not lose the ownership of them; on the contrary, it retains it fully. In the third place, directors of enterprises who receive means of production from the Soviet state, far from becoming their owners, are deemed to be the agents of the state in the utilisation of the means of production in accordance with the plans established by the state.” (Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR)
In other words, according to Stalin the central state was simply engaged in transferring wealth it owned from one of its factories to another; just as, for instance, the Ford motor company did when parts produced in one of its factories were transferred to another for incorporation into the final product.

Faced with this argument those in the Marxist tradition responded with a number of possible, and not always compatible answers. One was to accept that Russian producer goods were not commodities and that therefore Russia was not capitalist but some new form of exploiting class society.

Another was to accept the analogy with Fords and argue that Russia was a single, giant capitalist firm operating within the context of the world capitalist system.

A third argument was that the products Russian enterprises transferred to each other were commodities because they had to be paid for, the receiving enterprise having to transfer a sum of money from its account to that of the supplying enterprise. So what the central planners in Russia were planning was not the simple physical transfer of productive resources between productive units but the exchange of commodities among commodity-producing enterprises.

This last was undoubtedly a correct analysis as the central planners not only had to plan the physical transfer of producer goods from enterprise to enterprise but also to fix prices’ generally. Since the death of Stalin the Russian authorities have come to accept that producer goods in Russia are commodities (which leaves a few die-hard orthodox Trotskyists as the only defenders of Stalin’s position).

The following, then, is a more accurate description of the system of imperative (that is, compulsory, binding) central state planning in Russia, an understanding of which is essential to a comprehension of the changes proposed by Gorbachev under the name of perestroika:
“In the Soviet Union some three-quarters of total production is made up of means of production. In a Western type commodity-capitalist economy production and exchange takes place through market relations established directly between enterprises, i.e. in a decentralised way. In the Soviet system, on the other hand, production and exchange relations between enterprises are not directly established horizontally but take place via a vertical centralisation. It is the system of material supply that controls and plans the circulation of commodities. Herein lies the fundamental element of the originality of the Soviet economy. The enterprise receives orders not only on what it must produce and in what amounts. It also has precise instructions on the destination of the commodities it produces: their buyers and users are laid down by the planning authorities. And, above all, the origin, amounts and specifications, and delivery date of their own supply of raw materials, semi-finished products and equipment – the input of their production – are similarly planned. Thus the major part of inter-enterprise exchanges are controlled and organised by administrative apparatuses situated outside and above the units concerned.”  (B. Chavance, Le système économique soviétique).
To which must be added that, as indicated, the prices which enterprises must pay their suppliers and must charge their customers are also fixed centrally.

In other words, what the central state in Russia has been planning from Stalin’s time to today has not been the simple physical transfer of wealth between the various productive units it owned but the exchange of commodities between them. Productive units in Russia produce wealth to be sold (commodities), even if they have not been free to decide to whom to sell and at what price. But despite this state control there is still commodity-production by wage labour, and so therefore capitalism.

Failure of central planning
The aim of production in Russia, as in any capitalist country, is to maximise the amount of surplus value extracted from the class of wage and salary earners. To do so requires some measure of the rate of exploitation of wage-labour, of the surplus produced by workers over and above the value of their wages and salaries. This can only be provided by a price structure in which the prices of resources used in production accurately reflect their cost of production plus the average rate of profit (what Marx called their “price of production”).

In Western-type capitalism such a price structure is brought about more or less spontaneously through the operations of market forces. In Russia the central planners had to try to work it out themselves. For various reasons they failed, as has been admitted by Academician Abel Aganbegyan, one of Gorbachev’s top economic advisers and a leading theorist of perestroika, when he writes in his recent book The Challenge: Economics of Perestroika (Hutchinson, £8.95):
“The existing system of prices does not give a true valuation because prices do not reflect social costs and the efficiency of production. Up to now this common denomination has been lacking in the Soviet Union.”
This has meant that the Russian ruling class has been deprived of an accurate measure of the rate of extraction of surplus value at enterprise and industrial branch level as well as at the level of the economy as a whole, and so hasn’t been able to calculate properly where to invest new capital so as to make the most profit and achieve the highest possible average rate of profit over the whole economy.

Although central planning has been successful in developing one or two specially selected industrial sectors; in ‘particular the military (for such a comparatively backward country economically, Russia’s advances in weaponry and space research, whatever else may be said about them, represent a considerable technological achievement), it has proved a failure for the rest of industry .

This is not just the consequence of an inability to develop a coherent price system, but also because it could not provide a substitute for competition as a spur to enterprises increasing labour productivity through technological innovation and advance.

This failure has been evident to the Russian rulers since the late 1950s and various reforms have been introduced to rectify things, but all to no avail. In Khrushchev’s time, the economist Liberman proposed that enterprises should be allowed more freedom to seek and retain profits. Experiments in this direction were made but were never extended to the whole economy, as this would have demanded the complete dismantling of central state planning. As reform after reform failed, and the Russian economy continued to stagnate in terms of productivity and technological advance (it is not for nothing that the Russian rulers refer to the 20 years of Brezhnev rule as “the period of stagnation”), this question had finally to be faced. Which is what Gorbachev has done and what perestroika, or restructuring, is all about.

Perestroika and market forces
The restructuring that perestroika involves is precisely the abandoning of central state planning of commodity production and exchange in favour of allowing enterprises to buy and sell directly from each other at prices fixed by the market.

As explained by Aganbegyan, the first step towards this has already been taken in the “Law on Socialist Enterprises” passed in June 1987 and operative on 1 January this year. Under this law individual enterprises have been granted their independence from the state:
“Enterprises and associations are to become independent, self-accounting, self-financing and self-managing. These four characteristics all involve the responsibility of the enterprise, and imply a completely new economic situation for the basic production units in the Soviet economic system. Only in these conditions can the working collective of an enterprise really be master, owner and director of the resources of production available to it.”
Since such independence is being guaranteed by a law enforceable in the Courts this amounts to a virtual “privatisation” of these enterprises. This time it is not just a question, as it was in a previous law passed at the time of the Liberman experiments in 1965, of allowing enterprises to retain some of their profits as an incentive to get them to carry out the central state’s orders and instructions efficiently. Enterprises are to become autonomous legal and economic units dependent for their income on the sale of the commodities they produce.
“Enterprises are changing over to full self-accounting, in which all expenditure must be covered by income. What does full economic accounting mean? It may be contrasted with partial economic accounting. Currently enterprise income covers only running costs, while at the same time a significant part of capital investment of the enterprise comes from centralised resources. Full economic accounting, above all, implies that there are no subsidies so that the income of an enterprise from production covers both its running costs and its capital expenditure.”
In a later chapter Aganbegyan expands on what this will mean:
“Enterprises will receive their earnings from the sale of their output. The gross revenue of enterprises will be formed by these earnings after material input expenses have been met (on raw materials, finishing, and even amortisation). From this gross revenue an enterprise makes payments for resources used (natural resources and labour, and the use of capital stock), makes contribution to the budget, local authority rates and to ministry funds, pays off bank credit and any fines 10 contractors and makes any other payments due. The remainder is self-managed income at the full disposal of the enterprise’s working collective, determining its well-being and further development. To receive a large self-accountable net income more goods must be sold, through increasing both the quantity and quality of production, and by trying to get higher prices. For this a competitive edge will need to be maintained against other similar enterprises and higher quality and a better technological level of output will need 10 be attained. All this is a precondition for a larger self accountable income. The self-accountable income also depends on production costs. The lower the fuel, energy and raw material consumption, the larger the enterprise’s income.”
In other words, the enterprises are going to be expected to behave in the same way as private and state enterprises do in the openly capitalist West: to seek to maximise their retained profits (“self accountable income”) both by minimising costs and increasing sales.

Their relationship to the banks is to be similar too. “It will be advantageous for an enterprise”, writes Aganbegyan, “to draw on credit and this will increase its self-accountable income if the credit is well used so that the profit is increased at a greater rate than the interest paid on the credit”.

The next step in perestroika after this granting of legal and economic independence to enterprises will be to allow them to choose their own suppliers and customers and to agree among themselves the prices of the goods they trade with each other. Aganbegyan does not disguise the fact that this will have to involve the dismantling of the old system of central state planning described above, under which enterprises’ suppliers, customers and prices were fixed centrally:
“Up to now the market in the Soviet Union has been both restricted and deformed. Most means of production have been centrally allocated by the state through a material and technical supply system. They are not freely bought and sold . . . During perestroika market relations in the USSR will be deepened and broadened. Above all the market is set to more than double in size thanks to the transition from centralised material and technical supply to wholesale trading in means of production, including direct commercial links between enterprises. In this way a well-developed market in means of production will be created, and the proportion of centrally set prices will be retained only for the most essential products, to control their rate of growth and to stave off inflation. At the same time the scope of contracted and free prices will grow significantly.”
The abolition of “centralised material and technical supply” (as described above by Chavance) and “centralised pricing” which have been features of the Russian economy since the 1930s would represent a really radical change in the organisation of the Russian economy, but the timetable for this has already been laid down. By 1990 60 per cent of all production is to take place through wholesale trading, rising to 80-90 per cent in 1992. Similarly, the number of prices set centrally is to be reduced so as to cover only the more essential products (such as fuel, electricity and certain raw materials and steel products). The rest are to be determined by market forces and even then the prices of those commodities which remain centrally fixed are to be linked to their world market price. Planning will still remain but be indicative — providing global estimates of market demand — rather than imperative.

Return of the bondholder?
If it is implemented — and it remains to be seen whether or not this reform will suffer the fate of previous ones — perestroika will represent a fundamental change in the form of capitalism that has existed in Russia until now. It will represent a transition from centrally planned commodity production and exchange to a more competitive system in which the competing units would be, as in the West, legally and economically autonomous enterprises. The economic laws of capitalism will come to operate in Russia through competition rather than through the State which, Aganbegyan admits, has proved to be an inadequate substitute.

Other changes can be expected to follow. In his book Aganbegyan dismisses the idea that a stock exchange could develop in Russia. Other advisers to the Russian rulers are not so sure, according to a recent newspaper report:
“A senior Communist Party official yesterday predicted that the Soviet Union could eventually have its own stock exchange under reforms promoted by Gorbachev. Mr Evard Figuranov, of the Party’s Central Committee’s economic department, said creation of an exchange was the logical extension of new forms of stimulating use of savings introduced over the past year. “It is not under consideration yet, but I think it will be in the future”, he said at one of a series of news briefings, organised to coincide with the current Party conference in Moscow . . . Over the past year, small, state-owned enterprises around the country have begun offering shares to employees and bonds for specific development projects as control by ministries in Moscow has been relaxed. Mr Figuranov said a bond market could arise alongside a share market for the construction of social projects like kindergartens and sports complexes.” (Daily Telegraph, 2 July 1988)
This would indeed be a logical extension of perestroika, and not just kindergartens and sport complexes. For, if enterprises are to be allowed autonomy to seek to maximise their so-called “self accountable income”, why should they be obliged to go to the banks when they want money to pay for some development project? Why shouldn’t they be allowed to offer bonds and shares for sale to the general public? It should not be imagined that there are no rich people in Russia. There are – the children of scientific and artistic prize-winners who have inherited wealth from their parents, for instance, as well as the top members of the nomenklatura and their families, and black marketeers past and present – and many of these would be only too keen to invest their wealth for profit.
Adam Buick


Next month we look at the consequences for Russia’s paper commitment to be working towards a moneyless society of Gorbachev’s acceptance of so-called “market socialism”.

Thursday, October 1, 2026

Gorbachev and the End of Communism (1988)

From the October 1988 issue of the Socialist Standard

The Bolsheviks who seized power in Russia in November 1917 drew a distinction, at the insistence of Lenin but unlike Marx and Engels, between socialism and communism.

By “socialism” they meant a society where everybody would be an employee of the state which in turn would own all the means of production; what should more properly be called state capitalism. By “communism” they meant what up to then had more usually been called socialism — a classless, moneyless, wageless, stateless society based on common ownership and democratic control. Thus, in the ABC of Communism, a textbook written to explain the new programme the Bolshevik party had adopted in March 1919, Bukharin and Preobrazhensky stated:
“The communist method of production presupposes in addition that production is not for the market, but for use. Under communism, it is no longer the individual manufacturer or the individual peasant who produces; the work of production is effected by the gigantic cooperative as a whole. In consequence of this change, we no longer have commodities, but only products. These products are not exchanged one for another; they are neither bought nor sold. They are simply stored in the communal warehouses, and are subsequently delivered to those who need them. In such conditions, money will no longer be required. Communist society will know nothing of money. Every worker will produce goods for the general welfare. He will not receive any certificate to the effect that he has delivered the product to society, he will receive no money, that is to say. In like manner, he will pay no money to society when he receives whatever he requires from the common store.”
In Bolshevik theory communism could not be established immediately after the capture of political power but only after “socialism” — defined, as we saw, as 100 per cent state capitalism — had been achieved. A moneyless, wageless society was seen as evolving gradually out of the state capitalist society that was the Bolsheviks’ real immediate aim.

This is still the official dogma of the Russian ruling class though their vision of communism, like everything else they inherited from their 1914 Marxist past, has suffered some significant distortions. It is seen as being able to exist on less than a world scale, either in one large country like Russia or the whole Russian bloc but above all the Party (if not the state as such) is seen as surviving into it.

Stalin proclaimed that “socialism” – more or less total state capitalism – had been achieved in 1936. So, ever since, the country has supposedly been heading for communism. Khrushchev, the last previous “liberal” ruler of Russia before Gorbachev, even tried to give this goal a concrete form as a way of enlisting popular support for his anti-Stalinist reform programme. The new Programme of the Russian Party, adopted in October 1961, declared in its introduction:
“Today the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is adopting its third Programme, a programme for the building of communist society . . . . The supreme goal of the Party is to build a communist society on whose banner will be inscribed: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”
and ended with the words:
“The Party solemnly proclaims: the present generation of Soviet people shall live in communism!”
A specific timetable was even laid down:
“The material and technical basis of communism will be built up by the end of the second decade (1971-80) . . . The construction of communist society will be fully completed in the subsequent period.”
The “communist principle of distribution according to need” was to be introduced gradually, even before 1980, before being extended generally in the 1980s:
“In the course of the second decade housing will gradually become rent-free for all citizens. Public transport facilities (trolleys, buses, trolley-buses and subways) will become free in the course of the second decade, and at the end of it such public amenities as water, gas and heating will also be free.

In addition to the existing free medical services, accommodation of sick persons at sanatoria and the dispensing of medicines will become gratuitous.

The transition to free public catering (midday meals) at enterprises and institutions, and for collective farmers at work, will begin in the second decade.”
Free housing, public transport, water, gas, heating, medical services and meals at work – this was the promise for the 1980s that the ruling party made to the Russian workers in 1961. Other promises included falling prices and the abolition of income tax. The fact that not one of these has been realised – Russian workers still have to pay for public transport, water, gas, heating and so on -shows that it is not just Western politicians who make promises that they don’t – in fact can’t – keep.

One of the first things Gorbachev had to do after he became Party leader in 1985 was to admit failure in this respect. As he told the 27th Party Congress held in February 1986:
“Much has changed in our life in the quarter of a century since the adoption of the Third Party Programme. New historical experience has been accumulated. Not all of the estimates and conclusions turned out to be correct. The idea of translating the tasks of the full-scale building of communism into direct practical action has proved to be premature. Certain miscalculations were made, too, in fixing deadlines for the solution of a number of concrete problems.”
He went on to denounce “simplistic ideas about the ways and period of time for carrying out the tasks of communist construction” and to declare that ”as for the chronological limits in which the Party’s targets are to be attained, they do not seem to be needed”; all that could be said on this was that these targets would be achieved after the end of the present century.

Gorbachev was announcing, in other words, that the establishment of “communism” in Russia was being postponed indefinitely. More in fact, since his alternative to Khrushchev’s “construction of communist society” as a mirage to hold before the Russian people — perestroika — amounts to a virtual abandoning of communism as a goal. The essence of perestroika, which is merely the Russian word for restructuring, is the gearing of production of individual state enterprises more to the profitable market demand than hitherto, involving in particular a price reform which, with the ending of state subsidies, is likely to mean a rise — rather than a fall towards zero, as promised by Khrushchev —in the price of many goods and services. Gorbachev said so explicitly at the special Party conference held at the end of June this year:
“The price reform cannot fail to affect retail prices. Today the retail price of many food products, notably that of meat and milk, is considerably lower than the actual cost of producing them, lower than the state’s procurement price. The state is compelled to cover this difference in the form of a subsidy. That is not a normal situation. It undermines the incentive for producing these products and gives rise to a wasteful attitude, especially towards bread.

We know all this perfectly well, comrades. It is absolutely necessary to resolve this problem, no matter how difficult it may be and no matter what doubts and fears it may create at first glance.

Here is our approach: the funds which the state is paying out as subsidies today will be handed over in full to the population as compensation.”(Financial Times, 29 June 1988)
In other words, instead of free services and falling prices being subsidised as a supposed transition to “the communist principle of distribution according to need”, both prices and wages are going to be allowed to rise, so forcing workers to buy what they need at a price corresponding to economic cost as determined by the operation of market forces. Money-commodity relations are to be strengthened rather than gradually abolished, as envisaged in the 1961 Party Programme. Perestroika, in fact, represents a complete repudiation of this perspective.

So where does this leave “communism”, or rather the free distribution by the Russian ruling class to its workers of goods and services? This goal now seems to have been shelved. The original version of the Party Programme adopted at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 declared that “with the transition to the single form of people’s property and the communist system of distribution, commodity-money relations will become economically outdated and will wither away”. However the revised version adopted, under Gorbachev, at the 27th Party Congress in 1986 affirmed market relations to be inherent to the Russian social system (as indeed they are).

Propagandists for Gorbachev’s reforms go out of their way to emphasise that the goal is now a society in which the market will still exist. Abel Aganbegyan, a top economic adviser to Gorbachev and one of the theorists of perestroika, speaks in his recent book The Challenge: Economics of Perestroika of achieving in the 21st century, not the free distribution promised by Khrushchev for the 1980s and 90s, but “the full supply to the market of all the sought-after goods in order to ensure the full satisfaction of demand”. Another supporter of Gorbachev, Fedor Burlatsky, who in his time was also a  propagandist for Khrushchev, now criticises Khrushchev for having wanted to “leap” into communism. In an article this April in Literaturnaya Gazeta (translated into English and published in the June issue of Marxism Today) he contrasted “state socialism”, of which he sees Khrushchev’s “communism” as a variant, with what he calls “public, self-managing socialism” which he defines as “the planned commodity economy based on individual cost-accounting by enterprises”.

Though they have not done so yet, the Russian Party may end up embracing the same position as their Chinese counterparts who have also made a U-turn on this issue and who now see the “socialist” (in reality, state capitalist} stage, with commodity-production and market relations, lasting for another hundred years.
“In the latest attack on Stalin, the Shanghai journal Shu Lin carried an article attacking him for pressing too rapidly the transition from socialism to communism . . . Nowadays, the article said, China was only at the beginning of a 100-year socialist stage which was laying the foundation for the final realisation of Communism – only hazily defined even by Deng Xiaoping, the senior leader.” (Independent, 27 July 1988)
By that time the workers of the world should long have overthrown both the Russian and Chinese ruling classes and themselves have established a socialist (or communist, for the two words mean exactly the same thing} society based on common ownership and democratic control in which wealth will be produced simply as useful products to satisfy needs and no longer as commodities to be bought and sold on a market.
Adam Buick

Monday, September 11, 2023

What about Russia? (1991)

From the September 1991 issue of the Socialist Standard

Is the Soviet Union socialist?

Of course not. Nobody believes that any more, do they?


But didn't they try socialism and it failed?

No. The Soviet Union has never at any time been socialist. Socialism has always meant a society based on the common ownership and democratic control of the means of production where goods and services are produced directly to satisfy people’s needs, not for sale on a market with a view to profit. Since 1917 the Soviet Union has always had state ownership not common ownership and this under a one-party dictatorship with goods and services still being produced for sale and profit. Lenin, whose government introduced this system, called it “state capitalism”. It was an accurate description. What has failed in the Soviet Union is this state capitalism not socialism.


But they called themselves socialists, didn't they?

Yes, but that is not enough to make someone a socialist. All sorts of people have called themselves socialist, including Hitler, Idi Amin and Colonel Gaddaffi. without anybody taking their claims seriously. The claims of the Soviet dictators should have been dismissed in the same way, and probably would have been if parties like the Communist Party which once had some influence amongst workers in Britain had not talked about "the socialist sixth of the world” and painted the Soviet government as governing in the interests of the workers.


So you say that this wasn't true?

Yes, that's right. It was a lie. and we exposed it right from the start earning ourselves the undying hatred of the Communist Party. The Soviet Union has never been socialist and the workers have never held power there. Socialism means a classless society but ever since their coup of 1917 power has been exercised by the Party bosses. Over time these evolved into a new ruling class, collectively owning the means of production and enjoying a privileged lifestyle—the notorious nomenklatura.


OK, you say the Soviet Union was state capitalist but whatever it was it failed, didn't it?

Sure, but don’t forget that all forms of capitalism in all countries have always failed to solve the problems facing wage and salary workers, and always will because capitalism is based on exploitation, whether the exploiters are rich private capitalists or privileged state bureaucrats. It is true that by the 1950s the centrally-planned state-capitalist economy completed under Stalin after Lenin’s death did begin to show signs of stagnation. Sections of the Soviet ruling class did realise this and under Khrushchev some reforms allowing market forces more freedom to operate were tried, but when the political implications of this for the rule of the Party bosses became clear Khrushchev was removed. Brezhnev took over and so began "twenty years of stagnation". Then came Gorbachev.


Wasn't Gorbachev forced to abandon Marxian economics and embrace the market?

No. You can’t abandon something you never accepted in the first place. Marx, who always insisted that socialism had to be democratic, would turn in his grave at what has been done in his name in the Soviet Union. It is quite true that he was against the market since it represented everything that he as a socialist saw as wrong with capitalism: impersonal forces controlling people’s lives instead of their own conscious democratic decisions; relations between people reduced to the cash nexus; profits being put before needs. Nor did Gorbachev have to restore the market in the Soviet Union since it has never ceased to exist there. Workers have always had to work for wages and purchase their needs. Enterprises have always tried to make a profit and have supplied each other on a buying and selling basis. It was these market relationships that the state tried to plan, with the aim of maximising profits not necessarily at enterprise level but on the economy as a whole.


So what was perestroika about then?

What Gorbachev inherited from Brezhnev was a stagnating state-capitalist economy where the attempt to control the market by central state commands had failed, resulting in a fall in the rate of profit in the Soviet Union—a serious matter in a profit-seeking economy such as the Soviet Union has always had. since profits are the source of funds not only for the privileges of the nomenklatura but also for re-investment in the more up-to-date productive equipment and techniques needed to remain competitive by international standards. To restore the rate of profit in the Soviet Union and make the Soviet economy more competitive, Gorbachev proposed abandoning the central command economy and allowing enterprises much more freedom to respond to market forces and profits.


So why did they overthrow Gorbachev?

Gorbachev represented that section of the Soviet ruling class who realised that things could not go on as before if the Soviet Union was to remain a powerful state in the capitalist world. They were prepared to move in the direction of western-style capitalism, even if this meant abandoning the dictatorship of the Communist Party and finding some other way of maintaining the power and privileges of their class. Those who overthrew him represent another section of the Soviet ruling class who are not prepared to surrender their political and economic privileges under the nomenklatura system.


So do you support Gorbachev?

No.


What about Yeltsin?

Not him either.


So who do you support?

We are always on the side of the workers in any situation. Gorbachev and Yeltsin are capitalist politicians who represent one section of the Soviet ruling class. They merely have a different programme for increasing working class exploitation in the Soviet Union and restoring the rate of profit there from that of the military junta who seized power. Workers should not follow leaders in Russia any more than they should in any country. Instead they should look to their own democratic self-organisation both to defend their interests within capitalism and, once they have become socialists, to get rid of capitalism and replace it by real socialism. This means a society of common ownership and democratic control of the means of production by all the people with goods and services being turned out to satisfy people's needs not for the market and profits.

Caught In The Act: On the agenda (1991)

The Caught In The Act Column from the September 1991 issue of the Socialist Standard

On the agenda

As the nights start drawing in, we are reminded that soon it will be time for us to be amused, bewildered or outraged — or perhaps all three — by those annual excursions into fantasy called the party conferences. This year the minds of the party faithful (if that is the right word for the intriguers, back-stabbers and manipulators who infest the chosen seaside towns on these occasions) will be that much more concentrated by the prospect of a general election. It is strongly rumoured that John Major will allow the voters to choose between the Labour and Tory methods of running British capitalism in early November and will use his party's conference as the launch pad for their campaign.

There would be nothing unusual in this. Harold Wilson and Margaret Thatcher are only two recent examples of remorseless exploiters of the publicity given to their party conferences, with an eye to the next election no matter how far away that might have been. So in 1969 Wilson attacked the Tories: "We are promising change: theirs is a prescription for decay". So Thatcher, year after year, fertilised the uglier tumours of nationalism among the sillier of her fans. It was all aimed at a wider audience, beyond the conference hall, watching it happen on their TV sets or reading about it in their newspapers and, it was assumed, deciding thereby how they would vote.

This is all good fun except that conferences are supposed to be events where members of an organisation confer. That means they review past activities, debate current issues and decide about the future. Of course the Tories have never been impressed by that. They never have pretended that theirs was a democratic conference. An all-controlling chair, an overbearing line-up of party heavyweights on the platform and a carefully sifted parade of speakers ensured that controversy reared its unwelcome head only in complaints about party policy being loo indulgent — in calls to bring back hanging, or to bash more foreigners or to turn the screw more tightly on the poorer members of the working class. Stage management was the name of the game, with its climax in Thatcher's exit to the boneheaded chanting of Land of Hope and Glory.

Much as they might sneer at these substitutes for thinking, the Labour Party of the 1990s seems keen to imitate them. Time was when their conferences were freer ranging, but this caused a certain amount of embarrassment when the delegates, under the impression that they were laying down policy for a Labour government, voted for unilateral nuclear disarmament or some other idea which no government in its right mind would entertain. Faced with this, the Labour Party tactic has been to ignore any conference decisions they did not like as glowing examples of a great democratic movement at work.

Either way. and for either party, it amounts to the same thing — a waste of time. When there is work to be done to change society fundamentally, nobody should be deceived by the spewing of words, the reams of promises and the gushing of public relations hype which is what the conferences really are.


USSR Unemployment - Official

In those good old, bad days when Stalin glowered over the cowering people of Russia, apologists for the murderous regime there always had a last line of defence when they were forced up against reality. Unable to refute the hard evidence that "peace loving" Russia was in fact a world-ranking military power, that "freedom loving" Russia in fact ruthlessly controlled every possible aspect of its people lives, that "socialist" Russia imprisoned, tortured and murdered tens of millions of people in order to sustain Stalin in power, there was always one final pathetic justification for all the horrors. There was. squirmed the apologists, no unemployment in Russia; surely that proved the system there was basically different to, and better than, what existed in the West.

So there must have been many a die-hard from the old Communist Party, grown old and weary under the stress of defending the indefensible, in despair at the news that even that puny argument is no longer available. In July a new employment law came into effect in Russia which legalises — in other words admits the existence of — unemployment and lays down a system of unemployment benefit, or dole to you and me.

As Russian industry moves into a long and painful period of reform it is being encouraged to "release" its "surplus" workers, just like British firms when they try to stay profitable by sacking people. Some estimates have it that as many as 20 million Russian workers may be out of work — or thrown on to the industrial scrapheap, to use a favourite Communist phrase — to rely on state benefit for their subsistence.

But being on the dole in "socialist" Russia, where poverty was supposed to have been wiped out over 50 years ago, will not be easy. Seven conditions will have to be satisfied, like signing as available for work and being means tested. To dole claimants in this country it will be gloomily familiar; they will be able to depress their Russian counterparts with an endless fund of stories about waiting for hours to plead for their pittance, about how to grovel to the best effect and finally how to get by on starvation money with no new clothes or outings or entertainment.

Like any country threatened with large scale unemployment, Russia expects a steep increase in the harshness and more destructive poverty among its workers. The Communist die-hards will probably blame it all onto Gorbachev and his betrayal of the true, Stalinist faith. In fact all Gorbachev is doing is to rearrange a social system which was basically never different from avowedly capitalist states like Britain and America. After nearly a century of appalling suffering, with the prospect now of yet more, the people of Russia have nothing to thank their "Communist" rulers for — nor those in other countries whose obsession made them blind and deaf to the suffering.


Citizen's Arrest 

There has recently been an addition to the list of words — like "freedom", "peace" and "truth" — without which the life of a speech-making politician would be exceedingly difficult. It is "citizen". The fact that the Tories have recently begun to talk about their concern for the "citizen" and the government to produce something called a Citizen's Charter should rally us to the defence of the word, to prevent it being mauled like so many others.

The word "citizen" has a lot of implied meanings for it suggests people of equal standing, who participate in society on terms of equality and who willingly share in social obligations. It is the kind of word we might use to describe the people of the future society in which work and pleasure are inseparable and human beings regard each other as natural friends. It will be tragic if by "citizen" we mean some unquestioning sycophant of property society, if the word becomes twisted and debased in the battle between the Labour and Conservative parties over who should be the next government of British capitalism.

In any case what "rights" do we "citizens" have under this social system? Capitalism is founded on the monopoly of the means of life by a minority of parasites and its laws and morals — including the "rights" of people — are fashioned by that fact. Governments win power through the votes of "citizens" who have been seduced by promises to protect their interests but when a party are in power those promises are at best compromised, at worst ignored. This happens behind a smokescreen of lies, evasions and euphemisms, some of these the product of devilishly creative minds, which no "citizen" is permitted to penetrate.

In fact any government which really acknowledged the "rights" of its "citizens" is unlikely to survive very long. Capitalism depends on the restriction of freedom and of "rights" and part of its trick is to persuade the very people who are denied these things that it is in their interests for things to be like that. To overturn this set-up we might begin by thinking about how words are distorted in order to sustain it.
Ivan

Thursday, August 10, 2023

Russia's crisis congress (1990)

From the August 1990 issue of the Socialist Standard

The party is not quite over yet – but nearly. Everybody knows that the party has been a disaster. There was not enough food. The waiters got drunk on bad vodka. The speeches were foolish, uninspiring and full of lies. The books on the shelves, left there purposely so that guests could delude themselves with stories of the raving success of the party, were written by committees which were briefed to make hell look like a sunshine holiday. It was a useless, horrible, miserable party and now they are leaving in droves, despite threatening looks from fat guys in uniforms who stroke their Lenin badges.

It is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which is marching steadily into its own shallow grave. Its past has been exposed as tyranny in the name of workers’ dictatorship. Its present is surrounded by a ruined state-capitalist economy and a disillusioned workforce. Its future is a fantasy in the minds of fat-cat bureaucrats who cannot conceive of the idea that they are no longer to be an unelected ruling class. In reality, the future of the Communist Party in the Russian Empire is about as optimistic as were the futures of genuine socialists and communists in the days of Stalin.

Death cries of Leninism
The 28th Congress of the CPSU last month was the most important since 1917. By comparison, the 20th Congress, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin after Stalin was dead and the damage had been done, can be seen as a bit of political posturing by politicians who wanted to distance themselves from the fascistic history of Stalinism. The second most important Congress since 1917 was the 27th in 1986; it was there that the newly-appointed boss of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, declared the need to reform the economy. There is a great deal of talk, mainly by naive leftists and media pundits, about the immensity of Gorbachev’s role in bringing about change.

Capitalist observers of history always need the Great Men: Stalin – Bad; Gorbachev – Good – and that’s that. The fact of the matter is that Gorbachev is a Leninist hack, a careerist political climber who worked his way up the party dictatorship without ever denouncing its undemocratic rule or false claim to be a workers’ state. Gorbachev is a Leninist, even though he is now having to play down such unpopular imagery .The difference between the 27th and 28th Congresses can be sensed from Gorbachev’s closing speech at the former:
“What can be said today is that our Congress was held in an atmosphere of Party-principledness and unity, exactingness and Bolshevik-style truth . . . It is precisely in this way, in Lenin’s spirit, that we have acted at our Congress. It is precisely in this way that we are going to act in the future as well.” (Tass, 6 March, 1986)
Since then the party has fallen to pieces. Monolithism, which was forced on the party by Lenin’s tyrannical resolution banning internal party opposition at the 10th Congress in 1921, has been abandoned. The article (number Six) of the national constitution banning the existence of other political parties was repealed in February. This did not happen because Gorbachev and his cronies fancied the idea of a little political pluralism. On the contrary, Gorbachev was persistent in declaring that Article Six could not be abandoned in the foreseeable future; in short, one-party dictatorship must prevail. The change came because millions of the party’s subjects no longer believe in “Bolshevik-style truth”. They see it as consisting of an Orwellian vocabulary where a state-capitalist prison is defined as a socialist paradise.

Gorbachev may have been certain that “we are going to act in the future” in the spirit of Lenin, just as Hitler thought that he would rule for a thousand years and Thatcher probably does too, but the utter bankruptcy of Leninism as a method of ruling over people has reached a point of crisis. By 1990 it became clear to those who would see that offering the workers a touch of democracy from above (glasnost) or attempting piecemeal reforms of the economy (perestroika) would not keep them obedient. The clamour for change was too loud to be ignored.

There were two options which were available if the 28th Congress was to be avoided. The military could try to stage a coup. There are quite a few Russian generals and KGB chiefs who think with admiration of the way that the Deng gang saved their skins in Tiananmen Square. That talk of a military coup is widespread in the upper ranks of the army is no secret. An attempted coup could still happen – certainly local attempts to use military force to hold on to state power by the party rulers could be envisaged – but it is uncertain whether the conscript soldiers would carry out such orders on a broad enough scale to make it effective. Remember that in Rumania, the only state capitalist dictatorship where the party men have so far attempted to resist the will of the majority, most of the soldiers, being workers themselves, went to the side of the majority. In the so-called Soviet army the workers in uniform have formed a union called Shield and the first article of its constitution is that its members refuse to fire on workers of their own country.

The other way in which Gorbachev could have tried to hold back the demise of his party would have been to cancel the 28th Congress. It is reported that he was advised to do this, but as soon as reports were circulated it became clear that the congress would take place whether it was cancelled formally or not. Communist Party branches from throughout the Empire (no, not the USSR – what is Socialist or Soviet about a one-party tyranny?) were determined to voice their anger at the condition they found themselves in.

Splits and factions
What was it, then, that delegates came to say at the 28th Congress? There were four main factions. Firstly, there were the so-called radicals. The term “radical” has a nice sound about it. It makes these people seem like fresh-thinking progressives. This is far from being the case. The “radicals” are those who have seen that state capitalism cannot be reformed and want to see a non-statist market economy set up in the Russian Empire as soon as possible. They are intoxicated by illusory information about the success of Britain and the USA. Just as media simplifiers have pushed the myth that Gorbachev invented the changes in eastern Europe, so they repeat the idea that Boris Yeltsin is the chief “radical”. To be sure, Yeltsin is the most popular politician amongst Russian workers who want quick change, but his radicalism is based upon populist posturing which appeals to Russian national chauvinism, and wholly ignorant economic promises about the benefits for workers within a free market. Amongst the other “radicals” there is much debate about how to run a market economy without the state. Their main concern is to become the beneficiaries of the capital that is now state-owned. The “radicals” are a private capitalist class in waiting. Indeed, some of them are already investing their roubles in the non-state co-operatives (private businesses, in fact) which have a major growth area in the economy. The “radicals” have formed a faction called Democratic Platform: although it only had less that 10 percent of the delegates at the 28th Congress, its grass roots support within the Communist Party is nearer to 50 percent.

Opposed to Democratic Platform are the conservatives. These are the party men whose whole lives have been spent on rising within the ruling class by means of spewing out its hollow Leninist clichés to order. Their main symbol is Yegor Ligachev, the last remaining Politburo Brezhnevite, until the Congress, when he was removed. Most of Brezhnev’s men have either died or been purged. The conservatives maintain that the seventy-year tragedy of Leninism has been a great success story. They are the ravers at the party, dancing away into the early hours as if it does not really matter that the peanuts have all gone and there is a lynch-mob at the front door. One should not feel sorry for these old swines. They have built careers on the harsh exploitation of workers who were forbidden by law to fight back. They dared to tell the wage slaves of the Russian Empire that a “Socialist Republic” had been achieved in 1917. While the mass of the population were miseducated by the propaganda of Leninism, the members of the Leninist vanguard were living in the country dachas, driving the limousines and shopping in special stores which stock luxury goods. Is it any wonder that they are now hated? They are fighting for their survival as a class. They deserve what is coming to them.

A third faction at the Congress were the nationalists. The break-up of the Russian Empire is very likely. The nationalist delegates want to be part of the new ruling class within the new states. Fourthly, there are the Gorbachev crowd. They want to hold on to party control over capitalism, but they know that they must make certain democratic concessions and introduce major economic reforms in order to do so. In order to please the “radicals” they are abandoning support for state capitalism and declaring full support for a market economy of the German or British type. This has kept some “radicals” within the party, but the more that centralised party planning fails the quicker the rush to leave will be. They do not want to take the blame. At the same time, the Gorbachev leadership must convince the conservatives that their power will not end with the demise of state capitalism. Frankly, unless there is a military coup, the conservatives have little choice but to sit tight and hope that Gorbachev is right. To the nationalists, Gorbachev is offering state funding and the chance to be part of a successful economy. To most nationalists the offer is not of the sort that leads to ecstasy.

Change beyond the Change
At the 28th Congress the Communist Party split. Having split it will now face competition from other parties – notably the party to be formed in the autumn by Lysenko and the “radicals” – and it is highly likely that millions of workers will respond, if only negatively, by voting for anything but the Communist Party. In some cases, this “anything” is not a very savoury entity. In the non-Russian republics the non-Leninist outfits will be nationalistic and will drift quickly into extreme right-wing economic thinking. In Russia, which is where the battle is really going to be fought out, the prospect of widespread support for chauvinistic, religious, racist and ultra-Thatcherite policies is high on the agenda. There is a degree of free-market utopianism which has affected Russian “intellectuals” which is similar to the kind of myopic instant love felt by many Western “intellectuals” towards the Stalinist utopia.

There are too many politicians playing with the dreams of the workers of the Russian Empire. One thing is for certain: these workers are going to be hurt terribly. After years of putting up with the illusion of socialism, they will now be forced to endure mass unemployment, price inflation and wage cuts to pay for Western loans. All of this in the name of capitalist freedom. Marxism is a dirty word amongst these workers. They were taught that Lenin and Stalin and Brezhnev were all good Marxists and they are sick of the product. The present writer wrote an article for a Russian newspaper called ‘Socialism Without Bolshevism’, but was advised by the editor to cut out the positive reference to socialism as it would stick in the throats of the paper’s sixty-million plus readers.

William Morris wrote of “the change beyond the change”. He was writing about people in late feudal society looking at the dawn of capitalism and how they must look not only to the change which was before them, but to the change after that. We socialists must do the same thing now. As we look at eastern Europe we have mixed feelings: the end of Leninism and the democratic struggle by which this has happened is a source of inspiration, but the changes which are happening . . .

We are Marxists who see change not as a single event with a beginning and an end. The victory of Bolshevism in Russia marked the defeat of autocratic Tsarism, which was a mighty advance, but it also marked the emergence of the myth of a socialist state, which was arguably the greatest obstacle that has since stood in the way of the revolutionary socialist movement. Now that Bolshevism is dying – almost dead, we would be foolish to waste time mourning the victory of the free-market antithesis. Our eyes are upon the struggle of the morrow, not for the victory of this faction of that party, or of this nationality or that reform, but for the realisation on the part of our fellow workers that however you organise this rotten system it will still be rotten. It is rotten under Gorbachev; it is the same under Bush, Kohl or Mitterand. And its rottenness will give rise to men and women who will not be content with less rotten: they will go for the change beyond the change.
Steve Coleman

Sunday, October 20, 2019

Russia and Private Property (1990)

From the April 1990 issue of the Socialist Standard

The decision by the Central Committee of the CPSU at its February meeting to abandon its guaranteed, constitutional monopoly on power really could prove to be as momentous as the media claimed at the time. However this will not be for the reasons they gave – that it will open up a new era of freedom, prosperity and progress for Russia – but because it could lead to a change in the way that the means of production are monopolised by the minority owning class there.

Except for some of those that can be operated by individuals or by a family unit, all means of production in Russia are vested in the state which also has a monopoly in the hiring of wage-labour. This has meant that the group that has controlled the state has also controlled the means of production, has in effect owned them. However, the members of this group have not done so as individuals possessing legal property deeds in their own names, but collectively as a group. It is this group – as a group – that has been the collective owner of the means of production and the collective employer of the working class in Russia, in short the collective capitalist there.

So who are they? Who are those who make up this group that monopolises the means of production in Russia in this way? As Russia has been a one-party dictatorship since Lenin introduced this in 1921, they have been the leading members of the ruling party plus those appointed by them to key posts carrying with them a life-style based on privileged access to the best consumer goods, housing, health care, education for their children, holidays and officially known as the nomenklatura. Not possessing legal property titles in their own names, they have not been able to bequeath their privileged position to their children. So the group that has constituted the collective capitalist class in Russia has been recruited by other means than inheritance, in fact by rising up the bureaucratic hierarchy of the single party.

It is this party that has been the mechanism by which the collective capitalist class in Russia has monopolised the state and so the means of production and by which they have renewed themselves and recruited new members. This is why the political and ideological representatives of this class have proclaimed the “leading role of the party” to be a pillar of the Russian system. It is also why the decision by the Party’s Central Committee at its February meeting to abandon it could prove to be of immense importance.

Gorbachev wants a mandate
Of course abandoning a constitutional right to be the only governing party, indeed the only party allowed to exist – the notorious Article Six of the 1977 Russian constitution – is not the same thing as actually abandoning power. The leaders of the “Communist” Party still want, like Mrs Thatcher, to go on ruling for ever but from now on they hope to do so with a democratic mandate from the electorate.

There is a short-term reason for this: they feel they need popular endorsement to be able to push through the tough anti-working class measures perestroika involves. For although glasnost (openness) has progressed quite far, perestroika has not. Enterprises have been given legal independence from the government ministries that used to control them, but price reform – the key measure of perestroika and what it is all about, designed to bring prices into line with what the law of value demands – has not yet been implemented.

Price reform will involve ending government subsidies on basic consumer goods such as food, housing and transport and allowing their prices, along with those of industrial goods, to be fixed by the free play of market forces. Although the object is to get the stagnant Russian economy moving again, it is bound to mean for at least the short-term falling living standards and rising unemployment. Learning the lesson of the events in Poland, Gorbachev is clearly not prepared to launch into this attack on the working class without a mandate to do so. His conservative opponents in the Party hierarchy might not like his political reforms, but they don’t want him to go since they know that they would have even less chance of controlling the potentially explosive situation in Russia.

It is the longer-term implications of the decision to abandon the Leninist principle of one-party dictatorship that could prove to be the most significant though, as this could herald a change in the way the means of production are monopolised in Russia with the ruling class there changing itself from a class of collective owners into a class of individual owners as in the West.

Such a change has always been a possibility but until now only a rather remote one. It is a measure of the historic importance of events in Eastern Europe – which will surely have led to the liquidation of the nomenklatura system there by the end of the year – that they have forced what once seemed to be the immovable Russian Party-elite to reconsider its position.

The transformation of the Russian ruling class from a collectively-owning state bureaucracy into a class of private capitalists with private property rights vested in them as individuals certainly won’t take the form of the present members of the nomenklatura abdicating and handing over their power and privileges to the small group of privately-owning capitalists who have always led a precarious existence on the margins of the Russian state-capitalist economy. Nor would it need to take the crude form of them simply dividing up the presently state-owned industries amongst themselves. It would be more likely to take the form of the Russian government gradually introducing more and more opportunities for private capitalist investment – which only those who have already accumulated wealth would be able to take advantage of. Most of these will inevitably be individual members of the nomenklatura as the group which for years has enjoyed bloated salaries, cash prizes and opportunities to speculate on the black market.

Although there have been periodic drives against corruption, the wealth accumulated by the members of the nomenklatura has largely survived intact. Up to now, however, they have not been allowed to use their accumulated wealth as capital – as wealth invested in production with a view to profit – but have been obliged to hold it as non-productive assets such as works of art, vintage cars and cash held in low-interest bank accounts. That Gorbachev wants to remove this restriction and channel such funds towards investment in production can be seen from the reference in the new Party Platform to “the distribution of state loan bonds on advantageous terms” and to “the selling of stocks and other securities”.

Ligachev’s Fears
High-denomination state bonds were issued for the individually wealthy to purchase right up until the 1940s (when their holders were virtually expropriated when Stalin reformed the currency in 1947), but this time rich Russians are to be allowed to purchase not just government bonds but also to invest directly in particular enterprises by purchasing bonds issued by them too. It is not difficult to see how this could evolve into a system of shareholding. In addition, private enterprise in the form of “co-operatives” is to be encouraged. Such co-operatives are supposed to be collectives of self-employed workers but once again, over time, pressure to allow them to employ wage-labour and for some of their members to become sleeping partners, or non-working investors, can be expected to grow.

This whole issue of “private property” is still a subject of controversy within the Russian Party. It ought to be understood, however, that the issue at stake is not whether individuals should be allowed to own non-productive assets, sometimes considerable amounts, as private property which they can bequeath and inherit. This has long existed and all sides agree it should continue. Nor – yet – is the issue about whether individuals should be allowed to employ other individuals. It is about whether “co-operatives” of the self-employed should be allowed to own means of production and compete with state enterprises for sales and profits.

On the one side, there are the supporters of Igor Ligachev who was reported as saying at the February Central Committee meeting that “he opposed the introduction of private property with his whole soul”, adding: “I am also against turning our party into an amorphous organisation, a political club” (Independent 7 February 1990). On the other side, are those who agree with Boris Yeltsin when he says: “I am for private property, including the means of production. The limits are that it should not be sold, and not inherited” (Vancouver Sun, 21 December 1989).

The new Party Platform shows that it is the partisans of “private property” who are winning. Ligachev is nevertheless probably right when he sees “co-operative private property” as the thin end of a wedge that will open the way, despite what Yeltsin says, both to private property rights in means of production being sold and inherited and to the private employment of wage-labour. This latter is still regarded in Russia as a case of “the exploitation of man by man” – as indeed it is, though Ligachev is being inconsistent when he denounces the employment of hired labour by private individuals while accepting it by the state. Clearly, what he favours is the nomenklatura continuing to monopolise the means of production collectively as a group dictatorially controlling the state where the means of production are state-owned.

Gorbachev, on the other hand, realises that it is now no longer possible for the nomenklatura to role in the old way and that some sort of flexibility is called for, if only to be able to push through perestroika without provoking a workers’ revolt. He probably isn’t consciously working towards ushering in a Russia where the nomenklatura has disappeared as such and has succeeding in converting itself into a class of Western-type privately-owning capitalists, but it is in this direction that his reforms can now be seen to be leading.
Adam Buick

Sunday, October 6, 2019

Running Commentary: Comic cuts (1986)

The Running Commentary column from the April 1986 issue of the Socialist Standard

Comic cuts

The newspaper business has been going through some changes recently, most noticeably the movement of Murdoch's News International to Fortress Wapping. In the process, Murdoch managed to engineer the sacking of 5.000 printworkers. His titles, including the Sun and The Times, are now being printed by members of the electricians' union.

Murdoch's manoeuvres have brought much condemnation from many Labour MPs, outraged at his tactics in deceiving the workers and saving on redundancy payments (although these tactics can hardly be said to be new to capitalism). The Sun has long been a target of left-wingers, who find its gutter journalism, cheap titillation and especially its patriotic. pro-Thatcher jingoism. offensive.

Murdoch's competitors in the newspaper business are concerned about the increased levels of profitability and efficiency he has gained. Robert Maxwell, who owns the Mirror Group, is in the most direct competition with Murdoch: he produces the same kind of comic. The Mirror also has a high proportion of scandal stories although, in an effort to appear refined, Maxwell recently ordered his Page 3 Lovelies to cover up their nipples.

In order to meet the challenge of News International, Maxwell recently imposed a change in working practices at his two publications in Glasgow, the Daily Record (which still shows nipples) and the Sunday Mail (which doesn't). The workers at these papers did not fancy a deterioration in their working conditions and being forced to produce an Irish copy of the Daily Mirror. Maxwell decided that these workers had sacked themselves — strange behaviour with four million on the dole so he shut down his Scottish operation and locked the workers out.

The reaction of Labour MPs in Scotland was not to condemn Maxwell despite his high-handed management. Murdoch was called the Dirty Digger, and an interfering foreigner (after all he is Australian). But the shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar, John Smith and many other Labour MPs expressed "concern" over the breakdown in "communication", and stressed the need to get these rags, which for years have spread anti-working class filth across Scotland, back to giving their "specific contribution” to the Scottish political scene.

So what is the difference between the lies of Maxwell's distorting Mirror and the Wapping-great lies of Murdoch's Sun that warrants such selective outrage from Labour MPs? Of course it could be the fact that Murdoch is a supporter of the Tories, while the "socialist millionaire" supports the Labour Party and so is courted by Kinnock & Co. at their conferences. But Labour would never betray workers' interests just to get cheap political support, would they?

The effort of the Labour MPs managed to get Maxwell back to the negotiating table, and the Daily Record back to the gutters. But not for long — while workers allow parasites like Murdoch and Maxwell to remain in positions of power and influence then we will continue to be insulted and insecure.


Sounds familiar

At the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in February, the Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev spent much time talking about the need to reform the Russian economy. In his calls for expansion, modernisation and efficiency he sounded astonishingly like Thatcher. Factories which regularly make losses are to be allowed to go bust: "The state will not be responsible for their debts and losses", he said (all quotes. Guardian, 26 February). This could be Thatcher talking about "lame- ducks" being a burden on the Great British Taxpayer.

Managers and workers who produce unsold goods that end up in warehouses are to suffer loss of pay and bonuses. Wage increases must be earned — they must be related to the quantity of work done. Again, Thatcher has had a lot of experience of berating workers for taking “unearned" pay rises. Since the workers produce all the wealth in society, it is difficult to see how their wages — a fraction of what they produce anyway — can be unearned.

Gorbachev also called for less central interference from the state planning agency Gosplan, in the day-to-day running of the economy. They must "allow industrial management to get on with the job". The "right" of management to manage is a common cry of government ministers and of parasites such as Murdoch and MacGregor. What this "right to manage" usually amounts to is pay cuts and job losses.

Many of the current problems with the Russian economy were blamed on failures of the past. The stagnation and inertia, bureaucracy and corruption of the Brezhnev years in the seventies are the root of today's problems, according to Gorbachev. This is one that politicians often rely on. The current problems are blamed on the failures of the previous administration, whether Labour or Tory, Republican or Democrat, or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The fact is that capitalism produces problems by its very nature, regardless of the extent of state control. Whatever reforms Gorbachev rushes through it is clear that the workers in Russia will do the hard work and suffering, while the ruling class relax in their dachas and bemoan how lazy the workers are.

The strangest thing about Gorbachev's speech to the Congress was the fact that he cracked jokes (about Lenin!). Of course Mikhail — like "our" Maggie or Neil — is very conscious of his image, liking to appear as a humorous, concerned person. He's even been compared to the "great communicator" (or bullshitter). Ronald Reagan. Now what's the Russian for Saatchi and Saatchi?


Whitewash

How much longer can Botha and the ruling National Party in South Africa get away with promising reforms and then failing to deliver the goods?

Botha's latest promise was made in a recent speech in which he admitted that South Africa had "outgrown the outdated concept of apartheid". But he then went on to restate the belief basic to apartheid: that South Africa consists of separate tribal peoples or nations, each of which must have jurisdiction over its own affairs while the whites retain overall control. What this means in practice is the policy of "independent” tribal homelands for the blacks — Bantustans — poverty-stricken reservations with nominal autonomy which provide a ready supply of cheap black labour for the predominantly white ruling class.

The "reforms" outlined by Botha include the restoration of South African citizenship to those who lost it when the Bantustans were granted "independence"; the extension of self-government to the remaining non-independent homelands; limited rights of property ownership for blacks in the townships; amendments to the Pass Laws so that everyone in South Africa would have to carry identity papers; and the establishment of a new National Advisory Council that is to include blacks.

Most black workers in South Africa will recognise these "reforms" as worthless, since they leave the main institutions of apartheid intact. For example, the proposed amendments to the Pass Laws would still enable the police arbitrarily to arrest blacks for being in the "wrong" area and it is likely that black access to the cities will continue to be dependent on a job and accommodation. The proposed Advisory Council represents the same kind of tokenism as the constitutional amendments which gave Indians and Coloureds separate national assemblies while the real power remains in the hands of the white ruling class.


Free speech

You would have thought that the Left had learned its lesson from last year's events at North London Poly when the Socialist Workers' Party orchestrated such favourable publicity for the National Front by trying to prevent Patrick Harrington from attending classes. But no, the Right are yet again being granted the moral high ground as defenders of free speech, as this year's intake of students conforms to the Left stereotype. Having found their feet as student radicals, they are now attempting to prevent selected demons of the Right from speaking on university and polytechnic platforms. Michael Fallon, Tory MP, was given a rough ride at Sunderland Poly, as was John Carlisle at Bradford University. An invitation to the philosopher of the new right, Roger Scruton, was withdrawn when Leeds City Council said that they could not guarantee his safety. And even tapes of American anti-Semite, Louis Farrakhan, were banned at the South Bank Poly in London.

Meanwhile, students at Bristol University have just discovered that John Vincent, Professor of History, has an alter ego as a reactionary columnist for the Sun newspaper. The word went out and the Left picketed his lectures, resulting in the involvement of the police and local publicity more favourable to the "victimised Professor Vincent" than to the "lefty student yobs". Why, you might ask, if it is his column in the Sun to which they object, are they picketing his history lectures at Bristol University? Their argument is that he is using his position as an academic to lend spurious credibility to his journalistic efforts. But never mind the finer details — picketing is so much more fun than lectures and, after all, John Vincent is right wing and therefore a legitimate target for emotional tirades about racism, fascism, the Sun newspaper . . . And let's not worry too much about free speech, or the damage being done to serious opponents of capitalism.

Tuesday, January 22, 2019

Czechoslovakia's brief Spring (1988)

From the August 1988 issue of the Socialist Standard

Twenty years ago this month Russian. East German. Hungarian and Polish tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia and put an end to the "Prague Spring", an attempt to liberalise the state capitalist regime there.

The process of liberalisation had begun in January when the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party voted to replace the ageing Stalinist Novotny as General Secretary with Alexander Dubcek. This represented a decisive victory for the liberalising elements within the Party over the conservative elements. In April the Party published a 24,000 word Action Programme entitled Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism. On the political field, it proposed an end to censorship, the introduction of freedom of assembly, the expression of minority opinion and various other reforms of a democratic nature. On the economic field, it sought to move away from the centralised, bureaucratic kind of state capitalism that existed in the country towards a more decentralised, market-oriented kind that came to be known as "market socialism" (despite the contradiction in terms). Under a plan drawn up by a professor of economics. Ota Sik, who became one of the deputy Prime Ministers, individual state enterprises were to be given a wide measure of autonomy and forced to compete for markets and bank loans; in addition, elected works councils were to be instituted as a means of preventing management from slipping back into lazy, bureaucratic ways.

Real steps were taken in the direction of freedom of expression and assembly: censorship was actually abolished and views critical of the regime could be freely expressed. Outside Czechoslovakia, intellectuals who had always been sympathetic to Russia but secretly felt guilty about its totalitarian nature welcomed the changes as the coming of "socialism [read: state capitalism] with a human face".

The changes were less welcome to the Russian ruling class and indeed to elements within the Czechoslovak ruling class too. As the statement we published in the Socialist Standard at the time made clear, the main concern of the Russian ruling class was strategic: they were afraid that political liberalisation might get out of hand and lead to Czechoslovakia escaping from the Russian sphere of interest. As this was not a development they could risk, they sent in their tanks to restore a political regime that was potentially less dangerous.

Leading role of the party
Basically, the sort of political regime the Russian ruling class wanted to see in Czechoslovakia was one similar to their own. where "the leading role of the Communist Party" was firmly entrenched. Because of the nature of state capitalism in Russia and similar countries the ruling elite needs to be tightly organised to exercise its control over the means of production. Any weakening of "the leading role of the Party" is therefore a weakening of the position of a ruling class made up of those who occupy the top posts in the Party, the government, the armed forces and the nationalised industries and who in Russia are known as "nomenklatura" after the list of posts filled by party appointees.

Liberal elements within the Czechoslovak Party had begun to waver on the question of the leading role of the Party and it was this that led the Russian rulers to defend their strategic interests. The Party's Action Programme, published in April 1968, had declared that "the leading role of the Party was too often understood as a monopolistic concentration of power in the hands of the party organs" and in a questionnaire prepared with the collaboration of the Party's Central Committee and published in the Party's journal Rude Pravo on 13 May, readers were asked to answer such questions as:
Does the internal democratisation of a Communist Party provide a sufficient guarantee of democracy?
Can you speak of democracy as being socialist when the leading role is held only by the Communist Party?
Should the Communist Party carry out its leadership role through serving devotedly free, progressive socialist development, or through ruling over society?
Technocrats and bureaucrats
Actually, in questioning the leading role of the Party, the liberal elements within the Czechoslovak ruling class had no intention of abdicating power. As the last question above shows, they still wanted the Party to play this role but in a less authoritarian fashion.

They had been forced into this position by the economic situation that had arisen in Czechoslovakia. Leading economists like Ota Sik realised that in the context of world capitalism what Czechoslovakia needed was a competitive economy whose products were able to compete in terms of price and quality with those of other countries. According to Sik. the only way to revitalise the Czechoslovak economy to this end was to move away from centralised, bureaucratic control to decentralised, market control. This would naturally involve taking power from some of the bureaucrats and giving it to industrial managers. It was in this sense that the leading role of the Party was questioned: not that the Party should give up power, but that it should no longer seek to take all decisions centrally.

This — a struggle between technocrats and bureaucrats — is how the struggle between liberals and conservatives was seen, inside as well as outside Czechoslovakia. The present writer recalls a discussion at one of our outdoor meetings in the summer of 1968 in which a Czech student argued that Dubcek was working, quite correctly in his view, to end "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in Czechoslovakia, by which he meant the rule over competent technocrats like his father by (as he put it) "thick workers" appointed to management posts on the basis of their Party loyalty!

It was in fact such ex-workers whose position and privileges were threatened by the Dubcek reforms and who welcomed the Russian tanks with open arms. The conservative elements within the Czechoslovak ruling class were restored to power in August 1968 (Dubcek was not finally removed from office and demoted to a forestry worker until April 1969). but this did not mean that the country's economic problems went away. The new government the Russians installed tried to solve them by introducing a certain measure of "market socialism" while strictly upholding the "leading role" (or political monopoly) of the Party

From Prague to Moscow
Ironically, twenty years later Russia is facing the same sort of economic problems as did Czechoslovakia, and Gorbachev has embraced the economic analysis and solution proposed by Ota Sik in 1968: the granting of autonomy to individual state enterprises to swim or sink in a competitive market situation.

For this is what the much-vaunted perestroika, or restructuring, amounts to. And like Dubcek. Gorbachev has met with resistance from conservative elements within the ruling class, those whose power and privileges are threatened by a relaxation of central, bureaucratic control over the economy. To overcome this Gorbachev too has appealed for support among the population in general, but unlike Dubcek has not for one moment questioned "the leading role of the Party"; and he has no intention of doing so. since he firmly believes that the Party should retain its monopoly of political power. All he wants is to overcome conservative resistance to the economic perestroika that has become necessary to revive Russia's stagnating economy. The furthest he is prepared to go in permitting activity outside Party control is local pressure groups over local issues such as preserving some historic building or opposing a road going through their back gardens.

Gorbachev would answer the three questions posed by Rude Pravo in May 1968. "Yes. the internal democratisation of a Communist Party does provide a sufficient guarantee of democracy”; "Yes, you can speak of democracy being socialist when the leading role is held only by the Communist Party", and "Yes. the Communist Party should carry out its leadership role through ruling over society". On this issue he is in complete agreement with his alleged rival Ligachev. who has declared that "the guarantee of the irreversability of perestroika is the Communist Party" (Observer, 5 June)

For Gorbachev does not believe in democracy. What he believes in is what used to be called "oligarchy". the rule of the few, in his case the leaders of the Communist Party. Nor do the constitutional measures he proposes — limitation on length of terms of office, secret ballots for the election of Party leaders, more power to Party members in Soviets — amount to a "democratisation" of the Party. All he is trying to devise is some method for renewing the cadres of the vanguard party so as to avoid a repetition of the recent government of Russia by sick and tired old men. The Communist Party will continue to be run from the top down even if those at the top are chosen differently (and even that remains to be seen: Khrushchev proposed the same sort of measures in 1960 and the Central Committee used its new powers to vote him out of office).

A collectively-owning state capitalist class such as exists in Russia recruits its members and leaders in a different way from the individually-owning private capitalist class in the West. The latter renews itself through inheritance and also by some small businessmen becoming richer, while the administration of its political affairs is left to politicians elected by a capitalist-minded populace. In Russia the ruling class is organised as a hierarchy — the Party — renewed by recruitment and promotion.

Gorbachev's concern is to provide mechanisms to enable younger and more dynamic people to rise to the top of the hierarchy without having to wait for their predecessors to die. so as to allow the Russian ruling class to pursue its interests at home and abroad more efficiently. This has nothing whatsoever to do with democracy, not even with the limited political democracy that exists in some Western countries. It is not a process of democratisation. but one of reorganisation of the promotion procedures within the Russian ruling class.
Adam Buick