Let’s have common ownership, not Common Market (1971)

From the September 1971 issue of the Socialist Standard

A pathetic spectacle provided by the reformist parties and their satellites as they work themselves into a lather over the issues thrown up by capitalism. They fall for it every time. Whether it be the balance of payments, export-chasing, or gold reserves, at the drop of a hat they form up into positions and start to do battle for the capitalist class, whose interests alone are involved.

Capitalism has always provided plenty of distractions to take working class attention away from the real issue, and every time the self-styled leaders of the workers have proclaimed them as vital issues that will lastingly effect the future course of history.

The Common Market is just another distraction. The arguments for and against joining are equally irrelevant. One thing is certain, that the real issue has not been and is not being debated by the pundits of the “left” and “right”.

Capitalism often produces strange bedfellows, but when the mutual commitment to capitalism of both “left” and “right” wing groups is understood, it is not surprising to find the so-called Communist Party and National Front in the same camp, and the Trotskyists trailing along as usual behind the Tribune set, with Enoch Powell thrown in for good measure. The Labour Party front bench, which maintained a precarious unity while in power, have gone their different ways. Wilson complains loudly about “knives” and “hatchets”, but is not listened to by Roy Jenkins, Michael Stewart or Lord George Brown. The petty demagogues line up in a power struggle inside the Labour Party, as Michael Foot seeks to purge pro-market members from the shadow cabinet.

The two sides bicker incessantly about the “terms”, about New Zealand, and the possibility of better pickings for British capitalism elsewhere. None of these things is of the least concern to the working class. And, by working class, we do not mean the wage-slaves of just Britain and Europe, but of the entire world. What then is the real issue?

Throughout the world the means of production are concentrated in the hands of an owning minority — the capitalist class. This means that the vast majority own nothing but their physical and mental abilities to work. They must sell these abilities for wages or salaries in order to live. This vast non-owning majority is the working class. There is an antagonism of interests between the capitalist class owners and the working class non-owners since the fundamental relationship of capitalism, that of employer to employee, rests upon exploitation. The interest of the capitalist class is to maximise their profits and accumulate capital through the exploitation of wage-labour. To serve this interest, the whole world has been turned into a market for the profitable disposal of commodities (or wealth produced by wage-labour under conditions of private property and exploitation). The entire globe is the hunting ground for minerals and other resources to feed the hungry machines of industry, to keep up the flood of commodities and expand profits. The rivalry between national and international capitalists promotes their military power and fashions their alliances. War, like poverty, unemployment, slums and hunger, is inseparable from capitalism.

Both the pro- and anti-marketeers work on the same false assumptions, namely, that the market economy is indispensable, and, that there, is a unified national or European interest which workers and capitalists have in common. Socialists totally reject these assumptions. The interest of the working class is to end the system that exploits them; to abolish the employer-to-employee relationship; to do away with commodity production and get rid of the markets profits mad-house. This will mean the abolition of the wages-system and of buying and selling. In short, the interest of the working class, is to get rid of capitalism. The real issue is one of ownership. The workers in the six countries which at present belong to the EEC own none of the vast industrial or other resources of those countries. They are wage-slaves, just like the workers in Britain.

The only market that awaits British workers, like their European fellow-workers, is the labour-market, and the dictum “hired when it pays, fired when it doesn’t” will remain in force.

Instead of accepting the bogus arguments being trotted out by both sides, for and against joining, workers should be asking questions like: In or out of the Common Market, will wealth continue to accumulate in the hands of a few and will food still be destroyed while people starve? In or out of the Common Market, will poverty and insecurity continue to blight the lives of many millions ,both here in Britain and throughout the world? In or out of the Common Market, will H-Bombs remain both within Europe and outside to threaten the existence of mankind? In or out of the Common Market, will the massive power blocs, America, Russia, China, Japan and Europe, continue to struggle for advantage with war as their last desperate card?

These are questions which put the Common Market in its real capitalist perspective.

There are those who oppose entry because they fear loss of national identity. The workers have always been taught to be proud of their master’s country. If the barriers of nationalism are weakened through the EEC, this would not be a harmful effect, though there is little sign of it happening. All that is taking place is a grouping together of States, which has happened before, in earlier stages of capitalism, in America, Germany and Italy except that the EEC has yet to go for full political union.

Modern capitalism operates with such massive plant and investment levels that grouping together is the only way to stay in the big league. The military strategy of modern capitalism, and the costly technology of modern warfare, also dictate the coming together of groups of nations. If nationalism on the old scale diminishes, a continental scale of nationalism will develop as the rivalry between the emerging groups grows hotter.

What is really relevant to the world context in which we live today, is not new groupings, but a society without frontiers. Not bigger markets and fatter profits, but an end to all markets and all profits. Not the concentration of ever greater wealth into fewer hands, but the common ownership of the Earth and all its resources. This is the real issue which faces the workers of the world.

Harry Baldwin

Common Market: The great debate — where we stand (1971)

From the September 1971 issue of the Socialist Standard

Anyone who has recently been able to spare time from the test matches, television, pop music and so on may be aware that there is a new, rival attraction in the entertainment field. It is called the Great Debate on the Common Market, which makes it sound as if we have all been joining in, in every pub and bus queue and factory floor. At times, indeed, it has gone beyond mere entertainment, what with Harold Wilson walking about with a small forest of knives sticking out of his back and the Labour Party taking such fright at the public spectacle of its leader opposing something which his government tried to pull off, and then spending so much time in pious justification of his two contradictory attitudes, that they have suddenly started a Don’t Let’s Be Beastly to Harold campaign.

In fact, as Wilson (who has been known at times to tell the truth) says, there is a wide split of opinion on whether this country should join the Common Market. Both the big parties are split although the Tories, perhaps not yet completely recovered from their stunned delirium at the victory of June 1970, have been largely successful in stifling their dissenters. The public outside the parties are divided; soon, perhaps, marriages will be ruined and brother fall out with brother, swearing never to speak to each other again. And all because of the Great Debate on the Common Market.

One problem which the politicians have is in stimulating interest in something which has been an issue for about ten years. And such are the intricacies of capitalism’s trade — its agricultural support policies, its commodities agreements, its financial jugglings, that only an addict must now be able to stay awake when the thing is being discussed while the rest of us drop off in front of the telly set.

On the one hand the government case for going into Europe, while admitting that some food prices are going to rise (which, Common Market or no Common Market, is a pretty safe bet anyway) is that this is a tremendous opportunity for unheard of prosperity for us all. The official Factsheets on Britain and Europe talk about British industry having access to a market of more than 250 million people, of firms being able to plan their operations more adequately, of the “major benefits” resulting from the removal of tariffs between Britain and Europe.

It does not need a cynic to perceive a certain familiarity in those promises of a golden future. We can all remember similar prospects, held out over similar schemes of international unity or even international separatism, or some equally irrelevant proposal. The opponents of British entry seem to think that the golden future is here already. They argue that membership of the Six will mean abandoning, or weakening, the trading tie-ups with the Commonwealth, with no compensatory advantages. They mutter about upsetting the balance of payments, of losing that comforting trading surplus, which apparently stands between us and some unimaginable calamity. Some opposition may even be based upon xenophobic fears about the free movement of labour — about virile Frenchmen and Italians flooding over to steal all the best jobs and the most desirable women.

Now the Socialist Standard has always made it clear that such matters as the balance of trade, the exports of one capitalist state as against another, the exploitation of markets, are of interest to us only in as much as they illuminate the hopeless anarchies and inadequacies of capitalism. It is for this reason that we do not take a stand of opposing or supporting the efforts of the British capitalist class to get into Europe. This is not a matter of refusing to have any opinion or of imitating the feat of Wilson (and of Gaitskell before him) of sitting on the fence. In fact on this issue, as on all others, we have our own side. We are there, alone, but unlike the rest we know why.

At this point it is necessary to return to basics, however tiresome this may be to anyone who hungers for the excitement of the Great Debate. The first basic is that this is capitalism — if it were not, there would be no such thing as the Common Market. The attempt to join Europe, and the arguments about it, are all based upon the acceptance of capitalism, its needs and its priorities. We are invited to believe that these needs are of concern to workers, that the failure or success of the British application will make enough difference to our lives to be worth taking sides over. But the least which is needed to support this argument is evidence that the countries which are in the EEC are significantly different from those which are not in it.

So here is another basic. Capitalism divides its people into two classes — capitalist and worker, employer and employee, owner and non-owner, whichever term we choose to apply. These two classes are engaged in a struggle over the ownership of the means of wealth production. This struggle takes the form of disputes over wages, which are the only method open to the working class of obtaining wealth, either as the basic necessities like food or the lesser needs such as holidays and so on.

What this means is that a permanent feature of capitalism is (need we say this, in 1971?) the industrial struggle. Sometimes a strike; sometimes a go-slow; sometimes a lock-out. But always a struggle, never ceasing because it is inherent within capitalism. It is not unfair to insist that, if all the hopes and promises about the prosperity of the Common Market were real, its record of strikes and other industrial disputes would be markedly different. Of course it is only necessary to state this to illuminate the absurdity of the idea; France in May 1968, for example, is too recent a memory. Since then there has been a more “normal” pattern of industrial struggle, of transport strikes paralysing Paris, of a one-day general strike throughout Italy and so on. But the point is made. The class division of capitalism is as evident, as divisive and as disruptive in Europe as elsewhere.

We have already said that the Common Market could exist only within capitalism. This is so, first, because capitalism is a market system; its wealth is produced for the market, for sale as distinct from for human need. Now this might be all very well except for the fact that there is no way of adjusting production and the market so that they meet each other’s demands. Capitalism goes to great lengths to find a way of doing this; we are swamped with economic experts and market forecasters and all sorts of other very clever men and most of them are confident, at some time or other, that they have solved the problem and are about to bring everlasting profitability to capitalist industry and trade.

But of course if they ever succeed in this we would never hear dread words like bankruptcy, redundancy, slump. There would never be spectacular collapses like Rolls Royce and Upper Clyde; there would never be unemployment and capitalism would sail along like a great clipper ship under full sail on a calm sea. What actually happens is that it is more like a coracle in the Bay of Biscay in a Force Nine gale. Even the politicians know this; did not the MacDonald government in the thirties blame their troubles onto an economic blizzard; did not Wilson’s lot moan that they had been “blown off course”?

Apply this yardstick again, how does the EEC measure up? Is all well economically across the Channel? All calm and under control? In truth, day by day the reports come in showing that the Market economy is as wild and uncontrollable as anywhere else. On July 27, for example, the West German Economics and Finance Ministry was worried that the “tensions” in the German economy were showing no signs of lessening, with industrial producer prices still rising. The next day the Paris Chamber of Commerce reported a slow-down in industrial production, with what they claimed as the annual growth rate at 4.5 per cent as against the 6 per cent prevailing since last autumn. On July 30 the French Minister of Finance was admitting that the rate of inflation for the first half of 1971 was “not satisfactory”; prices had risen at twice the rate hoped for by the government and a wave of strikes is expected after the summer holidays.

It may be argued that these are trivialities, were it not that they are symptomatic of the basic chaos of capitalism, all over the world. Another current problem of the capitalists of the Six is their “voluntary” limitation of steel exports to America. At present the annual growth of these exports is limited to 5 per cent; the Americans are reported to want to reduce this to 2.5 or 3 per cent, while the European steelmen are anxious that Japanese steel, limited already in its access to the American market, may seriously compete in Europe. Negotiations are, naturally, going on but it does not need a fortune teller to know that they will be a typically futile exercise, with no basic effect on the system nor on the interests of its people.

These are examples of the anarchy of capitalists. As far as Europe is concerned, the anarchy is such that even the “experts” are not united in their forecasts on the British application, nor even on what is happening in Europe at the present. A study published last December by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (described by The Guardian as “the main independent economic forecasting and analytical group in Britain”) contradicted many of the opinions and forecasts from the other “experts”. Compare these views, from the government’s Factsheets and the Institute’s report as it appeared in The Guardian (1 December 1970).:

“Factsheets: One of the striking facts about the Common Market is its rate of growth.

NIESR: The economic growth of the Six has slowed down since the EEC was formed while that of the industrialised countries outside has speeded up.

Factsheets: . . . the main industrial advantage to us would be direct access … to a market of more than 250 million people.

NIESR: So far as the larger market offers advantages, Britain is already getting these from the outside.

Factsheets: The fact that our share of the Community’s total imports of manufacturers is still only about 7 per cent indicates the potential for growth in exports to Europe.

NIESR: Britain’s competitive position inside the Community might suffer as a result of cost increases imposed by Community policies …”

It would be possible to fill up several issues of the Socialist Standard with this kind of analysis of the Common Market. When we have cleared away all the rubbish of politicians’ speeches and the contradictory ramblings of assorted economists we are left with some basic facts. The EEC is no more than yet another instalment in the theory of the larger market which assumes, with absolutely no justification, that the problems inherent in a small market disappear, or can be more easily tamed, in a large market. What, if anything, actually happens is that the problems may well get larger with the market and as the intensity of wage-labour exploitation increases.

The problems are not, and cannot be, solved because the market is itself basically uncontrollable. If it were any other way, capitalism would be a much saner and more peaceable society than it is. Through all the Great Debate on the Common Market none of this is being argued; the debate is pre-occupied with other, quite irrelevant, matters such as commodity agreements and budget contributions. And the working class, who are always being misled into taking their masters’ sides in the disputes of capitalism, are now persuaded once again that their interests are what is at stake in the Great Debate and that it is all happening so that their lives can be improved.

The facts show otherwise. Working class lives can be improved by the simple process of getting rid of the social system which divides people into worker and capitalist and which sets up the conflicting interests and the anarchy of the market economy. That is what socialists want, what we work and struggle for. We are not detached from the Great Debate; we are deeply involved in it because we see in it more evidence of the futility and impotence of capitalism and of the urgent need to replace it with a society of common ownership.

Ivan

The Socialist Party exposes Mr Chamberlain and his Labour Critics (1938)

Blogger's Note:

 As I just scanned in the October 1938 issue of the Socialist Standard, which covered in some detail Neville Chamberlain and his actions in and around what is now known as the Munich Crisis, I thought I'd take the opportunity to also post on the blog the full text of the 1938 SPGB pamphlet, 'The Socialist Party exposes Mr Chamberlain and his Labour Critics'.

In its long history the SPGB has not made a habit of rushing out special pamphlets dealing with an 'issue of the day' — that is what the Socialist Standard is in place for  — but the Munich Crisis was self-evidently such a burning issue with the threat of possible impending war that the SPGB felt it was necessary to publish a standalone pamphlet which went into greater detail on the matter. It exposed the hard nosed political hypocrisy of Chamberlain's actions and the double-talk of both the Labour Party and the British Communist Party.

Such turbulent times called for special measures, and the SPGB were to publish another 'issue of the day' pamphlet the following year under the title of 'The Socialist and Conscription'. War was for the working class the issue of the day.

The Socialist Party exposes Mr Chamberlain and his Labour Critics (1938)

 

So the crisis is over. Representatives of the four major European Powers sat round the table and concluded arrangements that carve up Czechoslovakia, freeze Russia out of Europe, and, we are fervently assured, lay the basis of “peace in our time”. Lest there should be any doubt about this peaceful future, a great drive to develop armaments is proposed, and plans are being made to ensure that everybody will have a niche in defensive and offensive operations. The temporary popularity of Chamberlain, the general relief at the banishing of immediate war danger, and the united support worked up on behalf of the Czechs, are being utilised to push forward the increased armament campaign.

On September 30th hysterical crowds went wild with joy and hero-worship. War had been averted, and it was believed that Chamberlain was the man who accomplished that deed. His smiling face appeared on placards, in newspapers, and on the moving-picture screen. His wife shared in his fame, and crowds fought to shake her hand. For a while he was the most popular man in England. Yet the strange part of it is that Chamberlain’s fame is based on the circumstance that apparently his plans nearly went entirely wrong; raised the spectre of war, and eventually brought the Munich instead of the Godesberg Agreement. The British Government have been landed in a position in European affairs that was not expected by them. So far Hitler and not Chamberlain has gained most out of the diplomatic manoeuvres of months past.

What were the real facts of the situation? On what does Chamberlain’s claim to fame rest?

The immediate source of Chamberlain’s popularity is not hard to find. For a few days modern war, with its horrors, weighed like a black cloud on the minds of everybody. The subsequent relief on hearing the message of peace released an uncritical joy that deified the messenger.

What part has Chamberlain really played in this dangerous business?

For a long time the capitalist government of this country has been split into different camps over foreign policy. The reasons for this are too long to go into here. It is sufficient to say that they are partly economic differences and partly differences of view as to what best serves the general capitalist interest. One group favours “minding our own business” and leaving other nations to mind theirs; another group urges a better understanding with Russia and the resisting of the imperialist policies of Germany and Italy; a third group presses for a general pact between England, Germany, France and Italy, and the shutting out of Russia from any influence on European affairs.

The third policy is the one that has been urged by the Chamberlains and their supporters for some time past. It was given expression to by Chamberlain on the eve of the Munich meeting when, in his Parliamentary statement, he criticised the provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty.

Even while a member of the Baldwin Government, which had taken half-hearted measures to resist Italy’s policy in Abyssinia, Chamberlain made clear his disagreements on foreign policy. Sir Charles Petrie, an admirer of Chamberlain, describes the circumstances of the public statement in 1936 and, at the same time, made plain the nature of the support behind Chamberlain. He describes the incident as follows:

“Mr Chamberlain stepped into the breach. On the 10th June he was the guest of honour at the annual dinner of the 1900 Club, and he took the opportunity to declare against the continuance of Sanctions. The effect was tremendous. An audience which represented the wealth and power of Great Britain cheered the Chancellor to the echo” (The Chamberlain Tradition, page 249).

Since Chamberlain became head of the Government, foreign policy has changed its direction. The efforts of Government diplomacy have been turned towards finding a basis of agreement with Germany and Italy and the weaning of France away from its alliance with Russia.

The Munich conference of the four Powers appears to have been a long step towards accomplishing this object, though it occurred under dangerous circumstances, with the threat of war hanging over it. The fact that Czechoslovakian unity was sacrificed in the process was a small matter to the imperialist powers concerned.

The attitude of the Chamberlain group towards Italy’s Abyssinian venture and Germany’s march on Austria, gave Hitler a hint that further territorial conquests would not be seriously opposed providing these conquests did not interfere with British capitalist interests. When Chamberlain made his first trip to Hitler, on what was wrongly presumed to be an effort to save Czechoslovakian independence, he evidently went with the intention of being a party to the slicing up of that territory. His explanation in Parliament, on the eve of his last visit, makes this clear to those who examine the statement critically.

Taking into consideration the nature of Chamberlain’s foreign policy, as briefly outlined, the war situation out of which he “rescued” peace was largely of his own making.

While the Prime Minister was basking in the sunshine of mistaken adulation, one of his supporters pointed out that the real danger that menaces the interests of British capitalists is outside of Europe. On the morrow of the Munich pacts, while Germany was sending emissaries to Turkey and Yugoslavia, to widen its markets and its sources of raw materials, British politicians were heaving sighs of relief and turning to face “the danger again displayed by the Dominions and India, which has not passed unnoticed in Europe”.

The last remark is taken from an article in the Evening Standard (October 3rd) by Sir Arnold Wilson, who also makes the following significant statement:

“The Parliamentary Opposition parties are representing the redrawing of the map of Europe, now in progress, as a victory for Hitler, which it is, and a defeat for Britain, which it is not”.

This is another way of showing that Chamberlain went to Germany prepared to accede to the plans for dismembering Czechoslovakia. And why not? What does it matter to the British capitalist class whether the Czechs are independent or incorporated in Germany? The “National Honour” idea is a myth only invoked when it suits the interests of our rulers to beguile us with it. If Chamberlain, as is claimed, really set out to help Czechoslovakia, then “National Honour” went down on its knees before Hitler along with Chamberlain. Or, as the Daily Express (October 3rd) put it more genteelly:

“But this fact must be recognised by all: Britain accepted the Munich Agreement because our defences were not in a condition enabling us to take any other decision”.

This plea relating to the defences is being popularised as a means to obtain workers’ support for A. R. P. and similar defensive programmes—with all that these things will eventually mean.

One piece of information, relating to the crisis, that has now some significance was published in the News Review on July 14th, over two months before the crisis occurred:

“‘August, 1914’, is a date poignant with memories. What is it that makes Georges Bonnet, France’s Foreign Minister, so mysterious about August 1938?

To journalists who discussed the holiday question with him last week, Bonnet’s tendered the advice, ‘Certainly, take your holidays in August, but don’t leave Paris if you can help it’.

Though pressed for an explanation, he refused to say more than that ‘there will be a great deal to do,’ and that he himself would be at his desk throughout the month”.

What was in Bonnet’s mind? It could hardly have been war. Was in Godesberg?

The shameless diplomatic methods adopted have misled a number of people into believing that the whole business, including the threat of war, was a fake, deliberately contrived to secure acquiescence in the provisions of the Munich Agreement.

Two writers in the New Statesman (October 8th), J. M. Keynes and Robert Dell, make out a plausible case to show that it was a put-up job. That the crisis and the eleventh hour conference, with its solution, had been arranged beforehand. Although there are curious incidents that lend colour to this view, there are solid objections to it. The risk of war did ultimately enter into the game. Apart from other reasons it is too much to allow that a capitalist government would go into the huge expenses of war preparation, running into over £20 millions, either to lend substance to the shadow or for practice purposes.

The threat of war appeared in the scene because Chamberlain, in shaping his policy, apparently overlooked the fact that Hitler might not be inclined to bargain over territory that he felt strong enough to take if he wished to do so.

One purpose, among many, has been served by the crisis. It has been used as a means for enabling the British and French Governments to recognise officially the Italian conquest of Abyssinia without too much sanctimonious dust being raised about it. Now the way is open for British capitalists to invest freely in Abyssinia and to share with their Italian brothers the wealth squeezed from the Abyssinians.

In this time of stress where did the self-styled leaders of the working class, the Labour and Communist Parties, stand? The answer is easily given. They stood ready, if necessary, to man the guns and shoulder the burden of Empire in the mistaken idea that they were defending democracy against autocracy. Which shows how easy it is to divert movements that are anchored in the shifting sands of mere discontent. Such movements are easily directed into channels that serve the interests of the capitalists. The experience of decades has shown that when the cry “the country is in danger” is raised, the propertyless workers are urged by their leaders to flock to its defence, and to be ready to lay down their lives for a system that does not even guarantee to them the satisfaction of their elementary needs in food and shelter.

Over and over again the workers have been told by the Labour Party and the Communist Party that capitalism is on the down-grade, and that therefore they cannot hope for much improvement in wage conditions. Yet the country has been shown lately to be so wealthy that it could afford to throw away millions of pounds’ worth of goods in defensive measures, when it was believed that war threatened. Under a sensible social system workers would have bread instead of gas-masks.

Now that a great drive for armaments is proposed, the Labour and Communist Parties are logically bound to support it owing to their attitude during the war scare. This fact has been seized upon by all influential newspapers, which point out that the country is united in its desire to build up huge armaments.

Extracts from official sources show clearly the folly and the panic of those who claim to lead the workers.

On September 27th the Daily Herald published an article by the Editor, which contained the following statement:

“If there is war, it will be faced with calmness, with resolution, with unshakable courage. All that could be offered to Germany in honour and justice has been offered—far more than that, indeed . . . But if war there must be, since Herr Hitler is set on war, then it is better that it should be now, when Britain has strong allies beside her and to support her, the united opinion of the civilised world, than hereafter, when Germany, by successful aggression has won the mastership of Europe”.

Again, on September 30th, the Daily Herald spoke officially:

“In these last days two emotions have sustained the British people. One has been the desire for peace, if peace consistent with honour were possible. The other has been the determination to stand firm, if necessary to the ultimate degree—for the great principles of equity and justice in international affairs by which alone civilisation can flourish”.

International Information (September 12th), a typed sheet issued by the “Labour and Socialist International”, contained this statement:

“Whatever the risks involved, Great Britain must take its stand against aggression. There is now no room for doubt or hesitation”.

The above quotations are sufficient evidence of the Labour Party’s readiness to back the Government if war had been declared. The workers should also note also the insistence on “Honour”, “Justice” and “Equity”, all of which, it was contended, would be flouted if Czechoslovakia were split up. It is another example of the fatuity of the utterances of Labour when one remembers the official view of 18 years ago. In 1920 the Labour Party declared:

“Permission to the predominantly German areas of Czechoslovakia to determine their political future should be granted”—Quoted by the Evening Standard (September 16th).

If it were honourable, just and equitable for these areas to determine their political future in 1920, why has it become dishonourable, unjust and inequitable for them to do so now? Above all, why is it necessary that thousands of lives should be sacrificed now for something that was quite proper 18 years ago? The plain fact is that the Labour Party leaders do not know where they are.

The Communist Party is in a like position, and in addition responds blindly to the changing signals from Moscow. On October 3rd the Daily Worker published an article by the Editor. The following extracts from it are interesting as a logical interpretation of the Communist Party’s demand that Britain should stand firm in opposition to Hitler’s designs on Czechoslovakia.

“Had war broken loose on Saturday, as seemed almost certain up till Friday, the corpses of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children, would now be strewing the streets of Prague, Paris, Berlin, and even London”.

(. . .)

“That the ‘peace terms’ signed by Chamberlain are such that they strike a mortal blow at the interests and security of the British people”.

(. . .)

“The leaders of the British Labour Movement have to bear a great measure of responsibility for the sullying of British honour. For they who had the power to mobilise a tremendous public opinion, powerful enough to compel Chamberlain to have stood resolutely by France, Russia and Czechoslovakia, fell into the trap of assuming that Chamberlain was intent upon making a stand against Hitler, when actually he had no such intention”.

(. . .)

“There must be no further confidence in Chamberlain. Labour must stand firm in Parliament to-day and give a lead which will rally all the truly patriotic and progressive forces in Parliament against the shameful Munich betrayal”.

Two days later the Secretariat of the Communist Party repudiated the article. But they probably did so because it was too outspoken a statement of the logic of their position—that Britain and France should take a strong line against Hitler. That this would in all probability have led to war is shown by Russia’s war preparations and Litvinov’s explicit statement that Russia was prepared to join Britain and France in going to war in aid of Czechoslovakia if it were attacked.

It must be clear to anyone not blinded by prejudice that the Editor of the Daily Worker (who presumably was familiar with the attitude of the Party of which he was an official spokesman) based his article on Communist policy.

The Communist Party, like the Labour Party, has completely changed its attitude on Czechoslovakia. It has gone even further in its change of front. Consider its present insistence on Britain rallying to the support of Czechoslovakia and resisting the march of “reactionary Fascism”, and then examine the following quotation from The Struggle against War, and the Tasks of the Communists, a 6d pamphlet issued by the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1928:

“In the last imperialist war the Allies made use of the slogan ‘Fight against Prussian Militarism’, while the Central Powers used the slogan ‘Fight against Czarism’; both sides using the respective slogans to mobilise the masses for the war. In a future war between Italy and France, or Yugoslavia, the same purpose will be served by the slogan ‘Fight against reactionary Fascism’, for the bourgeoisie in the latter countries will take advantage of the anti-Fascist sentiments of the masses to justify an imperialist war” (page 14).

“In Czechoslovakia and in the Balkan countries, in Italy, in France, Spain, Belgium and Great Britain (Ireland) there are also oppressed nationalities. The Communist Parties must support the liberation movement of the oppressed nations and national minorities in all these countries, lead them in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and unreservedly champion their right to self-determination, which must include the right to complete separation” (page 31. Italics in the pamphlet).

It is doubtful if anyone but the Communist Party could make such a blatant and complete somersault in policy. Possibly the greatest joke of the whole tragic business, though it might have been a tragic one, is the spectacle of the Communist Party urging the British and French workers to be ready to lay down their lives in defence of democracy—and “bourgeois” democracy at that!

One thing at least can be said. Chamberlain’s actions were consistent, in line with his views on Czech dismemberment and his desire for unity with European Powers. But the attitude of the Labour and Communist Parties is a complete reversal of their former views. They held previously that Czechoslovakia should be allowed to be split up—in the name of “Justice” and “Liberty”. Now they want it to remain intact in the name of the same deities.

The reversal of policy by the latter two parties, just as much as the tricky diplomacy of the Chamberlain group, should be a warning to workers not to be misled by high-sounding phrases, but to look behind these phrases. Base their attitude on their class interest alone and they will not be led into the support of groups or parties that pursue a policy which obscures the fundamental antagonism of interest between worker and capitalist, of all races, colours and creeds.

The attitude of the Labour Party, the Communist Party, and others of like views, relating to the position of the Czechs, is due partly to fright, which has developed an acute attack of anti-Fascitus. They are prepared to see cities littered with the corpses of hundreds of thousands of working men, women and children, for what? To prevent what would be in the main merely a change of rulers.

While the workers of the world are prepared to put up with capitalism, and all that capitalism means, a change of rule is a minor question. Certainly not worth a war which would put back the movement for Socialism amongst both victors and vanquished. The present position of Germany, Austria and Italy is a striking illustration of this fact.

In conclusion, we must stress the fact that the only attitude for the workers to adopt, if they would free themselves from the horrors of both war and peace, is to organise together for the purpose of establishing a system of society in which the wealth of the world will be commonly owned by all the people of the world.

Nationalism and capitalism (2025)

From the October 2025 issue of the Socialist Standard

Pedants like to distinguish between ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’. The former signifies love for one´s country; the latter, while meaning that too, also means not being particularly tolerant of other countries (or cultures). In practice, though, ‘patriots’ can very easily become ‘nationalists’ even without knowing it. These are just two points along the same spectrum.

What that spectrum is based upon is an emotional attachment to the rather fuzzy concept of ‘national identity’. This is supposed to provide a kind of social glue that holds together large-scale, culturally diverse societies and allows them to function reasonably well.

National states

Benedict Anderson´s seminal work, Imagined Communities (1983), discusses the way ‘print capitalism’ and the growth of literacy aided the spread of national consciousness. Other factors, like improvements in transport and increased mobility, also helped to widen the social horizons of what were once relatively isolated communities that characterised a feudal society.

Before the rise of capitalism, nation-states did not really exist. Though there are strong grounds for saying that capitalism originated in England (specifically, in the English countryside, where the practice of wage labour became universalised), the first prominent individual to put nationalism on the map was, arguably, a Frenchman – Napoleon. Napoleon explicitly appealed to the idea of the nation as the basis of legitimate political power, where his predecessors had relied instead on such arcane notions as the ‘divine right of kings’ to govern.

However, we should not infer from this that nationalism is the indispensable precondition for a large-scale society to exist. Long before the nation-state existed, large multi-ethnic empires with extremely porous borders existed in the ancient world.

In Europe in 1500, there were approximately 500 more or less autonomous political units – an intricate patchwork ranging from Italian city states (many of which subsequently fell victim to conquest) to numerous principalities (often themselves the product of dynastic quarrels within aristocratic families) and a scattering of relatively consolidated kingdoms. Some of these were nominally part of one or other, much larger, ramshackle, sprawling entities, such as the Holy Roman Empire, which, as Voltaire once scornfully remarked, was ‘neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire’.

By 1900, however, the political landscape looked very different indeed. The number of self-governing units involved had been drastically whittled down to a mere twenty-odd nation-states having jurisdiction over the entire European landmass. Napoleon´s armies, which conquered much of Europe in the early nineteenth century, contributed to this development in the sense that they helped to create circumstances that eventually led to the rise of nationalist movements later on in that century.

Pseudo-traditions

Then there is the thorny question of nationalism and cultural diversity. Though it is claimed that nationalism enabled the emergence of large-scale culturally diverse societies, the fact of the matter is that cultural or ethnic differentiation has often presented a serious challenge to the nationalist project. If anything, the rise of nationalism has brought about the erosion of local cultures and languages and, in general, has had a flattening effect on the cultural landscape.

What is called the ‘national culture’ is not always what it seems. In The Invention of Tradition (1983), edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, the claim that certain national traditions or institutions have their origins in some mist-enveloped remote past (something that is supposed to invest a tradition with more authenticity) was critically scrutinised and found to be often false. Many of these traditions are pseudo-traditions only recently invented for the express purpose of trying to fashion a national identity – in more concrete terms to facilitate nationalist sentiment.

In short, the basic thrust of nationalist ideology tends towards cultural homogenisation. The more culturally homogenised a population is, the easier it is for the state to manipulate it and elicit its support. Standardisation also enables more effective bureaucratisation.

Taken to an extreme, this homogenising thrust can manifest itself in the form of genocide. As Ernest Gellner points out, where ethnic pluralism exists, ‘a territorial political unit can only become ethnically homogeneous… if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals’ (Nations and Nationalism, 2009).

However, one should note that this is only a tendency within nationalist ideology; in the real world, most nationalisms have had to opt for some kind of pragmatic or more inclusive compromise in the form of ‘multiculturalism’.

Globalisation

Factors curbing nationalism´s tendency towards cultural homogenisation within the confines of a given nation-state include not only the resilience of ethnic subcultures and the inward migration of ‘foreigners’, bringing with them their own cultural beliefs and practices, but also the impact of what might be called ‘global culture’:

Back in 1848, the Communist Manifesto had something to say about that:

‘In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature’.

Big business is, today, a major purveyor of this global culture. One thinks of the role of big tech companies in providing social media platforms or the impact of global chains like McDonald’s in shaping our culinary tastes. Wherever you go in the world, cities are getting more and more alike with the same monotonously predictable selection of High Street stores.

There is a certain irony in all this. Capitalism, which gave birth to the ideology of nationalism, has also unleashed powerful forces that tend towards the erosion of national distinctiveness.

Backlash

In some ways, this contradiction has brought us to the fraught times we are living in today. The unravelling of the Neoliberal project that has been the dominant paradigm since the 1970s has prompted a backlash against globalisation and the resurgence of virulent nationalism. Far-right movements are on the rise in many parts of the world. Their animus is mainly directed at that most emblematic aspect of globalisation – the movement of migrants across those imaginary borders that define the capitalist nation state.

Such migrations are often fuelled by wars and the devastation inflicted by military action undertaken by the very countries which now have some citizens bitterly complaining about the ensuing blowback in the form of desperately impoverished boat people arriving on their shores.

It’s not just war that is to blame; there is also the economic devastation wrought on people´s lives and livelihoods. For instance, the traditional Senegalese fishing industry has been virtually decimated by overfishing and the use of destructive methods, like bottom trawling, by industrial fleets from Europe and China. This has been a major factor in the increase in Senegalese migrants risking their lives to reach the Canary Islands in the hope of being relocated to mainland Spain.

Robin Cox

Lines on maps (2025)

Book Review from the August 2025 issue of the Socialist Standard

Borderlines: a History of Europe in 29 Borders. By Lewis Baston. Hodder Press £10.99.

This is a combination of history, contemporary politics and a travelogue. The author records his travels around parts of Europe, from Ireland to Finland and Romania, especially the border areas, reflecting on linguistic and cultural issues over the centuries. His account is supplemented by a number of photos and some helpful maps.

Prior to 1500 or so, there would have been no checkpoints at boundaries, and people could cross them as they pleased. Many borders nowadays are completely arbitrary, often going through the middle of fields and roads. There are over two hundred border crossings between Northern Ireland and the Republic, for instance. The Large Hadron Collider at Geneva in Switzerland is partly in France, and when it is operating a proton will cross the border 20,000 times a second. But perhaps the most extreme example is the town of Baarle, which is split between the Netherlands and Belgium: the border sometimes runs through the front doors of houses, and the Belgian part of the town consists of twenty-one enclaves surrounded by parts of the Netherlands. But at least the local fire brigade is cross-border, as ‘fires do not recognise international borders’.

The Sudetenland (the pretext for the Munich crisis of 1938) ‘did not exist before about 1930’. Kaliningrad (formerly called Königsberg) is in an exclave, a part of Russia enclosed by Poland and Lithuania; it was wanted by the Soviet Union as a year-round port on the Baltic. It was tightly controlled under Bolshevik rule, but now it is apparently ‘reclaiming its Prussian heritage’. The town of Chernivitsi is currently in Ukraine, but previously it was at various times in the USSR, Romania and Austria-Hungary.

People often talk about ‘historic boundaries’, as if they automatically have some legitimacy or justification. But borders change so often and so much over the years that they just reflect a particular moment or the balance of power at some period. In the case of Poland, for instance, borders have been altered many times, with partitions, annexations and people being forcibly relocated. After 1945, the German population of around eight million on the Polish side of the Oder–Neisse line was expelled, mostly to West Germany. This was ‘radical ethnic cleansing’, largely because Stalin saw this as a suitable border.

Borders are often a convenient place for smuggling, and also for taking advantage of differences in prices. Several million Russians cross into Finland each year to buy white goods of supposedly superior quality. But more often borders are heavily-policed places of suspicion, where mixed communities suffer and are oppressed. This book gives a vivid account of what borders, boundaries and frontiers can do to humans.

Paul Bennett

The Schuman Plan and the International Control of Basic Industries (1950)

From the July 1950 issue of the Socialist Standard

The French government has announced that six European countries would go ahead with negotiations on the Schuman plan to pool coal and steel resources—without Britain.

The British Government wanted a preliminary conference of Ministers on procedure. France turned this down.

The daily press in the last few months have given the Schuman plan a great deal of publicity. The British government has been reluctant to commit itself, and by requesting that discussions be held in order to clarify the practical application of the French proposals, hoped to avoid friction with the French government without having to either commit itself or give a complete rejection of the plan.

The chief point of the Schuman plan is the scheme to pool the coal and steel resources of western Europe.

The British Labour Party in April, 1950, published a pamphlet on behalf of the so-called International Socialist Conference which met at Witten, Ruhr, Germany, in March, 1950. The pamphlet, an individual work by W. Fienburgh, is entitled “International Control of Basic Industries.”

On page 2 he states under the heading “ The present position in the basic industries” the following:—

“Europe is nearing the end of a period during which, as far as the basic raw materials are concerned, demand has outstripped supply." On the same page he states “ . . . there is ample evidence that the main producing nations are expanding towards export targets which, in sum, exceed the import programmes of the importing nations of Western Europe and may exceed also the effective demand anticipated from the rest of the world. This raises the possibility of a restriction of expansion and production accompanied by a price war in European and world markets.”

He goes on “. . . To avoid these consequences it is essential, before the event is upon us, to make some approach to inter-European organisation in the basic industries.”

After stating that today, supply and demand in coal and steel at least are almost in balance, and talking about the possibility of a restriction of expansion and production he states on page 3, under the heading “The Aims of International Control,”—“International control should be designed to ensure that the basic industries were expanding fast enough and efficiently enough to meet the maximum demand for the product in the whole area, plus whatever export volume is needed to meet the over-all Western European balance of payments problem. Assessment of demand should be based upon the maintenance of full employment.”

If the supply has caught up or nearly caught up with the demand on the market, why all the plans for International control to ensure that the basic industries were expanding fast enough? One of the ideas as explained later in the pamphlet is “To gain the advantages of Rationalisation,” that is the most economical use of resources leading to greater over-all efficiency and lower costs.

This is the real reason of the plan. Talk of ensuring that the basic industries are expanding fast enough is put in to make the scheme attractive to workers seeking employment or who are fearing losing their jobs. For on page 4 he writes: —

“International control should ensure that basic industries do not expand production faster than the ability of the rest of the industry to consume the product.”

Like most members of the Labour Party he believes that by state control the government can run the economic life of the country according to plan.

Despite their failures they still draft new plans as fast as the old ones prove their bankruptcy. W. Fienburgh puts the cart before the horse when he states “The full employment economy is expansionist. The unemployment economy is restrictive.”

In actual fact the expansionist economy tends to lead to full employment, but when after a war the shortages are made up by the expansionist economy, capitalism reverts to the restrictive economy which leads to large scale unemployment.

The conclusions given by W. Fienburgh at the end of the first half of the pamphlet are interesting. Firstly he states:—

“It should be firmly noted that we cannot hope, through international control of basic industries, to impose socialism on countries which have not accepted it at the moment.” The fact that Socialism cannot be imposed on countries which have not accepted it is correct. However when a member of the Labour Party speaks of socialism he means state capitalism. Secondly he states ”. . . that each country should run its economy with the objective of maintaining full employment . . .”

It should be apparent that the economy of the country is not run with the objective of maintaining full employment, but is run with the idea of making a profit for the members of the capitalist class.

The competitive nature of the capitalist system, the economic rivalry between the national states for raw materials and markets for the commodities they produce, foredoom all the plans for international control of the basic industries to failure.

To sum up the scheme by an understatement, we quote the final sentence on page 8 of the pamphlet. “On balance the prospects of immediate internationalisation seem dim.”

D.L.

50 Years Ago: The Common Market: in or out – does it matter? (2025)

The 50 Years Ago column from the May 2025 issue of the Socialist Standard

For the first time in British History—a referendum. A device often used in other countries; Norway voted in such a manner to keep out. This vote, largely favoured by the anti-marketeers in the Labour Party, will resolve the decision for the Government. Mr. Wilson, when recommending the terms said “This is one of the most important parliamentary occasions in our history”. Not so. The British people are only being asked to endorse the continuation of capitalism, in or out, and they do this at every General Election. As yet, they continue to give this endorsement.

To remain in or get out has produced a weird assortment of protagonists. IN – Mr. Wilson and some members of his cabinet ally themselves with Mr. Heath, Maudling, the Liberal Party, the Confederation of British Industry, the Farmers’ Union and generally speaking ‘big business’. OUT – this includes an even weirder assortment. The Communist Party, Enoch Powell, Benn, Foot, Shore, the National Front and the TUC. (…)

How you will vote is your concern. We tell them to stuff their referendum. The real issue that the workers should tackle is Common Market or Common Ownership.

We and our sympathisers will vote. We shall register on our papers our commitment for Socialism. The question you are being asked to answer – In or Out – is of no concern to members of the working class. Whatever the outcome of the vote, Capitalism will continue. And continue it will until you and a majority like you take the revolutionary step of deciding to abolish capitalism in all its forms and to bring into being a new society. (…)

Away with all the trappings of capitalism – tariffs, customs duties, monetary union, competition, buying, selling etc. Vote for nothing but Common Ownership.

(From 'The Common Market: In or out — does it matter?' by Cyril May,  Socialist Standard, May 1975)

Caught in the Middle (2024)

Book Review from the January 2024 issue of the Socialist Standard

Goodbye Eastern Europe. An Intimate History of a Divided Land. By Jacob Mikanowski. Oneworld. 2023. 375pp.

Jacob Mikanowski’s book tells of how over many centuries, in what we still commonly call Eastern Europe, people and territories mixed, split and merged and empires came and went. Goodbye Eastern Europe is remarkable both for the eloquence and flair with which it is written and for the immensely broad and detailed knowledge it displays of the complex history of so many peoples and so many lands, into which the author also poignantly interweaves the story of his own Polish family. In a wide-ranging and dramatic but dispassionate narrative of shifting frontiers, multi-layered identities and changing nationalities, we view both worlds that have vanished and new cultures and systems of governments that have arisen, from medieval times right up to the present day, with even a perspective on the current war in Ukraine.

In comparing Eastern to Western Europe the author points to major developmental differences. In the West, he writes, ‘rulers worked hard to homogenize their states’, ‘the equation between ethnic and linguistic belonging began very early’, and ‘the machinery of the state worked like a giant steamroller, ironing out differences wherever they could be found’. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, empires were much more pragmatic, tending to accept and indeed ‘accentuate difference rather than suppress it’. So, for example, Christians of all persuasions and Jews were allowed to manage their own affairs by the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs. A Hungarian king, we are told, ‘lectured his son about the usefulness of immigrants’ on the grounds that ‘a kingdom of one language and one custom is weak and fragile’ and newcomers should be treated ‘with goodwill and honor’, in order that ‘they will prefer to live with you rather than inhabit any other place’. So Eastern Europe became a land of diversity and difference and remained largely so until the wars of the last two centuries tore the old empires apart (the Ottoman Empire, for example, ‘was crumbling like a mouthful of rotten teeth’), and made it begin to take on the homogenized, nationalistic model of the Western nation state. At the end of the First World War, in particular, with these new political formations taking shape, the map of Eastern Europe ‘resembled a sky full of shifting clouds’, as national mythologies (that ‘nemesis of the working class’, as someone has put it) developed.

Part 3, the last main section of this book, deals with how these clouds shifted and eventually came to rest, via a series of illuminating chapters entitled, respectively, ‘Moderns’, ‘Prophets’, ‘War’, ‘Stalinism’, ‘Socialism’ and ‘Thaw’, and ranging over the whole stretch of what could be called Eastern Europe from Poland and the Baltic states in the north to Bulgaria and Albania in the south. The chapter on war – World War 2 – though magisterially and dispassionately told, is hard to read for its unflinching account of the near extermination of the Jewish people in the Holocaust. Then, in the chapter on Stalinism in particular, while not dwelling on the horrors of the Soviet pre-war period when millions of Stalin’s supposed ‘enemies’ were starved, deported or eliminated, the author presents a stark view of the expansion of the Soviet dictatorship from 1939 onwards, as it initially took in eastern Poland and the Baltic states and then, after the end of the Second World War, completed the process of domination, in which ‘every country in the region was a one-party state, dominated by a local version of the Communist Party’, with leaders approved by Stalin who ‘dictated their foreign policies and determined their relationships with the rest of the world’. This was, as the author so eloquently puts it, the ‘dreamworld of High Stalinism’, a revolution ‘imposed not from below but from above, and not from within but from without’. It was, furthermore, he tells us, not just a model of political oppression but also failed to provide anything resembling decent living standards to its working masses and any claim to be establishing socialism was ‘shameless puffery’.

A contradictory and misleading thing, unfortunately, is that, having said this, the title he gives to the chapter that comes next, referring to the Khruschev-Brezhnev era that followed Stalinism, is ‘Socialism’. Misleading both because the reality of this era bore no relation to the classless, stateless, moneyless society of free access that proper socialism is and also because the author himself then goes on to portray that reality as very much the same as before but in a milder version. He characterises it thus: ‘Stalinism eliminated its enemies. The socialist regimes that followed neutralized them instead’. Whatever the case, it carried on being, as he puts it, ‘a realm of deceit, of empty slogans and meaningless exhortations’ as well as ‘status and scarcity’, where queues were one of’ ‘the defining experiences of life’.

It could not last and, from 1989 onwards, what the author – again misleadingly – calls ‘real socialism’ began to break up, both in the satellite states and the Soviet Union itself, leading to what he refers to as ‘thaw’. He sees this shift as a process of moving from socialism to capitalism, whereas in reality capitalism already existed in the East. It was not the private or ‘mixed economy’ capitalism of the West but capitalism nonetheless, state capitalism, a system with all the characteristic features of that system – money and wages, buying and selling, an elite class controlling (if not formally owning) the means of production and living off the benefits of this. Something that is still largely the case in countries such as China and Cuba.

The following overview in the book’s epilogue provides a fitting epitaph: ‘For Eastern Europe, the twentieth century was a century of barely interrupted cataclysms. The old ties that bound people together dissolved, only to be replaced with murderous aggression. As rival armies flooded into the region from east and west, neighbour killed neighbour. When the wars ended, mass expulsions and population transfers unravelled what was left of the old Eastern European tapestry’.

Howard Moss

Will Belgium survive? (2008)

From the September 2008 issue of the Socialist Standard

No permanent government has emerged from the elections held in June last year. Does this matter to the working class there?

Belgium is a patently artificial state inhabited by people speaking two different languages. It survived for many years with one of them (French) as the dominant language because it was the language of the ruling class. Now that this has ceased to be the case, and Dutch (Flemish) has also become a language of a part of the capitalist class as well as of the state, Belgium is beginning to show signs of coming apart at the seams. Revision of the constitution — How much autonomy should the regions be given? Should or should not Belgium become a federal state? How far out should the limits of Brussels (basically a French-speaking city surrounded by Dutch-speaking communes) go? — has become an issue preventing other issues being dealt with.

Belgium is a state which the then Great Powers allowed to be set up in 1830. Before that the territory that is now Belgium had formed part, first, of the territories of the King of Spain, then of those of the Emperor of Austria. After the French Revolution Belgium became, in 1792, part of France and remained so until after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. While part of France the Napoleonic code of law, which swept away feudal remnants, was introduced and manufacturing industry began to develop in the South. This, together with strategic considerations, was one of the main reasons why in 1815 Belgium was detached from France: not only were the frontiers of France to be moved further back from the Rhine, but France was also to be deprived of a nascent industrial base. Belgium became part of a kind of Belgian-Dutch federation under King William of Holland.

In 1830, in what Belgian history books refer to as a “national revolution”, the wealthy classes of Belgium broke away from those of Holland and set up an independent State. Though Holland protested, the Great Powers let this change happen as it still left the territory of Belgium detached from France.

The circumstances which led to the establishment of Belgium are worth recalling in that they have shaped the Belgian political scene to this day. Holland was essentially a trading and agricultural country and as such its ruling groups tended to favour free trade. The nascent industrial capitalist class in the south of Belgium, however, wanted tariff walls as a protection against British competition. The Dutch government did make some moves to accommodate them but not enough. In the end the Belgian capitalists decided to break away. This was not too difficult in view of the loose, almost federal character of the Belgian-Dutch State; in addition, the population of Belgium was greater than that of Holland. But the nascent Belgian capitalist class in the South needed support in the Dutch-speaking Northern part of the territory. This they managed to do, despite being French-speaking and anti-clerical in the tradition of the French Revolution, by an opportunist alliance with the Catholic Church over the schools issue. The Dutch government wanted to introduce a system of universal state education. The Catholic Church, (the majority religion in Belgium, unlike Holland which was a Protestant State), vehemently opposed this, insisting on its exclusive right to “educate” Catholic children.

The capitalists got their state. The Belgian constitution of 1831 was a model of bourgeois-liberal government. Power was in the hands of a parliament elected only by wealthy property-owners; the king (a minor German princeling imported specially to fill the post) was a mere figurehead. Their language, French, became the official language of the new State, despite the fact that a majority of people in its territory spoke Dutch.

But there was a price to pay: the power of the Catholic Church, and its control of its own schools, had to be respected. From a short-term point of view, the lack of a modern education system had certain advantages for the Belgian capitalists: they were able to extract very long hours of work for very low rates of pay, to such an extent that Marx once described Belgium as “a capitalists’ paradise”.

The industrialisation of Belgium, apart from Antwerp and Ghent in the Dutch-speaking North, almost exclusively in Wallonia, the French-speaking Southern part, brought into existence an industrial working class and, inevitably, working class attempts at political and industrial organisation. A Belgian Labour Party (Parti Ouvrier Belge) was set up in 1885, along the same lines as was later the British Labour Party except that the co-operatives rather than the trade unions provided the bulk of the members and funds. A deliberate decision was taken not to call it the “Belgian Socialist Party” on the grounds that the word “socialist” was unacceptable to many workers. With a start like this, the POB was destined for a pitiful career of gradualism and reformism. The POB was never really even a social-democratic party in the sense that the German SPD was; it never accepted Marxism as its ideology; in fact it had a contempt for theory altogether, concentrating on trying to get piecemeal social reforms for the working class; it was in short a simple “Labour” party.

In its early years the POB was at least militant on one issue of importance to the working class: the right to vote. The general strike of l893, which forced the Belgian parliament to extend a vote to adult males, was a magnificent episode in the history of the Belgian working class. The strike did not achieve “one man, one vote”, since the rich and educated were given more than one vote, but it did force the members of the Belgian parliament, in which there was not a single POB representative, to do what most of them were opposed to: grant a vote to adult (male) workers. Later strikes to try to get plural voting abolished were less successful, but by then the POB had its own members of parliament and had begun to get involved in parliamentary manoeuvres with its new-found allies, the radical bourgeois Liberals.

In fact the Belgian Labourites tended to be, at this time the tail-end or left-wing of the Liberal party. After more than twenty years of Catholic party rule, the Belgian Liberals were feeling left out in the cold, but they realised they were unlikely to get power again without support from the POB. Accordingly, in preparation for the 1910 election they launched a great anti-clerical campaign and attempted to get the leaders of the POB involved. This was easy, as the POB leaders were anticlerical themselves (and indeed many were freemasons). It is quite clear that had the occasion arose (which it didn’t, because the Catholic party won the election) the POB would have supported a Liberal administration and would probably have gone so far as to have formed an anti-clerical coalition with them. This no doubt would have caused a stir in the Second International, to which the POB was affiliated along with other Labour and Social-Democratic parties. After the First World War, of course, all the Social-Democratic parties were prepared to take power within capitalism and accept responsibility for running it, but it is a measure of the depth of the reformism of the POB that they would have been prepared to do this in 1910 when their fellow reformists still had some doubts.

The Belgian Liberals were, by and large, French-speaking and anti-clerical. As in practice their leftwing, the POB shared these characteristics, with unfortunate results for the development of the Belgian trade union movement, which took place mainly after the founding of the POB and partly under its auspices. As the industrial centre of Belgium was in the French-speaking South it was natural that the trade union movement should be strongest there, but it was by no means inevitable that this movement should have been dominated by an anti-clerical political party, thus cutting itself off from workers of catholic origin.

It would be wrong to put the entire blame on the POB for the present split in the Belgian trade union movement into two main groups, each with about a million members: the Labourite Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique and the self-explanatory Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (which is in fact the larger). The Catholic Church shares an equal blame; they combatted the POB before the first world war by organising rival co-operatives, sick clubs — and trade unions. Their trade unions didn’t have much success before the first world war, but grew rapidly between the wars as industrialization spread to the Northern part of Belgium. Employers preferred to deal with the less militant Catholic unions than with the “socialist” unions and their talk of the class struggle. But the Catholic unions also took up a very real grievance which the Labourite unions tended to neglect: the position of the Dutch language, spoken by workers in the North of Belgium.

French was the official language of Belgium after 1830. It was the language of the State and, even in the Dutch-speaking area, the language of the bourgeoisie. Thus in Northern Belgium a Dutch-speaking working class faced a French-speaking capitalist class. The Labourite unions, perhaps for the very good reason of not wishing to split the working class on linguistic lines, did not chose to exploit this situation, but it was taken up to some extent by the Catholic unions.

Today there is virtually no difference except in ideology — the FGTB is, on paper, committed to “the disappearance of the wages system”, while the CSC denounces the class struggle— between the two rival trade union groups. In practice both act as pure-and-simple, bread-and-butter unions negotiating over wages and conditions of work; on the political field their leaders are reformists, being supporters either of the Belgian Socialist Party (as, unfortunately for us genuine socialists, the POB has been called since 1945) or of the catholic political party.

The other great division in the Belgian working class besides the catholic/anti-clerical one is of course language. As stated, despite being the minority language, French was made the official language of the Belgian State set up in 1830. Dutch in fact has only been given completely equal status with French since 1932. Since the last world war the centre of economic gravity in Belgium has tended to shift from Wallonia, the French-speaking South, to Flanders, the Dutch-speaking North, and the numerical superiority of Dutch-speakers has began to make itself felt on the political scene.

The man who must share a great responsibility for side-tracking the French-speaking part of the Belgian working class on the language issue was a militant trade union leader in the Liège engineering industry, André Renard, who died in 1962 and who is still something of a myth for many militant trade unionists in Belgium, Towards the end of the grande grève, the general strike of 1960-1 over the government’s attempt to cut workers’ living standards, Renard suddenly introduced the quite unrelated political issue of “federalism”. Claiming that the workers in the French-speaking south, where the strike was virtually solid, had been betrayed by the Dutch-speakers in the North (where the Catholic unions, following a lead given by Cardinal Van Roey in his Christmas message, urged their members to stay at work), Renard argued that if Wallonia had the power to pass its own laws on economic matters it would be able to carry out various “anti-capitalist structural reforms”. He called for Belgium to be converted into a loose federation which would give Wallonia this power, virtually a demand for independence of course. This demand, and the reformist strategy behind it was supported by both the so-called Communist Party (which, under proportional representation, had a handful of members of parliament) and the Trotskyists (including, conspicuously, their international leader, Ernest Mandel, who was from Belgium).

The effect of this appeal was to heighten language-consciousness amongst French-speakers. In the years that followed French-speaking federalist groups increased their representation in parliament. So, on the other side, did the Dutch-speaking federalists, organised in a series far right parties. Today, it is the Flemish federalists and separatists who have been making the running, reflecting the fact that Flemish capitalists don’t want to continue to pay for the state benefits received by workers in Wallonia where heavy industry (coal, steel, engineering) has been considerably run down since Renard’s day.

That the working class in Belgium should be divided on linguistic lines is, from a socialist point of view a matter for regret, but it also confirms the correctness of our opposition to ”leftwing” groups in that they should be partly responsible for it.

Whether Belgium will eventually split up, or at least become a federal State of some sort, remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: this constitutional issue is of no consequence whatsoever for the working class of the area. Whatever the constitution it will be that of a capitalist State and the working class will remain propertyless sellers of labour-power to the minority who own and control the means of production.

Adam Buick

The Irish 'No' (2008)

From the September 2008 issue of the Socialist Standard

A socialist in Ireland looks at the vote there to reject the EU’s proposed Treaty of Lisbon.

On the 12th of June, voters in the Republic of Ireland rejected a constitutional proposal to ratify the Lisbon Treaty. The rejection has caused ripples across Europe and provoked a lively and continuing discussion in the letters pages of the newspapers and in radio phone-in programmes. It is a quintessential example of what passes for ‘politics’ under capitalism with heated debate amongst the protagonists and yet the result is as irrelevant to most people as the composition of government here after the next election. Closer inspection of the campaign and its aftermath reveals all the pointlessness, chicanery and opportunism of mainstream politics.

The European Union (although that wasn’t its name at the time) was founded by six, reasonably like-minded European countries by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The aim then (and still now) was to make capitalism more efficient throughout the continent by organising it on a pan-European scale. The basic tenets of permitting the free movement of capital, goods and ‘labour’ (people in the real world) between member states had the intention of giving capitalists the opportunity to conduct their business in the most profitable location at any moment in time. Over the last 50 years the Union has grown so that it now has nearly 30 member countries ranging from the Mediterranean, to the Nordic states and includes most of the pre-1990 Eastern bloc. In fact most countries in Europe are now either members, candidate members, associate members or at a minimum aspirational members. Like any organisation, as it has evolved over time, its governing rules require continual amendments and the Lisbon Treaty is the latest such initiative. The main thrust of all these successive amendments has been to put flesh on and develop the principle of free movement and free trade within Europe.

The problem for the EU is that there is no longer unanimity amongst what may be termed the European capitalist class as to how the Union should develop and what are the appropriate rules for possibly completing structures for it. The Irish referendum debate and result is a manifestation of this and illustration of how the governing ideas in society are those of the capitalist elite. One section of the capitalist class, controlling large multi-national enterprises that are involved in international manufacture and tradable services are extremely concerned about global competition from the USA, China, India, South America etc. They want to see more integration of capitalism within Europe by the dismantling of any remaining national barriers in order to strengthen their position with respect to these external competitors. Some of this programme would involve having a uniform tax base throughout Europe and a ‘Services Directive’ whereby capitalists in any country in the Union would have open access to markets in all the other countries and not be hindered by any local labour or other regulations. Broadly this section of the capitalist class has the approval of the Brussels Commission, the ruling administration of the EU. Furthermore as part of this programme, they are prepared to accept a stronger social element to the EU in terms of certain aspects of workers rights to in effect partly compensate workers for the increased competitive environment in which they will have to sell their labour. This political philosophy usually goes by the name of Christian or Social Democracy where capitalist engage with the organised labour movement taking a long term view of the benefits to profits that stem from stability and social cohesion. As against that there is another rival section to the capitalist class. These generally operate smaller businesses acting in predominately national markets or trading almost exclusively with individual countries outside Europe such as the USA. They see no real need or advantage to be gained from deeper collaboration and are at a minimum, suspicious or completely opposed to these developments. To them other capitalists within Europe are as much a threat as those outside the EU. They also tend to be more resistant to the social aspects of Europe viewing it as a cost that confers no particular advantage to them.

Within Ireland, this uncertainty or confusion in the ruling circles of Europe also manifested itself. On the Yes or pro-treaty side was an uneasy and in parts unlikely alliance consisting of most of the important political parties, the employers’ umbrella organisation IBEC, the corresponding labour organisation, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and important sectional groups such as the Farmers organisations. The political parties, although they spend huge time and effort in ritualistic attacks on each other, basically share the same Christian Democratic ethos which fits in with the EU philosophy and explains their support for the Treaty. Given the predominance of multi-national companies in Ireland’s industrial portfolio (who located here specifically to take advantage of membership of the EU), it was no surprise that IBEC also solicited a yes vote. The unions’ governing body, the ICTU was won over by the social concessions in the Treaty and a desire to be in line with the mainstream labour movement on the continent.

The anti-Treaty side was even more motley in terms of its make-up and consisted of two entirely disparate streams (one from the Right and one from the Left) each in turn containing a myriad of sub-organisations. From the right of the political spectrum were prominent businessmen such as Ben Dunne (retail), Ulick McEvaddy (airlines) and most prominently Declan Ganley (communications). Joining them were a variety of free-market commentators, staunch and unchanging Europhobes and some reactionary populists. The main plank of their opposition to the Lisbon Treaty could be summarised by the lessening of Ireland’s influence within Europe due to the proposed loss of automatic national Commissioners and less ability for Ireland to set independent tax and national macro-economic policies. This Rightist element of the No campaign also included a curious assortment of very traditional and conservative nationalists and extreme Catholics worried about threats to Ireland’s sovereignty and ability to set independent (i.e. Catholic) social policies. The Left side of opposition to Lisbon also had a multitude of identifiable sub-groups each with its own grievance. Although the Green Party is part of the government, a dissident wing of the Green Party opposed the centralising tendencies inherent in the Treaty. Sinn Fein claimed to be concerned about the effect on the position of Irish workers of unrestricted access to the Irish market by foreign capitalists and also were unhappy with the increasing role of a potential European army and its effect on Ireland’s traditional neutrality. The Greens and Sinn Fein were joined in their opposition by a large number of small groups of Leftist, Trotskyite, Anarchist, ‘Anti-War’ and some bizarre single-issue protest organisations (Rural Hospitals, Palestinian Solidarity, etc.).

Most of the debate was ridiculous. The Yes side warned of economic meltdown if the Treaty was rejected when everyone knew an economic recession was already underway caused by factors nothing to do with the issue. Sinn Fein (an organisation responsible for over half of all deaths in the 30-year Troubles through its former armed wing, the IRA) claimed to be worried about growing ‘militarism’ within Europe. The Left groups opposed the Treaty on the longstanding and remarkably persistent misapprehension that capitalism organised on an international basis is something reprehensible while if the same society exists on a national basis, then that is something tolerable. This presumably stems from their aspiration that national capitalism can be more easily converted into state capitalism than if it has an international character. In fact some of the claims, mostly by the No side, made about the EU were so conspiratorial that they had the air of a UFO crank convention.

In any event, the Treaty was rejected by 53 percent to 46 percent on a relatively healthy turnout of over 50 percent. While both elements of the No campaign claimed credit for the result, the real winner out of the debate is the mysterious Mr. Declan Ganley who in the space of a few short weeks went from being an unknown figure to being the perceived architect of the Irish rejection. He is a self-made millionaire who made his money through his close contacts with senior members of the American Bush administration which yielded a number of lucrative defence contracts with the US military authorities. Prior to that he had advised a number of former Communist countries in Eastern Europe on the implementation of ‘privatisation’ of state assets and interests. He set up the campaigning organisation, Libertas which provided the bulk of the resources of the No side in terms of flyers, posters, billboard and newspaper advertising. The generous funding of this body is mysterious and under electoral rules does not have to be disclosed until next year. Also because it is not a political party, the level of disclosure about its donors is less stringent than it would be otherwise. There are rumours (denied by Libertas) that the organisation is financially supported by right wing elements in the Republican Party in America who see a growing and more integrated EU as a future threat in the same way as they now view China. He is now the toast of Euro-sceptics throughout Europe (at least those of a rightist persuasion) and has become a leading standard bearer of trans-European opposition to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. He has been glowingly endorsed by the British euro-sceptics, UKIP and the Tory right.

It is clear that Libertas outspent all the other bodies involved in the campaign. They were helped in this by a court ruling, a decade ago in connection with another referendum which made it illegal for the Government to spend public money on advocating a Yes vote. At the time this ruling was viewed as a progressive measure (levelling the playing field in referenda campaigns) but all it has led to is the American situation where private money now dictates the campaigns and success usually goes to the best funded groups and not those with the best arguments or greater support. The practical effect of the ruling is that the Government parties had to spend their own party money and resources to encourage a yes vote. This led to a very token campaign on their behalf as the party loyalists were hardly going to be enthusiastic about selling a 260-page technical document to the electorate. Although the main opposition parties (Fine Gael and Labour) were nominally supportive they clearly decided against spending money to obtain a result that the government would ultimately claim as a victory for itself. There is nothing unusual about that; most political parties only spend real money on getting their own members elected in sufficient numbers to give them access to power where the prospects of enrichment and rewards are tangible. Spending money to change peoples’ minds for its own sake is not a priority. All in all this has left the Irish government with a headache they could have done without. They are under pressure from the leading integrationist countries such as France and Germany to resolve it before other countries with a history of cold feet about European federalism such as Britain, Denmark and the Czech Republic join the No bandwagon. At the same time they are hemmed in by the justifiable taunts of ignoring the peoples’ sovereign will if they ignore or try to legally finesse the outcome of the vote.

What the future holds for this issue, time will tell. Inevitably it will be resolved by some compromise and the System will continue. In five, ten or twenty years time, people will look back and marvel at the heat and dust that it has raised and maybe wonder whatever became of Declan Ganley. For Socialists such tinkerings with the system are of no real concern. Given that the Treaty itself is mainly technical in nature and independent studies show it will not make a huge change to the day-to-day operation of the EU, whether it is ratified or not will not significantly impact on our lives. Only when the over 90 percent of the world’s people, who make a meaningful contribution to life on earth, realize that their interests need a new outlet, can politics become real and meaningful.

Kevin Cronin